Study guide

Banking Products and High-Risk Sectors

CAMS Study Guide Exam

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1 Chapter 1: CAMS Orientation and Exam Facts

Current CAMS Exam Format Eligibility Credits and ACAMS Membership Package Pricing and Study Materials Pearson VUE Scheduling Window Passing Score and Result Reporting Exam Non-Disclosure and Practice Ethics

2 Chapter 2: Financial Crime Risks and Methods

AML, CFT, Sanctions, Fraud, ABC, and Tax Evasion Financial Systems and AFC Consequences Predicate Crimes and Financial Crime Exposure Sector, Product, Customer, Jurisdiction, and Channel Risk Banking Products and High-Risk Sectors Politically Exposed Persons and High-Risk Customers

3 Chapter 3: High-Risk Sectors and Structures

MSBs, PSPs, and E-commerce Platforms Insurance Product Risk VASPs, Cryptoassets, and Related Products Gaming, Gambling, and Real Estate Gatekeepers, Trusts, and Company Service Providers Accountants and Other High-Risk Structures

4 Chapter 4: Global AFC Frameworks

FATF Role and Recommendations United Nations Sanctions Regimes Regulators, Law Enforcement, and FIUs Public Sector, Private Sector, and NGO Objectives Cross-Border Cooperation Authority Reports, Trends, and Typologies

5 Chapter 5: Governance Regulations and Information Sharing

Risk-Based Regulatory Expectations Regulatory Examinations and Enforcement Public-Private Partnerships Information Sharing Mechanisms De-Risking and Financial Inclusion RFIs, Tipping Off, and Customer Communication

6 Chapter 6: AFC Compliance Program Design

Effective Program Pillars Three Lines of Defense and MLRO Role Risk Appetite Statement Enterprise Risk Assessment Risk-Based Controls Policies Standards and Procedures

7 Chapter 7: Program Governance and Operating Model

Horizon Scanning and Regulatory Guidance Governance Committees and Terms of Reference AFC Team Structure and Responsibilities Front Office Interaction Supporting Functions and Risk Partners Training, Awareness, and Staff Risk Culture

8 Chapter 8: Customer Lifecycle Controls

Control Tools Across the Customer Lifecycle Data Quality, Integrity, Access, and Taxonomy Customer Experience and Friction Digital Onboarding and Electronic KYC (e-KYC) External Data Sources and Beneficial Ownership Customer Screening and Sanctions Lists

9 Chapter 9: Ongoing Controls and Monitoring

Periodic Refresh and Perpetual KYC Adverse Media Screening Batch Screening and Fuzzy Logic Transaction and Payment Screening Rules-Based Transaction Monitoring Model Risk Management and Tuning

10 Chapter 10: Investigations and Case Support

Investigation Triggers and Case Triage Open Source Tools and Investigator Support Escalation and Suspicious Activity Decisions Documentation and Evidence Quality Law Enforcement and FIU Requests Post-Investigation Feedback Loops

11 Chapter 11: Technology and Emerging AFC Practice

AI and Machine Learning in AFC Controls Blockchain Transaction Screening Automation to Support Investigators Scenario Coverage and Threshold Setting Data Privacy, Cybersecurity, and Other Risk Functions Technology Governance for AFC Tools

12 Chapter 12: Final CAMS Review and Exam Day

Domain-Weighted Study Allocation Simulator Practice Without Actual Exam Claims Pearson VUE Identification and Test Rules Time Management and Guessing Strategy Retake Extension and Appeal Boundaries Recertification and Ongoing Membership

Banking Products and High-Risk Sectors

Key Takeaways Explain This Topic AI

Correspondent banking and trade finance are among the highest-risk banking products.

Nested accounts and payable-through accounts hide the true originator of funds.

Money services businesses, casinos, and dealers in precious metals are high-risk sectors.

Trade-based money laundering uses over- and under-invoicing to move value across borders.

Last updated: June 2026

High-Risk Banking Products

Certain banking products concentrate laundering risk because they obscure parties or move large value across borders. The CAMS exam tests the typology and the specific control for each.

Correspondent banking lets one bank (the respondent) access services through another (the correspondent), often cross-border. The correspondent may have no direct visibility into the respondent's underlying customers. The chief dangers are nested accounts (a respondent quietly providing access to its downstream banks) and payable-through accounts (a respondent's customers transacting directly through the correspondent's account).

The mitigant is robust correspondent due diligence: know-your-correspondent, restrictions on nesting, and a prohibition on shell banks (banks with no physical presence and no affiliation to a regulated group), barred under the USA PATRIOT Act.

Trade finance funds international commerce through letters of credit and similar instruments. Trade-based money laundering (TBML) moves value by mis-stating price, quantity, or quality of goods.

  • Product Core risk Key control
  • Correspondent banking Nested/payable-through accounts, shell banks Know-your-correspondent, no shell banks
  • Trade finance Over/under-invoicing, phantom shipments Document scrutiny, price benchmarking
  • Private banking Wealthy clients, PEPs, opacity Source-of-wealth/funds verification
  • Wire transfers / RTP Speed, layering, mule flows Originator/beneficiary data (Travel Rule)
  • Trade-Based Money Laundering in Detail

TBML is a favorite exam topic. The classic techniques:

Over-invoicing — exporter overstates price to move extra value to the exporter's side.

Under-invoicing — exporter understates price to move value to the importer.

Multiple invoicing — billing repeatedly for one shipment.

Phantom shipments — no goods move at all, only paperwork and payment.

Red flags include prices far off market benchmarks, goods routed through unrelated high-risk jurisdictions, shipments inconsistent with the customer's business, and amendments to letters of credit that change beneficiaries or value at the last minute. Because trade documents (invoices, bills of lading, packing lists) are easy to falsify and banks rarely see the physical goods, TBML is among the hardest typologies to detect, which is why the exam treats price benchmarking and trade-data analytics as essential controls rather than optional ones.

High-Risk Sectors

Beyond products, whole sectors warrant heightened scrutiny:

Money services businesses (MSBs) — money transmitters, currency exchangers, check cashers; high cash volume and speed.

Casinos and gaming — chips and credits can convert cash to apparently clean winnings; refining is the laundering analog of layering.

Dealers in precious metals, stones, and art — high value, portability, opaque valuation.

Real estate — large value, beneficial-ownership opacity, integration-stage favorite.

Worked Example

A correspondent bank notices that a foreign respondent's account is processing payments for several banks it never onboarded. This is nested activity — the respondent is reselling access. The correspondent should demand transparency, restrict or terminate the nesting, and assess whether a SAR is warranted. Doing nothing exposes the correspondent to the downstream banks' risk it never assessed.

Common Traps

Assuming the correspondent can rely entirely on the respondent's controls — it cannot ignore nesting.

Treating trade finance as low risk because documents look complete; TBML hides in pricing, not paperwork format.

Forgetting that shell banks are prohibited, not merely high risk.

Overlooking casinos and dealers in high-value goods as full obligated entities in many regimes.

The Wire Transfer Travel Rule

Wire transfers and modern real-time payment rails move value fast, which aids the layering stage. The control the exam tests is the Travel Rule : FATF Recommendation 16 requires that originator and beneficiary information "travel" with a transfer so each institution in the chain can screen and monitor it. Required data typically includes originator name, account/reference number, and address or other identifier, plus beneficiary name and account. Missing or meaningless originator information ("the customer") is itself a red flag and may require the receiving institution to seek the data, restrict, or reject the payment.

FATF has extended the Travel Rule to virtual asset transfers , so VASPs must collect and pass equivalent information.

Casinos, Refining, and High-Value Dealers

Casinos illustrate sector-specific laundering. A launderer buys chips with cash, plays minimally, and cashes out for a check described as "winnings" — converting cash to an apparently legitimate instrument. This is the gaming analog of layering and integration. In many regimes casinos are full obligated entities that must perform CDD and file reports above thresholds. Dealers in precious metals, stones, jewelry, and art present portability and opaque valuation; a single suitcase can hold enormous value, and prices are subjective, making over/under-valuation easy.

The art market specifically has drawn new obligations because anonymity and shell-company buyers obscure beneficial ownership.

Money Services Businesses and Nonprofits

Money services businesses (MSBs) — money transmitters, currency exchangers, check cashers, and crypto on-ramps — combine high cash volume, speed, and often a global agent network the principal cannot fully see. Controls include agent due diligence, transaction limits, and monitoring for structuring across agents. Nonprofit organizations (NPOs) can be abused for terrorist financing through cross-border disbursements to high-risk regions; FATF cautions against treating the entire NPO sector as high risk, instead requiring a targeted, risk-based approach so legitimate charities are not de-risked out of the system.

As always, identify the product or sector, name its core typology, and select the matching control rather than reflexively exiting the relationship.