Study guide
2.3 Administrative Units
Exam SC-300: Microsoft Identity and Access Administrator Exam
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1 Introduction & Exam Overview
1.1 Current Exam Facts & Logistics 1.2 Audience Profile, Zero Trust & Role Scope 1.3 Skills Measured & Study Map
2 Entra Tenant Administration
2.1 Tenant Properties, Domains & Company Branding 2.2 Built-in & Custom Roles, Effective Permissions 2.3 Administrative Units
3 Users, Groups, Licenses & Devices
3.1 Create, Configure & Manage Users 3.2 Groups & Custom Security Attributes 3.3 Licenses, Bulk Operations & Device Join
4 External Identities & Cross-Tenant Access
4.1 External Collaboration & Guest Lifecycle 4.2 Cross-Tenant Access Settings 4.3 Cross-Tenant Sync & External Identity Providers
5 Hybrid Identity
5.1 Entra Connect Sync vs Cloud Sync 5.2 PHS, PTA & Seamless SSO 5.3 AD FS Migration & Connect Health
6 Authentication Methods & MFA
6.1 Authentication Methods Portfolio 6.2 MFA, SSPR & Password Protection 6.3 Passwordless, Session Control & Entra Kerberos
7 Conditional Access
7.1 Planning, Assignments & Controls 7.2 Session Management, Device Restrictions & CAE 7.3 Auth Context, Protected Actions, Templates & Troubleshooting
8 Identity Protection & Global Secure Access
8.1 User Risk & Sign-in Risk 8.2 MFA Registration Campaigns & Risky Workloads 8.3 Global Secure Access
9 Workload & Managed Identities
9.1 Selecting Identities for Apps & Azure Workloads 9.2 Create, Assign & Use Managed Identities 9.3 Service Principals Fundamentals
10 Enterprise Apps & App Registrations
10.1 Enterprise Applications Integration 10.2 App Registrations, API Permissions & App Roles 10.3 Application Proxy & Consent
11 Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps
11.1 Cloud Discovery & Connected Apps 11.2 CA App Control & Session Policies 11.3 OAuth App Policies & Catalog Management
12 Entitlement Management
12.1 Catalogs & Access Packages 12.2 Access Requests & Terms of Use 12.3 Connected Organizations & External User Lifecycle
13 Access Reviews
13.1 Plan & Create Access Reviews 13.2 Monitor & Respond to Access Reviews
14 Privileged Identity Management
14.1 PIM for Entra Roles & Azure Resources 14.2 PIM for Groups, Approval & Audit 14.3 Break-Glass (Emergency Access) Accounts
15 Monitoring, Logs & Secure Score
15.1 Sign-in, Audit & Provisioning Logs 15.2 Diagnostics, KQL & Workbooks 15.3 Identity Secure Score
2.3 Administrative Units
Key Takeaways Explain This Topic AI
Administrative units (AUs) partition directory objects so role assignments can be scoped to a subset of users, groups, or devices instead of the whole tenant.
Recommend AUs when delegated administrators must manage only their region, department, or subsidiary without Global or tenant-wide User Administrator rights.
Scoped role assignments bind a principal + Entra role + administrative unit; the role's permissions apply only to objects in that AU (for roles that support AU scope).
Restricted management administrative units further protect member objects so only specific admins can manage them, limiting even some tenant-wide operators from casual changes.
AUs are not Conditional Access groups, not Azure management groups, and not a substitute for Privileged Identity Management—though they combine with PIM and role-assignable groups in mature designs.
Last updated: July 2026
The problem administrative units solve
A single Microsoft Entra tenant often serves many business units, countries, and schools. If every helpdesk technician receives tenant-wide User Administrator , they can manage every user in the company—including executives in other regions. That violates least privilege and complicates audit.
Administrative units (AUs) are containers for users, groups, and devices that enable scoped role assignments . You still use familiar Entra roles (User Administrator, Helpdesk Administrator, Groups Administrator, and many others that support AU scope), but the assignment applies only to directory objects that are members of the target AU.
Approach Scope of authority When it fits
Tenant-wide Entra role Entire directory (subject to built-in protected limits) Central identity team, break-glass, global processes
Administrative unit–scoped role Objects inside one AU Regional/dept delegated admins
Restricted management AU Protected population; only allowed admins manage members Executives, VIP, regulated cohorts
Separate tenants Hard isolation Rare; high cost; breaks unified collaboration
SC-300 prefers AUs over "create another tenant" for ordinary delegation inside one organization.
When to recommend administrative units
Recommend AUs when all of the following are true (or when the exam stem strongly implies them):
One tenant should remain the identity boundary for collaboration and licensing.
Different teams must administer disjoint sets of identities (by country, brand, school campus, hospital ward, franchise, etc.).
Central IT still needs occasional tenant-wide control.
The required admin tasks map to Entra roles that support administrative unit scope .
Do not recommend AUs as the answer when the real need is:
Azure resource isolation → management groups, subscriptions, resource groups, Azure RBAC.
Application access → groups, entitlement management, Conditional Access.
Temporary elevation alone → PIM without any population split.
Guest lifecycle for partners → external identities / entitlement management (AUs can still hold guests, but B2B policy is the primary design).
Classic SC-300 scenario shapes
"Contoso has helpdesks in France and Germany. Each must reset passwords only for local employees." → AU per country + Helpdesk/User Administrator scoped to that AU.
"The university registrar may manage student accounts but not faculty." → Student AU + scoped role; faculty in another AU or default directory without that scoped assignment.
"A subsidiary was acquired and keeps local IT for user management." → Subsidiary AU, not a second tenant, unless regulatory isolation demands otherwise.
Configure and manage administrative units
High-level lifecycle:
Create an administrative unit (Microsoft Entra admin center → Roles & admins → Admin units , or Microsoft Graph administrativeUnits ).
Add members : users, groups, and/or devices depending on what you will delegate. Membership can be assigned manually or, where supported, dynamically (dynamic membership rules for AUs require appropriate licensing and configuration—exam items often use assigned membership for clarity).
Assign roles at AU scope: choose role, choose principal (user or group), choose the administrative unit as scope.
Operate : scoped admins manage only in-scope objects; verify with test accounts.
Review : access reviews / periodic membership audits for AU population and scoped role holders.
Task Notes for the exam
Create AU Needs appropriate privileged role (e.g., Privileged Role Administrator / Global Administrator patterns)
- Add user to AU Places the user under AU-scoped management boundaries
- Assign User Administrator on AU Principal can administer users in that AU , not all tenant users
- Nested management AUs do not replace groups for app access; they scope admin rights
- Graph automation Useful for bulk AU membership in large orgs
- Membership design tips
Prefer one primary AU dimension (geography or department) to avoid unmanageable intersections; if you need two dimensions, document which role uses which AU set.
Putting a group in an AU does not automatically put all group members in the AU for every behavior—understand whether the scenario scopes management of the group object itself versus user objects. Many password-reset scenarios require the user objects to be AU members.
Devices in AUs support device-admin delegation patterns where roles support device scope.
Scoped role assignments deep dive
A scoped assignment is the triple:
Principal + Role definition + Administrative unit scope
Compare with tenant-wide:
Principal + Role definition + Directory (tenant) scope
Implications:
A User Administrator scoped to AU-West can reset passwords for users in AU-West.
The same person cannot reset passwords for users only in AU-East unless also assigned there or holding a tenant-wide role.
Built-in limits still apply: scoped admins generally cannot escalate into managing Global Administrators just because those admins were mistakenly added to an AU—protected admin relationships and role rules still matter. Exam items emphasize population scoping , not breaking Microsoft's privileged user protections.
- Assignment Can manage users in AU-A Can manage users in AU-B Can manage non-AU users
- User Admin @ tenant Yes Yes Yes
- User Admin @ AU-A only Yes No No
- User Admin @ AU-A and AU-B Yes Yes No
- No User Admin role No No No
Not every Entra role supports AU scope. Privileged, tenant-configuration roles (for example, many policy-wide roles such as certain Conditional Access tenant settings) remain tenant-scoped by design. If the task is "edit a tenant-wide Conditional Access policy," AU-scoped User Administrator is the wrong tool—you need a role that can manage CA at tenant scope.
Restricted management administrative units
Restricted management administrative units (also discussed as restricted management AUs / protected AUs in learning materials) add a stronger boundary: objects in the AU are manageable only by admins explicitly allowed to manage that restricted AU, blocking many tenant-wide helpdesk-style operations that would otherwise apply.
Use restricted management AUs when:
A population is high value (C-suite, key signing officers, highly regulated staff).
You must prevent ordinary tenant-wide User Administrators from changing those accounts.
Central privileged admins still need a controlled path to manage them.
- Feature Standard AU Restricted management AU
- Scoped role assignments Yes Yes
Limits casual tenant-wide admin impact on members Partial / by scope design Stronger restricted management controls
- Typical use Regional delegation VIP / sensitive user protection
- Complexity Moderate Higher; plan break-glass carefully
Exam cue words: "must not be manageable by the corporate helpdesk even though helpdesk has User Administrator," "protect executive accounts," "only the identity security team may modify these users." That points to restricted management AU patterns rather than a simple department AU alone.
AU versus whole-tenant role assignment scenarios
Worked comparisons you should be able to recreate under time pressure:
Scenario A — Central only
A 200-person startup with one IT admin.
Design: Tenant-wide roles (preferably PIM-eligible). AUs add little value.
Scenario B — Regional helpdesk
Four regions, each with L1 support.
Design: AU per region; Helpdesk Administrator or User Administrator scoped per AU; central identity team keeps Privileged Role Administrator / Global Reader / tenant Conditional Access roles.
Scenario C — VIP protection
Regional AUs exist, but executives still get password resets from local helpdesk by mistake.
Design: Move executives into a restricted management AU ; assign management only to a tier-0 identity team; keep regional AUs for everyone else.
- Scenario D — Wrong abstraction
- "Developers need Contributor on the production subscription."
Design: Azure RBAC on the subscription/resource group—not an Entra administrative unit.
- Scenario E — App access only
- "Contractors need access to an app for 30 days."
Design: Entitlement management access package / groups / Conditional Access—not AU-scoped User Administrator (unless contractors' account administration is also delegated).
Implementation checklist for labs and exam recall
Confirm the delegation boundary (who administers whom).
Create AUs that match that boundary.
Populate user (and group/device) membership correctly.
Assign the least privileged Entra role that supports AU scope .
Test with a scoped admin account: success in-AU, failure out-of-AU.
Protect AU membership changes and scoped role assignments with monitoring, PIM, and reviews.
For sensitive populations, evaluate restricted management AUs.
Document that AUs scope directory administration , not Azure resource RBAC and not app SSO by themselves.
Common traps
Using AUs to replace Conditional Access location or device controls.
Assigning tenant-wide User Administrator and expecting AU membership alone to block access—it will not; the role assignment scope must be AU-scoped.
Forgetting to add users to the AU, then wondering why scoped admins cannot see them.
Confusing management groups (Azure hierarchy) with administrative units (Entra directory containers).
Assuming every privileged role can be AU-scoped—validate role support.
Administrative units are one of the cleanest least-privilege tools in Microsoft Entra ID. On SC-300, whenever the stem emphasizes delegated administration of a subset of identities inside one tenant , start your answer with administrative units and scoped roles, then layer restricted management only when the population needs extra protection.