Study guide

Accountants and Other High-Risk Structures

CAMS Study Guide Exam

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1 Chapter 1: CAMS Orientation and Exam Facts

Current CAMS Exam Format Eligibility Credits and ACAMS Membership Package Pricing and Study Materials Pearson VUE Scheduling Window Passing Score and Result Reporting Exam Non-Disclosure and Practice Ethics

2 Chapter 2: Financial Crime Risks and Methods

AML, CFT, Sanctions, Fraud, ABC, and Tax Evasion Financial Systems and AFC Consequences Predicate Crimes and Financial Crime Exposure Sector, Product, Customer, Jurisdiction, and Channel Risk Banking Products and High-Risk Sectors Politically Exposed Persons and High-Risk Customers

3 Chapter 3: High-Risk Sectors and Structures

MSBs, PSPs, and E-commerce Platforms Insurance Product Risk VASPs, Cryptoassets, and Related Products Gaming, Gambling, and Real Estate Gatekeepers, Trusts, and Company Service Providers Accountants and Other High-Risk Structures

4 Chapter 4: Global AFC Frameworks

FATF Role and Recommendations United Nations Sanctions Regimes Regulators, Law Enforcement, and FIUs Public Sector, Private Sector, and NGO Objectives Cross-Border Cooperation Authority Reports, Trends, and Typologies

5 Chapter 5: Governance Regulations and Information Sharing

Risk-Based Regulatory Expectations Regulatory Examinations and Enforcement Public-Private Partnerships Information Sharing Mechanisms De-Risking and Financial Inclusion RFIs, Tipping Off, and Customer Communication

6 Chapter 6: AFC Compliance Program Design

Effective Program Pillars Three Lines of Defense and MLRO Role Risk Appetite Statement Enterprise Risk Assessment Risk-Based Controls Policies Standards and Procedures

7 Chapter 7: Program Governance and Operating Model

Horizon Scanning and Regulatory Guidance Governance Committees and Terms of Reference AFC Team Structure and Responsibilities Front Office Interaction Supporting Functions and Risk Partners Training, Awareness, and Staff Risk Culture

8 Chapter 8: Customer Lifecycle Controls

Control Tools Across the Customer Lifecycle Data Quality, Integrity, Access, and Taxonomy Customer Experience and Friction Digital Onboarding and Electronic KYC (e-KYC) External Data Sources and Beneficial Ownership Customer Screening and Sanctions Lists

9 Chapter 9: Ongoing Controls and Monitoring

Periodic Refresh and Perpetual KYC Adverse Media Screening Batch Screening and Fuzzy Logic Transaction and Payment Screening Rules-Based Transaction Monitoring Model Risk Management and Tuning

10 Chapter 10: Investigations and Case Support

Investigation Triggers and Case Triage Open Source Tools and Investigator Support Escalation and Suspicious Activity Decisions Documentation and Evidence Quality Law Enforcement and FIU Requests Post-Investigation Feedback Loops

11 Chapter 11: Technology and Emerging AFC Practice

AI and Machine Learning in AFC Controls Blockchain Transaction Screening Automation to Support Investigators Scenario Coverage and Threshold Setting Data Privacy, Cybersecurity, and Other Risk Functions Technology Governance for AFC Tools

12 Chapter 12: Final CAMS Review and Exam Day

Domain-Weighted Study Allocation Simulator Practice Without Actual Exam Claims Pearson VUE Identification and Test Rules Time Management and Guessing Strategy Retake Extension and Appeal Boundaries Recertification and Ongoing Membership

Accountants and Other High-Risk Structures

Key Takeaways Explain This Topic AI

Accountants can be misused to disguise illicit funds as legitimate revenue through false invoicing, commingling, and fabricated accounts.

Trade-based money laundering (TBML) moves value via over- and under-invoicing, multiple invoicing, and misdescribed goods rather than cash transfers.

Charities and non-profit organizations (NPOs) can be exploited for terrorist financing through diverted donations and front operations.

Free trade zones, dealers in precious metals and stones (DPMS), and high-value goods dealers create additional placement and integration channels.

Last updated: June 2026

How Accountants Are Misused

Accountants and auditors are gatekeepers who can give illicit funds the appearance of legitimate business income. They are FATF-designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs) when they handle client funds, manage assets, or create companies. The misuse patterns:

False or inflated invoicing : recording fictitious sales so dirty cash appears as revenue.

Commingling : blending illicit funds with a cash-intensive legitimate business (a restaurant, car wash, or laundromat) so the proceeds look like takings.

Fabricated loans and intercompany transfers : documenting 'loans' that are really laundered capital, often between related shells.

Tax-driven layering : structuring transactions to obscure both the source and the tax position.

An accountant who turns a blind eye, or who actively books fictitious entries, becomes a professional enabler. The CAMS exam asks you to recognize when bookkeeping is being used as a laundering tool and which control — source-of-funds verification, scrutiny of related-party transactions, or a suspicious-activity report — fits. Recall the exam frame: 120 questions, 3.5 hours, passing score 75, no penalty for guessing, delivered at Pearson VUE. This material draws on Understanding the Risks and Methods of Financial Crime .

Trade-Based Money Laundering and Front Businesses

Trade-based money laundering (TBML) disguises the proceeds of crime by manipulating trade transactions, moving value without conspicuously moving cash. It is among the hardest typologies to detect because real goods and real paperwork are involved. Core techniques:

  • TBML technique Mechanism
  • Over-invoicing Buyer overpays the seller, shifting extra value to the seller's side
  • Under-invoicing Seller undercharges, shifting value to the buyer's side
  • Multiple invoicing The same goods are invoiced several times to justify multiple payments
  • Over- or under-shipment Quantity on documents differs from goods actually shipped
  • Misdescription of goods Cheap goods billed as high-value (or the reverse)
  • Phantom shipment No goods move at all; only the paperwork and payment

Red flags: prices wildly out of line with the market, goods routed through unrelated high-risk jurisdictions, payment from a third party unrelated to the trade, and documentation inconsistencies between the bill of lading, invoice, and letter of credit. Cash-intensive front businesses complement TBML by providing a plausible source of cash deposits. The exam expects you to spot the value-transfer mechanism even when no large cash transaction appears.

Charities, High-Value Goods, and Controls

Several other structures concentrate risk:

Charities and non-profit organizations (NPOs) are a recognized terrorist-financing vector (FATF Recommendation 8). Donations can be diverted, a charity can act as a front, or funds can be wired to high-risk conflict zones under humanitarian cover. The control is risk-based oversight — not blanket de-risking, which FATF warns against because it pushes legitimate charities out of the banking system.

Dealers in precious metals and stones (DPMS) and high-value goods dealers (art, luxury vehicles, jewelry) enable placement and integration; in the US, dealers must file Form 8300 for cash received above USD 10,000.

Free trade zones offer reduced oversight that facilitates TBML and re-invoicing.

Controls across these structures: verify source of funds and source of wealth , scrutinize related-party and third-party payments, apply EDD for NPOs operating in conflict zones and for high-value cash purchases, and reconcile trade documents against shipment reality.

Worked scenario: A charity receives large cash donations from unrelated donors and immediately wires the bulk to a region with active armed conflict, with little record of program activity. The CAMS-correct response is risk-based EDD — verify the program, the recipients, and the source of donations, and file a suspicious report if terrorist-financing indicators persist — rather than either ignoring the pattern or de-risking the entire charity sector. Choosing proportionate, evidence-based action over an extreme response is the exam's recurring test.

Detecting TBML, Reporting Triggers, and Exam Pitfalls

Because trade-based money laundering hides value inside legitimate-looking commerce, detection relies on document reconciliation rather than transaction-amount alarms. Compare the invoice, the bill of lading, the letter of credit, and customs declarations against one another and against market reality: a mismatch in quantity, price, goods description, or shipping route is the signal. Watch for circular trade (goods that return to the original seller), payment from or to a third party unconnected to the trade, and structuring of letter-of-credit drawdowns.

Front businesses that are cash-intensive — restaurants, car washes, parking lots — should show revenue consistent with footfall and capacity; deposits that exceed plausible takings indicate commingling.

Know the US reporting trigger for non-bank trades: a dealer in goods must file Form 8300 when it receives more than USD 10,000 in cash (or cash equivalents) in one transaction or related transactions, which captures dealers in precious metals and stones (DPMS), luxury vehicles, and art. This is distinct from the bank CTR even though both share the USD 10,000 figure.

Exam pitfalls for this section: do not look only for large cash movements — TBML and accountant-enabled laundering deliberately avoid them, so the answer often hinges on document or related-party anomalies. Do not treat the charity/NPO sector as a candidate for blanket de-risking; FATF favors targeted, risk-based oversight. Do not assume an accountant's involvement legitimizes a transaction; the accountant may be the enabler. And distinguish the various USD 10,000 triggers — bank CTR, casino CTRC, and dealer Form 8300 — which apply to different obliged parties.

A CAMS-strong answer identifies the value-transfer mechanism, names the correct obliged party and reporting trigger, applies source-of-funds and related-party scrutiny, and selects a proportionate, evidence-based control rather than an extreme reaction. Logging the typology, threshold, and obliged party after each missed item reinforces these high-yield distinctions.