Study guide

9.1 Screening at Onboarding: Sanctions Lists, PEPs, and Known Fraudsters

ACAMS Certified AML FinTech Compliance Associate CAFCA

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1 Chapter 1: CAFCA Exam Overview and Study Strategy

1.1 CAFCA Exam Format, Official Domains, and Study Strategy

2 Chapter 2: Domain 1: FinTech Business Models and Their Vulnerabilities

2.1 Neobanks, Challenger Banks, and Digital Banking Models 2.2 Payment Processors, Gateways, and Merchant Acquirers 2.3 Buy Now, Pay Later (BNPL) and Alternative Credit 2.4 BaaS Architecture, Embedded Finance, and Program Structures

3 Chapter 3: Domain 1: Financial Crime Types and the Regulatory Perimeter

3.1 Types of Financial Crime and Predicate Offences 3.2 Licensing, Registration, Charters, and Regulatory Sandboxes 3.3 Virtual Asset Service Provider (VASP) Framework & FinCEN MSB Rules

4 Chapter 4: Domain 1: Global AML Frameworks and Sources of Guidance

4.1 U.S. Regulatory Architecture: BSA, PATRIOT Act, and AMLA 2020 4.2 European Union Regulatory Framework: AMLD6, the AML Package, and MiCA 4.3 International Standards: UK FCA, Singapore MAS, and Hong Kong HKMA 4.4 Sources of Guidance for Building Anti-Financial Crime Processes

5 Chapter 5: Domain 1: Risk Management Framework, Risk-Based Approach, and Data Protection

5.1 Risk Management Framework: Lines of Defence, Policies, Assurance, and the MLRO 5.2 Risk-Based Approach, Risk Assessment, Risk Appetite, and Types of Risk 5.3 Handling Sensitive Information: PII, SPII, Privacy Laws, and Breach Reporting

6 Chapter 6: Domain 1: Bank Partners and Internal Threats

6.1 Regulatory Expectations and Enforcement on Sponsor Banks 6.2 How Banks Risk-Rate FinTechs: Onboarding, Ongoing Oversight, and De-Risking 6.3 Controlling Internal Threats: Insider Fraud, Collusion, and Data Misuse

7 Chapter 7: Domain 2: CIP, KYC, CDD, and EDD

7.1 Customer Identification Program (CIP) Under USA PATRIOT Act §326 7.2 The FinCEN CDD Rule & Beneficial Ownership Standards 7.3 KYC to EDD: Applying CDD and Enhanced Due Diligence Across Customer Types

8 Chapter 8: Domain 2: Identity Verification, Data Sources, and Device Data

8.1 Digital Onboarding & Electronic KYC (eKYC) Foundations 8.2 Biometric Face Matching and Liveness Detection 8.3 Verification Data Sources and How to Judge Their Reliability 8.4 Device Fingerprinting, Geolocation, and Behavioral Biometrics

9 Chapter 9: Domain 2: Onboarding Screening, Risk Ratings, and Fraud Red Flags

9.1 Screening at Onboarding: Sanctions Lists, PEPs, and Known Fraudsters 9.2 Customer Risk Ratings: Factors, Data Sources, and How Scoring Models Work 9.3 Detecting Synthetic Identity Fraud and Ineligible Applicants 9.4 Deepfakes, Generative AI Threats, and Scam Typologies

10 Chapter 10: Domain 3: Payment Screening

10.1 OFAC Sanctions Regimes & the 50 Percent Rule 10.2 Real-Time vs. Batch Screening Architecture in High-Velocity Rails 10.3 Screening Logic: Fuzzy Matching, Phonetics, and PEP Controls

11 Chapter 11: Domain 3: Transaction Monitoring Systems and Red Flags

11.1 Hybrid Transaction Monitoring: Rules Engines vs. Machine Learning 11.2 FinTech Typologies: Mule Networks, Funnel Accounts, and Rapid Pass-Through 11.3 Fraud-AML Convergence: BIN Attacks, ATO, and Credential Stuffing 11.4 Model Risk Management Under SR 11-7 & System Optimization

12 Chapter 12: Domain 3: Payment Methods and Transaction Risk Characteristics

12.1 Common Payment Methods, Crypto, and High-Risk Transactions Such as Aggregation 12.2 Transaction Risk Characteristics: Reversibility, Convertibility, Fund Integrity, and Privacy Coins 12.3 Wallet Types, Custody Architectures, and Counterparty Risks 12.4 Stablecoins, On/Off Ramps, and Asset-Referenced Tokens

13 Chapter 13: Domain 3: Monitoring Crypto Transactions

13.1 Blockchain Analytics & Transaction Tracing 13.2 The FATF Travel Rule for Virtual Assets 13.3 DeFi, Mixers, and Smart Contract Sanctions

14 Chapter 14: Domain 3: Alert Investigation, Audit Trails, and Monitoring MI

14.1 The Alert Investigation Process: From Unusual to Suspicious and When to Escalate 14.2 Building an Audit Trail for Suspicious Activity Reviews 14.3 Communicating Monitoring Results: KPIs, KRIs, OKRs, and Management Information

15 Chapter 15: Domain 4: Investigations and Customer Communication

15.1 Talking to Customers During Investigations and Offboarding: Financial Crime Risk vs Policy Breach 15.2 Reviewing KYC, Transactions, Open Sources, and Documents to Build an Investigation 15.3 Analytical Principles in Investigations: Avoiding Confirmation Bias and Other Traps

16 Chapter 16: Domain 4: SARs and STRs

16.1 SARs and STRs: What They Are, When and Where to File, and Why They Matter 16.2 Writing Effective SAR and STR Narratives

17 Chapter 17: Domain 4: Law Enforcement, Regulators, and Banking Partners

17.1 Operational AML Governance and Third-Party Risk Management 17.2 Working With Law Enforcement, Banking Partners, Regulators, and Other Third Parties 17.3 Types of Law Enforcement Requests: Subpoenas, Court Orders, 314(a), and International Requests 17.4 How Banking Partners' Terms of Service Relate to the FinTech's Own Terms

18 Chapter 18: Domain 5: Scaling Anti-Financial Crime Strategies

18.1 Assessing New Products and Features Before Launch 18.2 Refreshing the Financial Crime Risk Assessment as the Business Scales 18.3 Changes That Should Trigger a Financial Crime Risk Assessment Review 18.4 Record Retention Rules and Secure Data Storage 18.5 Outsourcing Controls: Surge Capacity, RegTech, and Independent Testing

9.1 Screening at Onboarding: Sanctions Lists, PEPs, and Known Fraudsters

Key Takeaways Explain This Topic AI

Firms choose sanctions lists by legal exposure: where they are established and licensed, the currencies they clear, where customers are, and partner-bank contracts.

A sanctions concern is indicated by a name or alias match with corroborating identifiers, a link to a sanctioned region, or ownership by designated persons.

Under FATF Recommendation 12, foreign PEPs always require enhanced measures, while domestic and international-organisation PEPs require them when the relationship is higher risk.

Screening must repeat whenever lists change and whenever customer data changes, not only at account opening.

Last updated: October 2026

CAFCA sub-topic 2.5 covers the principles and purpose of screening for sanctions , including what information indicates a sanctions concern and how to select the right list. It also covers PEPs , the risks they pose, and the difference between foreign and domestic PEPs, as well as fraudsters . Chapter 10 covers payment screening and matching algorithms. This section focuses on onboarding decisions.

Why each screen exists

Screen Purpose Legal or policy basis Outcome of a true match

Sanctions Prevent dealings with designated persons, entities or regions Sanctions laws (US OFAC, EU, UK, UN implemented nationally, local regimes) Do not onboard; block or freeze where required; report to the sanctions authority

PEP Identify heightened corruption and bribery risk AML law (FATF Recommendation 12 and national rules) Not prohibited: apply EDD, senior approval and monitoring

Adverse media Surface financial crime allegations, investigations or convictions Risk-based CDD Risk-rate, apply EDD, or decline under the risk appetite

Fraud / negative files Stop known fraudsters and reused identity elements Fraud policy, consortium rules Decline or step up checks; report where suspicious

Selecting the appropriate sanctions lists

A firm screens against the lists that legally bind it and those it accepts by contract or policy :

Where it is established and licensed. US persons must comply with OFAC. EU firms apply EU restrictive measures, and UK firms apply UK sanctions. UN Security Council designations apply through each member state's implementing law.

Currency and clearing exposure. Clearing US dollars brings a US nexus, so many non-US firms also screen OFAC lists.

Where customers and counterparties are. Local regimes, such as those of Singapore or Hong Kong, may add designations.

Partner-bank and card-network contracts , which often require specific lists.

Beyond the SDN list. OFAC also maintains non-SDN lists with different restrictions, such as the Sectoral Sanctions Identifications list and the Foreign Sanctions Evaders list. Ownership rules differ too: OFAC's 50% rule versus EU and UK ownership-and-control tests.

Document which lists, which versions and how often they are refreshed. Unverified free lists from unofficial websites are not a substitute for official sources or reputable vendors.

Information that indicates a sanctions concern

Name or alias match plus corroboration : date of birth, nationality, address, passport or registration number, or vessel IMO number.

Geographic nexus : residence, address, IP or device location, or phone country code in a comprehensively sanctioned region.

Ownership or control : designated persons who own the applicant entity alone or together, or who act as directors or signatories. That is a facilitation risk even where an ownership rule is not triggered.

Evasion signals : recently formed companies linked to designated groups, nominee directors, obscured ownership, and inconsistent addresses.

A nationality linked to a sanctioned country is not , on its own, a designation. Treat it as a risk factor, check whether a regime targets that category of person, and avoid blanket discrimination that the law does not require.

PEPs: foreign, domestic and international organisation

Category Who FATF treatment

Foreign PEP Person entrusted with a prominent public function by a foreign country (heads of state, senior politicians, senior officials, judges, military leaders, senior executives of state-owned companies, important party officials) Always: risk-management system, senior management approval, source of wealth and source of funds, enhanced ongoing monitoring

Domestic PEP Same functions in the firm's own country Reasonable measures to identify; enhanced measures where the relationship is higher risk

International organisation PEP Senior management of international organisations As for domestic PEPs

FATF extends the measures to family members and close associates . Some regimes go further. The EU, for example, applies enhanced measures to all PEPs, including domestic ones. PEP status is not a ban. It means higher risk of corruption-linked funds, which is managed with EDD. After a person leaves office, decide on a risk basis how long to keep enhanced measures, rather than using a fixed time limit.

Screening for fraudsters

Use internal blocklists (previously exited fraudsters and mule accounts), consortium databases, and negative device, email and phone data. A match should prompt a decision: decline, step up the checks, or review manually. The basis must be documented, and the data must be used within the scheme's rules and privacy law.

Process essentials

Screen the applicant, beneficial owners, directors and authorised signers at onboarding.

Re-screen the whole customer base when lists update (delta screening) and whenever customer data changes.

Disposition every alert as a true match, false positive or possible match. Escalate possible matches. Document the identifiers used to discount a match (Chapter 14).

Escalate true sanctions matches immediately to the sanctions officer, and follow blocking, rejection and reporting rules.

Realistic exam scenario

An applicant's name matches an entry on the EU consolidated list, but the listed person was born 30 years earlier and has a different nationality. Separately, the applicant states that her husband is a serving deputy minister in another country. The analyst should discount the sanctions alert, recording the date-of-birth and nationality differences. She should classify the applicant as a family member of a foreign PEP, which requires EDD, senior approval, source of wealth and source of funds, and enhanced monitoring. The application is not automatically declined.

Common exam traps

"PEPs are prohibited customers." They are higher risk, not prohibited.

Screening only once at onboarding.

Screening only the applicant , missing beneficial owners and directors.

Treating nationality as a sanctions match.