Study guide
18.4 Record Retention Rules and Secure Data Storage
ACAMS Certified AML FinTech Compliance Associate CAFCA
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1 Chapter 1: CAFCA Exam Overview and Study Strategy
1.1 CAFCA Exam Format, Official Domains, and Study Strategy
2 Chapter 2: Domain 1: FinTech Business Models and Their Vulnerabilities
2.1 Neobanks, Challenger Banks, and Digital Banking Models 2.2 Payment Processors, Gateways, and Merchant Acquirers 2.3 Buy Now, Pay Later (BNPL) and Alternative Credit 2.4 BaaS Architecture, Embedded Finance, and Program Structures
3 Chapter 3: Domain 1: Financial Crime Types and the Regulatory Perimeter
3.1 Types of Financial Crime and Predicate Offences 3.2 Licensing, Registration, Charters, and Regulatory Sandboxes 3.3 Virtual Asset Service Provider (VASP) Framework & FinCEN MSB Rules
4 Chapter 4: Domain 1: Global AML Frameworks and Sources of Guidance
4.1 U.S. Regulatory Architecture: BSA, PATRIOT Act, and AMLA 2020 4.2 European Union Regulatory Framework: AMLD6, the AML Package, and MiCA 4.3 International Standards: UK FCA, Singapore MAS, and Hong Kong HKMA 4.4 Sources of Guidance for Building Anti-Financial Crime Processes
5 Chapter 5: Domain 1: Risk Management Framework, Risk-Based Approach, and Data Protection
5.1 Risk Management Framework: Lines of Defence, Policies, Assurance, and the MLRO 5.2 Risk-Based Approach, Risk Assessment, Risk Appetite, and Types of Risk 5.3 Handling Sensitive Information: PII, SPII, Privacy Laws, and Breach Reporting
6 Chapter 6: Domain 1: Bank Partners and Internal Threats
6.1 Regulatory Expectations and Enforcement on Sponsor Banks 6.2 How Banks Risk-Rate FinTechs: Onboarding, Ongoing Oversight, and De-Risking 6.3 Controlling Internal Threats: Insider Fraud, Collusion, and Data Misuse
7 Chapter 7: Domain 2: CIP, KYC, CDD, and EDD
7.1 Customer Identification Program (CIP) Under USA PATRIOT Act §326 7.2 The FinCEN CDD Rule & Beneficial Ownership Standards 7.3 KYC to EDD: Applying CDD and Enhanced Due Diligence Across Customer Types
8 Chapter 8: Domain 2: Identity Verification, Data Sources, and Device Data
8.1 Digital Onboarding & Electronic KYC (eKYC) Foundations 8.2 Biometric Face Matching and Liveness Detection 8.3 Verification Data Sources and How to Judge Their Reliability 8.4 Device Fingerprinting, Geolocation, and Behavioral Biometrics
9 Chapter 9: Domain 2: Onboarding Screening, Risk Ratings, and Fraud Red Flags
9.1 Screening at Onboarding: Sanctions Lists, PEPs, and Known Fraudsters 9.2 Customer Risk Ratings: Factors, Data Sources, and How Scoring Models Work 9.3 Detecting Synthetic Identity Fraud and Ineligible Applicants 9.4 Deepfakes, Generative AI Threats, and Scam Typologies
10 Chapter 10: Domain 3: Payment Screening
10.1 OFAC Sanctions Regimes & the 50 Percent Rule 10.2 Real-Time vs. Batch Screening Architecture in High-Velocity Rails 10.3 Screening Logic: Fuzzy Matching, Phonetics, and PEP Controls
11 Chapter 11: Domain 3: Transaction Monitoring Systems and Red Flags
11.1 Hybrid Transaction Monitoring: Rules Engines vs. Machine Learning 11.2 FinTech Typologies: Mule Networks, Funnel Accounts, and Rapid Pass-Through 11.3 Fraud-AML Convergence: BIN Attacks, ATO, and Credential Stuffing 11.4 Model Risk Management Under SR 11-7 & System Optimization
12 Chapter 12: Domain 3: Payment Methods and Transaction Risk Characteristics
12.1 Common Payment Methods, Crypto, and High-Risk Transactions Such as Aggregation 12.2 Transaction Risk Characteristics: Reversibility, Convertibility, Fund Integrity, and Privacy Coins 12.3 Wallet Types, Custody Architectures, and Counterparty Risks 12.4 Stablecoins, On/Off Ramps, and Asset-Referenced Tokens
13 Chapter 13: Domain 3: Monitoring Crypto Transactions
13.1 Blockchain Analytics & Transaction Tracing 13.2 The FATF Travel Rule for Virtual Assets 13.3 DeFi, Mixers, and Smart Contract Sanctions
14 Chapter 14: Domain 3: Alert Investigation, Audit Trails, and Monitoring MI
14.1 The Alert Investigation Process: From Unusual to Suspicious and When to Escalate 14.2 Building an Audit Trail for Suspicious Activity Reviews 14.3 Communicating Monitoring Results: KPIs, KRIs, OKRs, and Management Information
15 Chapter 15: Domain 4: Investigations and Customer Communication
15.1 Talking to Customers During Investigations and Offboarding: Financial Crime Risk vs Policy Breach 15.2 Reviewing KYC, Transactions, Open Sources, and Documents to Build an Investigation 15.3 Analytical Principles in Investigations: Avoiding Confirmation Bias and Other Traps
16 Chapter 16: Domain 4: SARs and STRs
16.1 SARs and STRs: What They Are, When and Where to File, and Why They Matter 16.2 Writing Effective SAR and STR Narratives
17 Chapter 17: Domain 4: Law Enforcement, Regulators, and Banking Partners
17.1 Operational AML Governance and Third-Party Risk Management 17.2 Working With Law Enforcement, Banking Partners, Regulators, and Other Third Parties 17.3 Types of Law Enforcement Requests: Subpoenas, Court Orders, 314(a), and International Requests 17.4 How Banking Partners' Terms of Service Relate to the FinTech's Own Terms
18 Chapter 18: Domain 5: Scaling Anti-Financial Crime Strategies
18.1 Assessing New Products and Features Before Launch 18.2 Refreshing the Financial Crime Risk Assessment as the Business Scales 18.3 Changes That Should Trigger a Financial Crime Risk Assessment Review 18.4 Record Retention Rules and Secure Data Storage 18.5 Outsourcing Controls: Surge Capacity, RegTech, and Independent Testing
18.4 Record Retention Rules and Secure Data Storage
Key Takeaways Explain This Topic AI
US BSA rules generally require records to be kept for five years; CIP identifying information is kept for five years after the account closes.
UK Money Laundering Regulations require CDD and transaction records to be kept for five years after the relationship ends, then personal data deleted unless another legal basis applies.
Records must be retrievable fast enough for authority requests, such as reporting 314(a) matches within 14 days.
Legal holds for litigation, investigations or law enforcement requests suspend routine deletion of the affected records.
Last updated: October 2026
CAFCA sub-topic 5.4 covers the methods and rules of record retention and data storage . Retention lets authorities follow money years later. Storage design decides whether a scaling FinTech can find, protect and produce those records.
Retention rules in key jurisdictions
Record United States (BSA) UK (Money Laundering Regulations 2017) EU
CDD and identity CIP identifying information: 5 years after the account closes. Verification records: 5 years after they are made CDD evidence: 5 years after the business relationship ends (or after an occasional transaction) AML directives: 5 years after the relationship ends; national law may extend. The AML Regulation (from July 2027) keeps a five-year baseline
Transactions Generally 5 years (31 CFR 1010.430), including funds transfer records of US$3,000 or more 5 years from the transaction, kept within the relationship records 5 years
SAR / STR SAR and supporting documentation: 5 years from filing Internal and external reports kept under firm policy and legal advice As national law requires
Reports such as CTRs 5 years Not applicable Not applicable
The UK rules also say that after the retention period, personal data must be deleted unless the firm must keep it under another law or court order, or the person has consented. That puts the AML retention rule and data protection's storage limitation side by side.
Building a retention schedule
Inventory the data : identity documents and images, biometric templates, device and IP logs, transactions, case files, SAR records, screening results, communications.
Map each category to the rules that apply (AML, tax, consumer, privacy, contract) and choose the longest required period, without exceeding what is lawful.
Define the start event : account closure, transaction date or filing date.
Automate deletion or anonymisation after the period, with legal hold overrides.
Cover vendors : identity verification and screening vendors may keep copies of images or results. Contracts should say how long, where, and how the data is returned or deleted.
Test it : can you produce a five-year-old onboarding file, with its document image and verification result, today?
What a complete onboarding record contains
A retained onboarding file should let a reviewer rebuild the decision years later:
The identifying information collected and the date it was collected.
The documents inspected, or the results of non-documentary checks, including the source used, the date and the result.
Biometric or liveness results and the vendor reference, where used.
Screening results with the list version and the disposition of any match.
The risk rating at onboarding and the factors that produced it.
Any discrepancy and how it was resolved.
Approvals for higher-risk customers.
If any element sits only in a vendor's system, the firm must be able to retrieve it for the full retention period.
Storage requirements
Security : encryption, role-based access, logging, and segregation of SAR material (Chapter 5).
Integrity : protection against alteration, using version control or write-once storage for key records, and audit trails for edits.
Retrievability : indexed and searchable records, so that requests can be met on time. Examples include 314(a) match reports within 14 days and production orders with deadlines.
Completeness : the record must include the context, such as which list version was screened and which rule version fired (Chapter 14).
Location and localisation : some countries require certain data to stay in-country. India's central bank, for example, requires payment system data to be stored in India. Cross-border transfers need privacy safeguards.
Resilience : backups and disaster recovery that cover compliance records, not only customer-facing systems.
Cloud : a shared-responsibility model. The FinTech stays accountable for retention, access and deletion settings.
Legal holds
When litigation is expected, or a regulator or law enforcement request or investigation is under way, a legal hold must stop routine deletion of the relevant records. Holds need a clear trigger, scope, owner and release process. Deleting held records can amount to obstruction or spoliation.
Realistic exam scenario
To reduce privacy risk, a FinTech's engineers configure the identity verification vendor to delete document images and selfie results 90 days after onboarding. Two years later, law enforcement asks for the onboarding evidence for a mule account. The firm cannot produce the verification records it was required to keep. The firm must fix the retention settings to meet the five-year rules, and bring the vendor contract into line. It should assess whether other records were lost, consider regulatory disclosure, and document the remediation. Privacy goals are met by minimisation and security, not by deleting records the law requires.
Common exam traps
Deleting early for privacy reasons , breaching AML retention rules.
Keeping everything forever , breaching storage limitation.
Forgetting vendor-held copies.
Ignoring legal holds.