Study guide
Cross-Border Cooperation
CAMS Study Guide Exam
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1 Chapter 1: CAMS Orientation and Exam Facts
Current CAMS Exam Format Eligibility Credits and ACAMS Membership Package Pricing and Study Materials Pearson VUE Scheduling Window Passing Score and Result Reporting Exam Non-Disclosure and Practice Ethics
2 Chapter 2: Financial Crime Risks and Methods
AML, CFT, Sanctions, Fraud, ABC, and Tax Evasion Financial Systems and AFC Consequences Predicate Crimes and Financial Crime Exposure Sector, Product, Customer, Jurisdiction, and Channel Risk Banking Products and High-Risk Sectors Politically Exposed Persons and High-Risk Customers
3 Chapter 3: High-Risk Sectors and Structures
MSBs, PSPs, and E-commerce Platforms Insurance Product Risk VASPs, Cryptoassets, and Related Products Gaming, Gambling, and Real Estate Gatekeepers, Trusts, and Company Service Providers Accountants and Other High-Risk Structures
4 Chapter 4: Global AFC Frameworks
FATF Role and Recommendations United Nations Sanctions Regimes Regulators, Law Enforcement, and FIUs Public Sector, Private Sector, and NGO Objectives Cross-Border Cooperation Authority Reports, Trends, and Typologies
5 Chapter 5: Governance Regulations and Information Sharing
Risk-Based Regulatory Expectations Regulatory Examinations and Enforcement Public-Private Partnerships Information Sharing Mechanisms De-Risking and Financial Inclusion RFIs, Tipping Off, and Customer Communication
6 Chapter 6: AFC Compliance Program Design
Effective Program Pillars Three Lines of Defense and MLRO Role Risk Appetite Statement Enterprise Risk Assessment Risk-Based Controls Policies Standards and Procedures
7 Chapter 7: Program Governance and Operating Model
Horizon Scanning and Regulatory Guidance Governance Committees and Terms of Reference AFC Team Structure and Responsibilities Front Office Interaction Supporting Functions and Risk Partners Training, Awareness, and Staff Risk Culture
8 Chapter 8: Customer Lifecycle Controls
Control Tools Across the Customer Lifecycle Data Quality, Integrity, Access, and Taxonomy Customer Experience and Friction Digital Onboarding and Electronic KYC (e-KYC) External Data Sources and Beneficial Ownership Customer Screening and Sanctions Lists
9 Chapter 9: Ongoing Controls and Monitoring
Periodic Refresh and Perpetual KYC Adverse Media Screening Batch Screening and Fuzzy Logic Transaction and Payment Screening Rules-Based Transaction Monitoring Model Risk Management and Tuning
10 Chapter 10: Investigations and Case Support
Investigation Triggers and Case Triage Open Source Tools and Investigator Support Escalation and Suspicious Activity Decisions Documentation and Evidence Quality Law Enforcement and FIU Requests Post-Investigation Feedback Loops
11 Chapter 11: Technology and Emerging AFC Practice
AI and Machine Learning in AFC Controls Blockchain Transaction Screening Automation to Support Investigators Scenario Coverage and Threshold Setting Data Privacy, Cybersecurity, and Other Risk Functions Technology Governance for AFC Tools
12 Chapter 12: Final CAMS Review and Exam Day
Domain-Weighted Study Allocation Simulator Practice Without Actual Exam Claims Pearson VUE Identification and Test Rules Time Management and Guessing Strategy Retake Extension and Appeal Boundaries Recertification and Ongoing Membership
Cross-Border Cooperation
Key Takeaways Explain This Topic AI
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) are the formal channel for obtaining evidence and assistance across borders.
FIU-to-FIU exchange via the Egmont Group is faster and intelligence-based, but Egmont information generally cannot be used as evidence without consent.
FATF Recommendations 36-40 cover international instruments, mutual legal assistance, extradition, and other forms of cooperation.
Bank secrecy and data-protection laws cannot be used to refuse cooperation under the FATF standards.
Last updated: June 2026
Why Cross-Border Cooperation Matters
Money laundering and terrorist financing are inherently transnational : funds layered through shell companies in one jurisdiction may settle as real estate in another. No single country's authorities can follow the money alone, so the FATF standards devote an entire block — Recommendations 36 through 40 — to international cooperation. CAMS tests both the channels of cooperation and their limits .
Formal vs. Informal Channels
There are two broad routes, and confusing them is a classic exam error.
Channel Nature Typical use Evidentiary value
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) Formal, government-to-government Obtaining evidence, freezing/seizing assets, taking testimony Admissible as evidence
FIU-to-FIU exchange (Egmont) Informal, intelligence Early-stage information gathering, lead generation Intelligence only; needs consent for evidentiary use
A Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) is a formal bilateral or multilateral agreement under which one country's authorities request evidence, asset freezing, or witness testimony from another. MLATs are slower but produce material that can be used in court . By contrast, FIU-to-FIU exchange through the Egmont Group and its Egmont Secure Web is fast and used to develop leads, but Egmont information is shared for intelligence and generally cannot be used as evidence in a prosecution without the disseminating FIU's prior consent . This MLAT-versus-FIU distinction is among the most reliably tested points in this domain.
Other mechanisms include Interpol (police-to-police cooperation, e.g., notices), letters rogatory (formal court-to-court requests where no treaty exists), and supervisor-to-supervisor cooperation among regulators.
The FATF Cooperation Recommendations
R.36 — Ratify and implement international conventions (Vienna, Palermo, Merida, Terrorist Financing Convention).
R.37 — Provide the widest possible mutual legal assistance .
R.38 — Cooperate on freezing, seizing, and confiscating assets, including non-conviction-based forfeiture where possible.
R.39 — Support extradition for ML/TF offenses.
R.40 — Enable other forms of cooperation among FIUs, supervisors, and law enforcement.
Limits and Common Traps
A cornerstone principle: bank secrecy and data-protection laws cannot be invoked to refuse cooperation under FATF Recommendations (notably R.9 on financial-institution secrecy). A jurisdiction that hides behind secrecy is a candidate for the grey list.
Common traps:
Egmont/FIU information is intelligence, not evidence — using it in court without consent breaches the gateway; an MLAT is the evidentiary channel.
Bank secrecy is not a valid reason to refuse mutual legal assistance under the FATF standards.
Letters rogatory are the fallback where no MLAT exists, not the primary fast channel.
Dual criminality may be required for extradition, but FATF urges the widest possible assistance, so over-restrictive answers are usually wrong.
Choosing the Right Channel
Worked example: an FIU analyst suspects that proceeds traced to a shell company have moved to a bank in another country. To develop the lead quickly, the analyst sends an Egmont request to the foreign FIU and learns the account holder and recent activity — fast, but intelligence only. To freeze the account and obtain bank records admissible at trial, the prosecutor must then submit an MLAT request through the central authority (in the US, the Office of International Affairs at the Department of Justice). The two channels are sequential and complementary: the FIU exchange opens the lead, the MLAT secures the evidence.
Picking the FIU route to get court evidence, or the MLAT route to get a fast investigative tip, is the classic wrong choice.
Understand the conventions underpinning cooperation, since R.36 requires their implementation. The Vienna Convention (1988) addressed drug-trafficking proceeds, the Palermo Convention (2000) covered transnational organized crime, the Merida Convention (2003) addressed corruption, and the Terrorist Financing Convention (1999) targeted TF. These treaties create the obligations that MLATs and extradition rest on, which is why a jurisdiction that has not ratified them is more likely to draw FATF criticism.
Finally, note the speed-versus-rigor trade-off. Informal channels — FIU exchange, supervisor-to-supervisor cooperation, Interpol notices — are quick but limited in evidentiary use. Formal channels — MLATs, letters rogatory, extradition — are slower but produce admissible material and enforceable action. CAMS scenario items reward matching the channel to the objective: gather intelligence early through informal cooperation, then convert to formal cooperation when evidence or enforcement is required.
Asset recovery is the payoff of cross-border cooperation and a recurring exam theme. Under R.38, countries cooperate to freeze, seize, and confiscate laundered proceeds, and many systems now allow non-conviction-based forfeiture , which lets authorities recover assets even without a criminal conviction of the holder. The practical sequence is freeze first to prevent dissipation, then seize, then confiscate following the legal process, with the requesting and requested states coordinating throughout. Institutions support this by responding promptly to lawful freezing and production orders and by preserving records.
A scenario that has authorities waiting until after trial to freeze obviously dissipating assets is testing the principle that freezing must come early; the windows for recovering moved funds close quickly once layering and integration are complete.
A last point candidates should hold: cross-border cooperation rests on trust and confidentiality . Information shared through Egmont or an MLAT carries conditions on use and onward disclosure, and breaching them damages the relationship and can shut off future cooperation. This is why the disseminating FIU's consent governs evidentiary use, and why authorities respect the agreed purpose of shared data.
The mature, exam-correct posture is to use the fast informal channel to orient an investigation, escalate to the formal channel for anything that must stand up in court or freeze assets, honor every confidentiality condition attached to received information, and never treat secrecy laws as a shield — because under the FATF standards they are not one.