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8.3 Guarded Fabric & Shielded Virtual Machines

Administering Windows Server Hybrid Core Infrastructure AZ-800

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1 Introduction & Exam Overview

About Exam AZ-800: Format, Scoring & the September 2026 Retirement

2 Chapter 1: Active Directory Domain Services Architecture & Deployment

1.1 Deploying & Managing Domain Controllers On-Premises 1.2 Domain Controllers in Azure IaaS & Virtualized DC Cloning 1.3 Read-Only Domain Controllers (RODCs) & Password Replication Policies 1.4 Flexible Single Master Operation (FSMO) Roles & Troubleshooting 1.5 Active Directory Sites, Subnets & Site Link Topology 1.6 AD DS Replication: Topology Generation, Convergence & Diagnostics 1.7 Forest and Domain Trust Relationships

3 Chapter 2: AD DS Security Principals, Service Accounts & Domain Join

2.1 Managing Users, Groups & Objects in Multi-Domain and Multi-Forest Environments 2.2 Service Account Types & Group Managed Service Accounts (gMSA) 2.3 Joining Windows Server to AD DS, Microsoft Entra Domain Services & Microsoft Entra ID 2.4 Creating & Managing Users, Groups and Organizational Units at Scale

4 Chapter 3: Hybrid Identity & Microsoft Entra Integration

3.1 Microsoft Entra Connect Sync Architecture, Installation & Filtering 3.2 SourceAnchor, Synchronization Rules & Microsoft Entra Connect Health 3.3 Microsoft Entra Cloud Sync & Disconnected Multi-Forest Topologies 3.4 Hybrid Authentication Methods & Staged Rollout 3.5 Microsoft Entra Domain Services 3.6 Integrating Microsoft Entra ID, AD DS & Entra Domain Services: Choosing an Architecture

5 Chapter 4: Group Policy in AD DS and Hybrid Environments

4.1 Group Policy Architecture & Processing Order (LSDOU) 4.2 Group Policy Filtering, Loopback Processing & Client-Side Extensions 4.3 Group Policy Preferences, Item-Level Targeting & Central Store 4.4 Group Policy in Microsoft Entra Domain Services & Fine-Grained Password Policies

6 Chapter 5: Remote Server Management in Hybrid Environments

5.1 Windows Admin Center (WAC) Deployment On-Premises and in Azure 5.2 PowerShell Remoting, WinRM & the Kerberos Double-Hop Problem 5.3 Just Enough Administration (JEA) for Constrained PowerShell Endpoints 5.4 OpenSSH on Windows Server & PowerShell Remoting over SSH 5.5 Secure RDP Access, Remote Desktop Gateway & Azure Bastion

7 Chapter 6: Hybrid Management with Azure Arc and Azure Services

6.1 Azure Arc-Enabled Servers Architecture & Onboarding 6.2 Azure Machine Configuration & VM Extensions on Arc Servers 6.3 Azure Update Manager: Assessment, Maintenance Configurations & Dynamic Scoping 6.4 Azure Automation for Hybrid Workloads: Runbooks & Hybrid Runbook Workers

8 Chapter 7: Hyper-V Virtualization & Virtual Machine Configuration

7.1 Hyper-V Type 1 Architecture, Installation & Hardware Prerequisites 7.2 VM Generations, Secure Boot, vTPM, Enhanced Session Mode & Direct VM Access 7.3 Compute, Dynamic Memory & Hardware Acceleration 7.4 VM Resource Controls, CPU Groups & Host Compute Partitioning 7.5 Hyper-V Virtual Hard Disks & Checkpoint Management 7.6 Hyper-V Virtual Switches, NIC Teaming & Switch Embedded Teaming (SET) 7.7 Integration Services, Guest Components & Time Synchronization

9 Chapter 8: Hyper-V High Availability, Security & Containers

8.1 Hyper-V Failover Clustering & Cluster Shared Volumes (CSV) 8.2 Hyper-V Replica & Azure Site Recovery (ASR) 8.3 Guarded Fabric & Shielded Virtual Machines 8.4 Windows Server Container Hosts, Isolation Models & Images 8.5 Managing Container Instances & Linux Containers with WSL 8.6 Windows Container Networking & AKS Enabled by Azure Arc 8.7 Managing Container Images, Tags & Azure Container Registry

10 Chapter 9: Azure IaaS Virtual Machine Administration

9.1 Azure VM Sizing, Series Selection & Managed Disk Tiers 9.2 Azure VM Host Caching, Disk Bursting, Ephemeral OS Disks & Disk Operations 9.3 Azure VM High Availability: Availability Sets, Zones & Proximity Placement Groups 9.4 Virtual Machine Scale Sets, Autoscale & Azure Dedicated Hosts 9.5 Azure VM Networking, NSGs & Connectivity

11 Chapter 10: Hybrid DNS Infrastructure & Name Resolution

10.1 Active Directory-Integrated DNS Architecture, Dynamic Updates & Zone Types 10.2 DNS Records, Aging & Scavenging and the GlobalNames Zone 10.3 DNS Forwarding, Conditional Forwarding & Azure DNS Zone Integration 10.4 Hybrid Name Resolution with Azure DNS Private Resolver 10.5 Windows Server DNS Policies & DNSSEC

12 Chapter 11: IP Addressing, DHCP & IPAM Management

11.1 DHCP Server Role, the DORA Lifecycle & Active Directory Authorization 11.2 DHCP Scopes, Option Hierarchy, Reservations & Relay Agents 11.3 DHCP High Availability & Failover Configurations 11.4 IP Address Management (IPAM) Deployment & Auditing 11.5 Resolving IP Address Issues in Hybrid Environments

13 Chapter 12: Hybrid Network Connectivity, Remote Access & Private Access

12.1 Remote Access Role, VPN Protocols & Site-to-Site VPN to Azure 12.2 Network Policy and Access Services (NPAS), RADIUS & Policy Processing 12.3 Azure Network Adapter & Azure Extended Network 12.4 Web Application Proxy & Microsoft Entra Application Proxy 12.5 Microsoft Entra Private Access & Global Secure Access 12.6 Azure Relay & Hybrid Connections

14 Chapter 13: File Services, DFS, SMB & Azure File Sync

13.1 Windows Server File Share Access, NTFS Permissions & Access-Based Enumeration 13.2 File Server Resource Manager: Quotas, File Screens & Storage Reports 13.3 DFS Namespaces (DFS-N) & DFS Replication (DFS-R) 13.4 BranchCache: Distributed Cache and Hosted Cache Modes 13.5 Modern SMB Protocols, SMB Multichannel & SMB over QUIC 13.6 Azure File Shares, Tiers & Hybrid Permissions 13.7 Azure File Sync, Cloud Tiering & Monitoring 13.8 Migrating DFS Namespaces & DFS Replication to Azure File Sync

15 Chapter 14: Windows Server Storage Infrastructure & High Availability

14.1 Disk Partitioning, Volumes & Enterprise File Systems (NTFS vs ReFS) 14.2 Data Deduplication Architecture, Usage Types & Management 14.3 Storage Spaces & Storage Spaces Direct (S2D) 14.4 Storage Replica & Storage Quality of Service 14.5 iSCSI Target Server, IQNs, CHAP Authentication & Multipath I/O

8.3 Guarded Fabric & Shielded Virtual Machines

Key Takeaways Explain This Topic AI

Guarded Fabric and Shielded Virtual Machines protect tenant and enterprise workloads against compromised hypervisors, rogue virtualization administrators, and malicious storage fabric inspections.

The Host Guardian Service (HGS) provides two critical roles: the Attestation Service (validating host identity, health, and code integrity) and the Key Protection Service (KPS, releasing decryption keys only to healthy attested hosts).

TPM 2.0-trusted attestation provides hardware-rooted security by validating physical TPM Endorsement Keys (EK), Measured Boot TCG logs, and Code Integrity (CI) policies.

Shielded Virtual Machines require Generation 2 hardware, virtual TPM (vTPM), and BitLocker drive encryption, completely blocking Hyper-V Console Connect (VMConnect), PowerShell Direct, and raw VHDX mounting by host administrators.

Encryption Supported VMs enable BitLocker and vTPM for data-at-rest encryption while retaining VMConnect console access and PowerShell Direct for environments transitioning toward full shielding.

Last updated: August 2026

Guarded Fabric & Shielded Virtual Machines

In traditional virtualization environments, the virtualization administrator ( BUILTIN\Administrators or Hyper-V Administrators on the physical host) possesses unrestricted access to all guest virtual machines. A compromised hypervisor or malicious host administrator can attach debuggers, extract secrets from guest RAM, inspect unencrypted virtual hard disks ( .vhdx ), copy sensitive database files, or leverage PowerShell Direct and VMConnect to bypass guest operating system authentication.

To solve this vulnerability in high-security, multi-tenant, and regulated compliance environments, Windows Server provides Guarded Fabric and Shielded Virtual Machines . This architecture treats the physical host and virtualization administrators as untrusted entities, cryptographically isolating tenant workloads so that only authorized guest administrators can access the VM's data and runtime environment.

1. Guarded Fabric Architecture & Components

A Guarded Fabric consists of three core components:

Host Guardian Service (HGS): A clustered server role running in a dedicated, isolated Active Directory forest. HGS holds the keys and certificates required to unlock and run shielded VMs.

Guarded Hosts: Physical Hyper-V hosts equipped with specialized hardware (TPM 2.0, UEFI Secure Boot, virtualization extensions) that have been attested and authorized by HGS.

Shielded Virtual Machines: Generation 2 virtual machines with virtual TPM (vTPM) enabled and virtual hard disks encrypted using BitLocker, whose runtime state and memory are protected by the hypervisor. +-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

  • | GUARDED FABRIC ARCHITECTURE |
  • | |
  • | +---------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |
  • | | HOST GUARDIAN SERVICE (HGS CLUSTER - ISOLATED FOREST) | |
  • | | | |
  • | | [Attestation Service] [Key Protection Service (KPS)] | |
  • | | - Validates TPM 2.0 EK certs - Holds Tenant Key Protectors | |
  • | | - Measures Boot Logs (TCG) - Releases decryption keys ONLY when | |
  • | | - Enforces Code Integrity (CI) Policies Attestation Service confirms health | |
  • | +------------------------+--------------------------------------------------------+ |
  • | ^ | |
  • | 1. Attestation | | 2. Key Release |
  • | Validation | | (Encrypted Key) |
  • | | v |
  • | +------------------------+--------------------------------------------------------+ |
  • | | GUARDED HYPER-V HOST | |
  • | | - Hardware: TPM 2.0 + Secure Boot + IOMMU + Virtualization-Based Security (VBS)| |
  • | | | |
  • | | +---------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | |
  • | | | SHIELDED VIRTUAL MACHINE (Generation 2 Only) | | |
  • | | | - Virtual TPM (vTPM) + BitLocker OS/Data Volume Encryption | | |
  • | | | - VMConnect (Console) BLOCKED | PowerShell Direct BLOCKED | | |
  • | | | - Encrypted VHDX Disks & Live Migration Traffic | | |
  • | | +---------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | |
  • | +---------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |
  • +-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
  • 2. Host Guardian Service (HGS) Internals & Attestation Modes

The Host Guardian Service acts as the security arbiter for the entire fabric through two internal services:

Attestation Service: Interrogates candidate Hyper-V hosts attempting to start or run shielded VMs, evaluating hardware identity, boot state, and software baseline.

Key Protection Service (KPS): Stores encryption keys and issues transport keys. KPS will never release keys to a Hyper-V host unless the Attestation Service explicitly validates that the requesting host is healthy and authorized.

Attestation Modes Comparison

Windows Server provides two primary attestation modes: +-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

  • | HGS ATTESTATION MODES COMPARISON |
  • | |
  • | DIMENSION TPM 2.0-TRUSTED ATTESTATION HOST KEY ATTESTATION |
  • | --------------------+--------------------------------+--------------------------------|
  • | Security Level | Highest (Hardware-Rooted) | Medium (Software/Key-Based) |
  • | Hardware Requirement| Physical TPM 2.0 + UEFI 2.3.1c | No TPM required (standard x64) |
  • | | + Secure Boot enabled | |
  • | Identity Mechanism | TPM Endorsement Key (EK) cert | Asymmetric Host Public Key |
  • | Integrity Validation| Measured Boot (TCG log) + | None (Validates host identity |
  • | | Code Integrity (CI) policy | key only; no health check) |
  • | Recommended For | Enterprise Production & Highly | Branch offices, legacy hardware|
  • | | Regulated Environments | lacking TPM 2.0 |
  • +-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

TPM 2.0-Trusted Attestation Baseline Components:

Endorsement Key (EK) Certificate: Proves the physical authenticity of the motherboard TPM chip.

Code Integrity (CI) Policy: An authorized binary policy file created via Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC). Ensures only signed, trusted kernel-mode drivers and hypervisor binaries execute on the host.

TPM Baseline (TCG Measured Boot Log): Captures PCR (Platform Configuration Register) measurements from the UEFI firmware, boot loader, and hypervisor initialization. Any unauthorized change to the BIOS/UEFI or kernel drivers alters the PCR values, causing attestation to fail immediately. # ON THE GUARDED HOST: capture the TPM identifier (EKpub).

# Get-PlatformIdentifier takes -Name (mandatory) and RETURNS an XmlDocument --

# it does not write a file, so pipe .InnerXml to Out-File yourself.

  • (Get-PlatformIdentifier -Name 'HV-GUARD-01').InnerXml |
  • Out-File 'C:\HGS\GuardedHost01_EK.xml' -Encoding UTF8
  • # ON THE HGS SERVER: register the Guarded Host EK certificate (one XML file per host)
  • Add-HgsAttestationTpmHost -Path "C:\HGS\GuardedHost01_EK.xml" -Name "HV-GUARD-01"
  • # ON THE HGS SERVER: add an authorized Code Integrity (CI) Policy
  • Add-HgsAttestationCiPolicy -Path "C:\HGS\GuardedHost_CiPolicy.bin" -Name "ProductionCIPolicy"
  • # ON THE HGS SERVER: add the TPM baseline captured from a reference host
  • Add-HgsAttestationTpmPolicy -Path "C:\HGS\ReferenceHost.tcglog" -Name "Contoso-Gen11-Baseline"
  • Exam trap -- Get-PlatformIdentifier has no -Path parameter. Its only
  • parameters are -Name (mandatory), -CimSession , -ThrottleLimit and -AsJob ,
  • and it emits an XmlDocument object rather than writing to disk. -Path belongs

to the HGS-side cmdlets that consume the resulting file ( Add-HgsAttestationTpmHost , Add-HgsAttestationCiPolicy , Add-HgsAttestationTpmPolicy ). If the EK is captured

with the wrong syntax the XML file is never created and the subsequent Add-HgsAttestationTpmHost fails on a missing path. Remember the split: capture on the host with -Name , register on HGS with -Path plus -Name .

3. Shielded VMs vs Encryption Supported VMs

When securing virtual machines, Hyper-V supports two distinct VM protection policies configured under VM Settings > Security: +-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

  • | SHIELDED VMS VS ENCRYPTION SUPPORTED VMS |
  • | |
  • | SECURITY FEATURE SHIELDED VM ENCRYPTION SUPPORTED VM |
  • | -------------------------------+------------------------+-----------------------------|
  • | Generation Requirement | Generation 2 Only | Generation 2 Only |
  • | Virtual TPM (vTPM) | Mandatory | Enabled (Optional/Mandatory)|
  • | BitLocker Disk Encryption | Mandatory (OS & Data) | Supported (OS & Data) |
  • | VMConnect (Console Access) | BLOCKED | ALLOWED |
  • | PowerShell Direct | BLOCKED | ALLOWED |
  • | VHDX Inspection / Host Mount | BLOCKED (Encrypted) | BLOCKED (Encrypted) |
  • | Live Migration Traffic Encrypt.| Automatic / Mandatory | Configurable |
  • | Host Attestation Enforcement | Strict HGS Attestation | Runs on any Hyper-V Host |
  • | | Required | if key protector permits |
  • +-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

The Shielded VM Security Boundary:

Console Access Blocked: Host virtualization administrators cannot open a VMConnect console session to view the guest OS screen. Management must occur strictly over in-guest network protocols (RDP, SSH, PowerShell Remoting over IP).

PowerShell Direct Disabled: Prevents the host OS from using VMBus communication channels to inject commands or run processes inside the guest without network connectivity.

Loading diagram... HGS Attestation & Key Release Sequence

4. Shielding Data Files ( .pdk ) & Provisioning Workflow

Provisioning a new Shielded VM requires creating a Shielding Data File ( .pdk ) . The .pdk file is authored by the tenant or workload owner using the Shielding Data File Wizard or PowerShell, encapsulating all secrets required to deploy the VM securely onto an untrusted fabric. +-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

  • | SHIELDING DATA FILE (.PDK) CONTENTS |
  • | |
  • | [SHIELDING DATA FILE (.pdk) - ENCRYPTED] |
  • | ├── Guardian Configuration: Identifies authorized HGS cluster guardian public keys |
  • | ├── Owner Guardian: Tenant's private/public key pair proving VM ownership |
  • | ├── Volume Signature Catalog (.vsc): Hash baseline of trusted signed template disks |
  • | ├── Unattend.xml: Automated specialization file containing: |
  • | │ ├── Local Administrator password (encrypted) |
  • | │ ├── Domain-join credentials (encrypted) |
  • | │ ├── Static IP / Network configuration |
  • | │ └── Post-deployment startup run commands |
  • | └── RDP / SSH Public Certificates: In-guest administrative access keys |
  • +-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

Provisioning Steps:

Template Disk Preparation: A trusted Windows Server VHDX template is created, generalized via Sysprep, and signed with a digital certificate to generate a Volume Signature Catalog ( .vsc ) via Protect-TemplateDisk .

PDK Authoring: The tenant compiles the .pdk file using New-ShieldingDataFile , embedding the .vsc hash, guardian public keys, and encrypted unattend.xml .

VM Creation: The hosting provider or infrastructure team provisions the VM using the signed template disk and the tenant's .pdk file. The physical host never sees the plaintext local administrator password or domain credentials embedded in the unattend.xml .

5. Live Migration & Disaster Recovery of Shielded VMs

Live Migration in a Guarded Fabric: When a Shielded VM Live Migrates between two guarded hosts, the target host must independently attest with the HGS cluster and obtain a valid health certificate. The VM memory state and execution registers are encrypted across the network using session keys negotiated with HGS.

Cross-Fabric Migration & Disaster Recovery: To enable a Shielded VM to run in a secondary disaster recovery Guarded Fabric, the tenant administrator must append the secondary HGS cluster's Guardian certificate to the VM's Key Protector using Set-VMKeyProtector . # Query the HGS client attestation status on a Guarded Host

Get-HgsClientConfiguration

  • # Test end-to-end HGS Attestation and diagnostic reachability
  • Test-HgsClientConfiguration