Study guide

16.1 SARs and STRs: What They Are, When and Where to File, and Why They Matter

ACAMS Certified AML FinTech Compliance Associate CAFCA

Track your progress as you read

Finished sections get a check mark.

1 Chapter 1: CAFCA Exam Overview and Study Strategy

1.1 CAFCA Exam Format, Official Domains, and Study Strategy

2 Chapter 2: Domain 1: FinTech Business Models and Their Vulnerabilities

2.1 Neobanks, Challenger Banks, and Digital Banking Models 2.2 Payment Processors, Gateways, and Merchant Acquirers 2.3 Buy Now, Pay Later (BNPL) and Alternative Credit 2.4 BaaS Architecture, Embedded Finance, and Program Structures

3 Chapter 3: Domain 1: Financial Crime Types and the Regulatory Perimeter

3.1 Types of Financial Crime and Predicate Offences 3.2 Licensing, Registration, Charters, and Regulatory Sandboxes 3.3 Virtual Asset Service Provider (VASP) Framework & FinCEN MSB Rules

4 Chapter 4: Domain 1: Global AML Frameworks and Sources of Guidance

4.1 U.S. Regulatory Architecture: BSA, PATRIOT Act, and AMLA 2020 4.2 European Union Regulatory Framework: AMLD6, the AML Package, and MiCA 4.3 International Standards: UK FCA, Singapore MAS, and Hong Kong HKMA 4.4 Sources of Guidance for Building Anti-Financial Crime Processes

5 Chapter 5: Domain 1: Risk Management Framework, Risk-Based Approach, and Data Protection

5.1 Risk Management Framework: Lines of Defence, Policies, Assurance, and the MLRO 5.2 Risk-Based Approach, Risk Assessment, Risk Appetite, and Types of Risk 5.3 Handling Sensitive Information: PII, SPII, Privacy Laws, and Breach Reporting

6 Chapter 6: Domain 1: Bank Partners and Internal Threats

6.1 Regulatory Expectations and Enforcement on Sponsor Banks 6.2 How Banks Risk-Rate FinTechs: Onboarding, Ongoing Oversight, and De-Risking 6.3 Controlling Internal Threats: Insider Fraud, Collusion, and Data Misuse

7 Chapter 7: Domain 2: CIP, KYC, CDD, and EDD

7.1 Customer Identification Program (CIP) Under USA PATRIOT Act §326 7.2 The FinCEN CDD Rule & Beneficial Ownership Standards 7.3 KYC to EDD: Applying CDD and Enhanced Due Diligence Across Customer Types

8 Chapter 8: Domain 2: Identity Verification, Data Sources, and Device Data

8.1 Digital Onboarding & Electronic KYC (eKYC) Foundations 8.2 Biometric Face Matching and Liveness Detection 8.3 Verification Data Sources and How to Judge Their Reliability 8.4 Device Fingerprinting, Geolocation, and Behavioral Biometrics

9 Chapter 9: Domain 2: Onboarding Screening, Risk Ratings, and Fraud Red Flags

9.1 Screening at Onboarding: Sanctions Lists, PEPs, and Known Fraudsters 9.2 Customer Risk Ratings: Factors, Data Sources, and How Scoring Models Work 9.3 Detecting Synthetic Identity Fraud and Ineligible Applicants 9.4 Deepfakes, Generative AI Threats, and Scam Typologies

10 Chapter 10: Domain 3: Payment Screening

10.1 OFAC Sanctions Regimes & the 50 Percent Rule 10.2 Real-Time vs. Batch Screening Architecture in High-Velocity Rails 10.3 Screening Logic: Fuzzy Matching, Phonetics, and PEP Controls

11 Chapter 11: Domain 3: Transaction Monitoring Systems and Red Flags

11.1 Hybrid Transaction Monitoring: Rules Engines vs. Machine Learning 11.2 FinTech Typologies: Mule Networks, Funnel Accounts, and Rapid Pass-Through 11.3 Fraud-AML Convergence: BIN Attacks, ATO, and Credential Stuffing 11.4 Model Risk Management Under SR 11-7 & System Optimization

12 Chapter 12: Domain 3: Payment Methods and Transaction Risk Characteristics

12.1 Common Payment Methods, Crypto, and High-Risk Transactions Such as Aggregation 12.2 Transaction Risk Characteristics: Reversibility, Convertibility, Fund Integrity, and Privacy Coins 12.3 Wallet Types, Custody Architectures, and Counterparty Risks 12.4 Stablecoins, On/Off Ramps, and Asset-Referenced Tokens

13 Chapter 13: Domain 3: Monitoring Crypto Transactions

13.1 Blockchain Analytics & Transaction Tracing 13.2 The FATF Travel Rule for Virtual Assets 13.3 DeFi, Mixers, and Smart Contract Sanctions

14 Chapter 14: Domain 3: Alert Investigation, Audit Trails, and Monitoring MI

14.1 The Alert Investigation Process: From Unusual to Suspicious and When to Escalate 14.2 Building an Audit Trail for Suspicious Activity Reviews 14.3 Communicating Monitoring Results: KPIs, KRIs, OKRs, and Management Information

15 Chapter 15: Domain 4: Investigations and Customer Communication

15.1 Talking to Customers During Investigations and Offboarding: Financial Crime Risk vs Policy Breach 15.2 Reviewing KYC, Transactions, Open Sources, and Documents to Build an Investigation 15.3 Analytical Principles in Investigations: Avoiding Confirmation Bias and Other Traps

16 Chapter 16: Domain 4: SARs and STRs

16.1 SARs and STRs: What They Are, When and Where to File, and Why They Matter 16.2 Writing Effective SAR and STR Narratives

17 Chapter 17: Domain 4: Law Enforcement, Regulators, and Banking Partners

17.1 Operational AML Governance and Third-Party Risk Management 17.2 Working With Law Enforcement, Banking Partners, Regulators, and Other Third Parties 17.3 Types of Law Enforcement Requests: Subpoenas, Court Orders, 314(a), and International Requests 17.4 How Banking Partners' Terms of Service Relate to the FinTech's Own Terms

18 Chapter 18: Domain 5: Scaling Anti-Financial Crime Strategies

18.1 Assessing New Products and Features Before Launch 18.2 Refreshing the Financial Crime Risk Assessment as the Business Scales 18.3 Changes That Should Trigger a Financial Crime Risk Assessment Review 18.4 Record Retention Rules and Secure Data Storage 18.5 Outsourcing Controls: Surge Capacity, RegTech, and Independent Testing

16.1 SARs and STRs: What They Are, When and Where to File, and Why They Matter

Key Takeaways Explain This Topic AI

FATF Recommendation 20 requires financial institutions to report suspicions promptly to the financial intelligence unit when they suspect criminal proceeds or terrorist financing.

US banks file SARs at US$5,000 when a suspect is identified, at US$25,000 regardless of suspect, and for insider abuse at any amount; MSBs file at US$2,000.

In the UK, regulated firms report to the National Crime Agency, and a defence against money laundering request must be made before carrying out a transaction involving suspected criminal property.

FinCEN's October 2025 FAQs confirmed there is no requirement to conduct a separate continuing-activity review after filing a SAR.

Last updated: October 2026

CAFCA sub-topic 4.4 covers SARs and STRs : definitions, when and where they are required , why they are important , and best practices for writing them . This section covers the obligations, and the next covers narrative writing.

Definitions

SAR , the suspicious activity report, is the term used in the US, the UK and some other countries. It covers activity, including attempted transactions, not only completed transactions.

STR , the suspicious transaction report, is the term used in most other jurisdictions and in many FATF materials.

Both send a firm's suspicion to the national financial intelligence unit (FIU) , which analyses reports and passes intelligence to law enforcement.

FATF Recommendation 20 says that if a financial institution suspects, or has reasonable grounds to suspect, that funds are the proceeds of crime or related to terrorist financing, it must report its suspicion promptly to the FIU. Recommendation 21 requires legal protection for good-faith reporters and a ban on tipping off.

Where and when: key jurisdictions

Jurisdiction Report and recipient Main thresholds and timing

United States SAR to FinCEN through BSA E-Filing Banks: US$5,000 or more where a suspect is identified; US$25,000 or more regardless of suspect; insider abuse at any amount. MSBs: US$2,000 or more. File within 30 calendar days of initial detection; banks may take up to 60 days if no suspect has been identified. Banks must notify law enforcement immediately in ongoing violations needing immediate attention

United Kingdom SAR to the National Crime Agency through its online portal No monetary threshold. Report as soon as practicable once there is knowledge or suspicion (or reasonable grounds) of money laundering. A defence against money laundering (DAML) request is needed before proceeding with a transaction involving suspected criminal property (Chapter 4)

European Union STR to the national FIU (for example Tracfin in France) No threshold for suspicion. Report promptly. Many FIUs use the UNODC goAML platform

Singapore STR to the Suspicious Transaction Reporting Office Report promptly when there is suspicion

Hong Kong STR to the Joint Financial Intelligence Unit Report as soon as practicable; failure to report suspicion is an offence

Attempted activity counts. A suspicious account opening that the firm declines, or a payment it rejects, can still require a report.

Why SARs and STRs matter

Intelligence : FIUs combine reports from many firms to see networks that no single firm can see.

Investigations and prosecutions : SARs generate leads, link suspects and support asset recovery.

Typologies : aggregated reporting shapes advisories, alerts and national risk assessments.

Victim protection : fast reporting can support recalls and freezes in fraud and scam cases.

Legal compliance and protection : reporting is mandatory where the threshold is met. Good-faith reports are protected by safe harbour provisions, such as 31 U.S.C. 5318(g)(3) in the US and the protected and authorised disclosure provisions of the UK Proceeds of Crime Act.

Supporting rules to remember

Confidentiality. Never disclose a SAR or information that would reveal it. Store SAR records separately with restricted access.

Joint filing. US rules allow institutions involved in the same transaction to file a joint SAR. For example, a sponsor bank and a FinTech MSB can file one report (Chapter 17).

Continuing activity. FinCEN had long suggested filing at least every 90 days on ongoing activity. In October 2025, FinCEN and the federal banking agencies confirmed that there is no requirement to conduct a separate continuing-activity review after a SAR. Firms must still file when they detect further reportable activity.

Decisions not to file. The BSA does not require them to be documented, but firms usually record them for QA and governance (Chapter 14).

Advisory key terms. When a FinCEN alert or advisory applies, include its key term, such as FIN-2023-PIGBUTCHERING or FIN-2024-DEEPFAKEFRAUD , in SAR field 2 and the narrative.

Who decides

The decision to file belongs to the designated person: the BSA officer or SAR committee in the US, or the nominated officer (usually the MLRO) in the UK. In BaaS models, the sponsor bank decides on its own SAR, and a FinTech that is itself an MSB decides on its own (Chapter 17). Front-line staff report internally; they do not file directly.

Realistic exam scenario

A US MSB detects on 1 March that a customer has sent US$2,400 across six transfers to a counterparty linked to a reported investment scam. The customer cannot explain the payments. The total exceeds the MSB threshold of US$2,000, so the MSB must file a SAR within 30 calendar days of 1 March. The MSB rules have no 60-day extension, because that extension applies only to banks without an identified suspect. If the same activity occurred at a UK EMI, there would be no threshold. The EMI would report to the NCA as soon as practicable, and it would need a DAML before processing any further payment it suspected involved criminal property.

Common exam traps

Applying bank thresholds to MSBs , or the 60-day extension to MSBs.

"No completed transaction, no report." Attempted activity can be reportable.

"UK SARs have a dollar threshold." They do not.

Thinking continuing-activity reviews every 90 days are a legal requirement. FinCEN's 2025 FAQs say they are not.