Study guide
4.2 Cisco TrustSec, Security Group Tags (SGT), SXP & MACsec
CCNP Enterprise ENCOR 350-401
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1 Chapter 1: Enterprise Architecture & Hierarchical Design
1.1 Enterprise Network Design Models & Hierarchical Campus Architecture 1.2 On-Premises, Cloud & Hybrid Infrastructure Deployment Models 1.3 Hardware Switching Architecture & Packet Forwarding
2 Chapter 2: Enterprise Quality of Service (QoS)
2.1 QoS Components: Classification, Marking & Trust Boundaries 2.2 QoS Policy: Queuing, Shaping, Policing & Interpreting MQC Output
3 Chapter 3: Software-Defined WAN (Catalyst SD-WAN)
3.1 Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Architecture & Orchestration 3.2 SD-WAN Policies, Traffic Engineering & Application-Aware Routing
4 Chapter 4: Software-Defined Access (Catalyst SD-Access)
4.1 Catalyst SD-Access Fabric Architecture & Plane Separation 4.2 Cisco TrustSec, Security Group Tags (SGT), SXP & MACsec
5 Chapter 5: Device & Data Path Virtualization
5.1 Server & Network Device Virtualization 5.2 VRF-Lite & Virtual Routing Multi-Tenancy 5.3 GRE & IPsec Tunnel Virtualization Mechanics
6 Chapter 6: Network Virtualization & Overlay Technologies
6.1 LISP Architecture & EID-to-RLOC Mapping Mechanics 6.2 VXLAN & EVPN Overlay Architecture
7 Chapter 7: Layer 2 Infrastructure & Switching
7.1 VLANs, 802.1Q Trunking & VTPv3 7.2 Spanning Tree Protocol Mechanics 7.3 Advanced STP Protection Mechanisms 7.4 EtherChannel Link Aggregation
8 Chapter 8: Layer 3 Routing Foundations & EIGRP
8.1 IP Routing Foundations & Administrative Distance 8.2 Enhanced Interior Gateway Routing Protocol (EIGRP)
9 Chapter 9: OSPFv2 & OSPFv3 Operations
9.1 OSPFv2 Architecture & Neighbor State Machine 9.2 OSPF LSA Types & Multi-Area Design 9.3 OSPFv3 for IPv4 and IPv6 Address Families
10 Chapter 10: Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)
10.1 BGP Architecture, Neighbor States & Peering 10.2 BGP Path Attributes & Best Path Selection Algorithm
11 Chapter 11: Policy-Based Routing & Route Redistribution
11.1 Policy-Based Routing (PBR) & Route Maps 11.2 Route Redistribution & Loop Prevention
12 Chapter 12: IP Services & High Availability
12.1 First Hop Redundancy Protocols (HSRP, VRRP & GLBP) 12.2 Network Time Protocol (NTPv4) & Precision Time Protocol (PTP) 12.3 Network Address Translation (NAT/PAT) & VRF-Aware NAT
13 Chapter 13: IP Multicast Operations
13.1 IP Multicast Addressing, Group Management (IGMPv1/v2/v3) & IGMP Snooping 13.2 Protocol Independent Multicast (PIM-SM, PIM-SSM & Bidir-PIM) 13.3 Rendezvous Point (RP) Distribution Mechanisms
14 Chapter 14: Network Assurance & Monitoring
14.1 Diagnostic Utilities, Conditional Debugging & Path MTU Discovery 14.2 Syslog Architecture, Logging Facilities & Severity Levels 14.3 SNMPv1/v2c/v3 Security & Flexible NetFlow (FNF) Architecture 14.4 Switched Port Analyzer (SPAN, RSPAN, ERSPAN) & IP SLA Object Tracking
15 Chapter 15: Catalyst Center Assurance & Controller Operations
15.1 Cisco Catalyst Center (DNA Center) Assurance & AI Network Analytics 15.2 Cisco Catalyst Center Device Onboarding & Software Image Management (SWIM)
16 Chapter 16: Enterprise Security & Access Control
16.1 Device Hardening, AAA Architecture & RADIUS/TACACS+ 16.2 Access Control Lists (ACLs) for Infrastructure Security 16.3 Control Plane Policing (CoPP) & Control Plane Protection (CPPr) 16.4 Layer 2 Infrastructure Security Features 16.5 IEEE 802.1X Port-Based Authentication & MAB
17 Chapter 17: Threat Defense & API Security
17.1 Enterprise VPN Technologies (DMVPN Phase 1/2/3 & FlexVPN) 17.2 Next-Generation Threat Defense & Secure Access Service Edge (SASE)
18 Chapter 18: Network Automation, Programmability & Data Modeling
18.1 Python Fundamentals for Network Engineers & Cisco Libraries 18.2 YANG Data Modeling Language (RFC 6020/7950) & Model Types 18.3 REST API Architecture, HTTP Verbs, Security & Cisco Controller APIs 18.4 Model-Driven Telemetry (MDT) & NETCONF/RESTCONF Operations
19 Chapter 19: Orchestration, EEM & AI Operations
19.1 Configuration Management & Infrastructure as Code (Ansible & Terraform) 19.2 Cisco Embedded Event Manager (EEM) & Intent-Based Networking
4.2 Cisco TrustSec, Security Group Tags (SGT), SXP & MACsec
Key Takeaways Explain This Topic AI
Cisco TrustSec implements identity-based network segmentation by separating security policies into three functional phases: Ingress Classification, Tagging (Transport), and Egress Enforcement.
Security Group Tags (SGTs) are 16-bit numeric identifiers (values 1–65535) assigned to endpoints dynamically via 802.1X/MAB/ISE RADIUS attributes or statically via IP/Subnet/VLAN-to-SGT mappings.
TrustSec Scalable Group ACLs (SGACLs) enforce role-based access control policies at egress switch ports using a 2D source-to-destination SGT matrix programmed directly into hardware TCAM.
SGTs reach the enforcement point either inline -- embedded in the packet via the VXLAN-GPO Group Policy ID in SD-Access or the Cisco Meta Data (CMD) field carried in 802.1AE on classical Ethernet -- or out of band via the SGT Exchange Protocol (SXP) over TCP port 64999 in Speaker, Listener, or Both peering modes, which is how bindings cross non-TrustSec-capable devices; SXP is specified in the IETF draft draft-smith-kandula-sxp, not in any RFC.
MACsec (IEEE 802.1AE) is hop-by-hop Layer 2 encryption decrypted and re-encrypted at every link, which is precisely why an intermediate switch can still read and act on the CMD/SGT header, unlike end-to-end IPsec.
Last updated: August 2026
4.2 Cisco TrustSec, Security Group Tags (SGT) & SXP Protocol
Traditional enterprise security segmentation relies on IP-based Access Control Lists (ACLs) applied at router and firewall interfaces. However, in modern mobile and cloud-connected campus environments, IP-based filtering exhibits severe operational limitations: IP addresses change frequently as users roam, ACLs expand to thousands of unmanageable lines, and subnets become tightly coupled to physical topology.
Cisco TrustSec solves these scalability challenges by introducing Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) . Rather than inspecting source and destination IP addresses, TrustSec assigns a cryptographic or logical Security Group Tag (SGT) to users and endpoints upon authentication, enforcing policy independently of underlying IP addressing and physical topology. +-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
- | CISCO TRUSTSEC 3-PILLAR LIFECYCLE |
- +-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
- | |
- | [1. CLASSIFICATION] [2. TAGGING / TRANSPORT] [3. ENFORCEMENT] |
- | (Ingress Edge) (Network Fabric) (Egress Edge) |
- | - 802.1X / MAB via Cisco ISE - Inline Tagging: - Look up Dest SGT |
- | - RADIUS Access-Accept with SGT * VXLAN-GPO (16-bit ID) - Read Src SGT Tag |
- | - Static IP/Subnet/VLAN mapping * CMD / 802.1AE EtherType - Evaluate Matrix |
- | - Assigns Source SGT (e.g. SGT 4)- Control Plane: - Apply SGACL |
- | * SXP (TCP Port 64999) in Hardware TCAM |
- +-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
- 1. Cisco TrustSec Architecture & Plane Separation
Cisco TrustSec organizes security enforcement into three discrete, decoupled phases:
Phase 1: Classification (Ingress)
Classification occurs at the edge of the network when an endpoint first connects. The ingress switch determines the identity and authorization of the device and assigns a Source Security Group Tag (SGT) .
Phase 2: Tagging / Propagation (Transport)
Once assigned, the SGT must be communicated across the network infrastructure to the device responsible for policy enforcement. SGT transport occurs either:
In-Band (Inline Tagging): Embedding the SGT into the packet header on every hop (e.g., VXLAN-GPO Group Policy ID or Cisco Meta Data [CMD] / 802.1AE).
Out-of-Band (SXP): Propagating IP-to-SGT binding tables over a dedicated control protocol ( SGT Exchange Protocol - SXP ) when intermediate transit switches do not support inline tagging.
Phase 3: Enforcement (Egress)
Policy enforcement occurs at the egress network node immediately before the packet is delivered to the destination endpoint. The egress switch knows the destination host's SGT (from its local endpoint table) and extracts the source SGT from the incoming packet header. It then evaluates the Scalable Group ACL (SGACL) matrix in hardware TCAM to permit or deny the flow. +-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
- | WHY ENFORCEMENT OCCURS AT EGRESS (SCALE ADVANTAGE) |
- +-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
- | INGRESS ENFORCEMENT (Not Scalable): |
- | - Ingress switch must know the SGT of EVERY destination host in the global enterprise|
- | - Requires massive TCAM tables on every access switch and high lookup latency. |
- | |
- | EGRESS ENFORCEMENT (TrustSec Architectural Model): |
- | - Ingress switch only needs to know the LOCAL source host's SGT (Classify & Tag).|
- | - Egress switch only needs the SGACL rules for LOCAL destination hosts attached |
- | to its own ports. Massive reduction in TCAM memory consumption! |
- +-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Loading diagram... Cisco TrustSec Classification, Tagging, and Egress Enforcement Architecture
- 2. Security Group Tags (SGT) & Segmentation Hierarchy
- The SGT Format
A Security Group Tag (SGT) is a 16-bit integer value ranging from 1 to 65,535 :
SGT 0: Reserved to denote an Unknown / Untagged endpoint.
SGT 1: Default SGT for unclassified traffic.
SGT 2: Reserved for TrustSec-capable network devices (Control Plane communication).
SGTs 3–65,535: Dynamically or statically assigned to users, endpoints, servers, and IoT devices based on role.
Macro-Segmentation vs. Micro-Segmentation
TrustSec delivers layered, defense-in-depth segmentation: +-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
- | MACRO-SEGMENTATION VS. MICRO-SEGMENTATION |
- +-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
- | MACRO-SEGMENTATION (Virtual Networks / VRFs) |
- | +-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |
- | | CORP VRF (VNI 4099) | GUEST VRF (VNI 4100) | |
- | | +-------------------------------------+ | +-----------------------------+ | |
- | | | MICRO-SEGMENTATION (SGTs & SGACLs) | | | Micro-Segmentation: | | |
- | | | - Employees (SGT 4) | | | - Guest Users (SGT 99) | | |
- | | | - Contractors (SGT 5) | | | | | |
- | | | - HR Servers (SGT 10) | | | | | |
- | | | [SGACL: SGT 5 -> SGT 10: DENY] | | | | | |
- | | +-------------------------------------+ | +-----------------------------+ | |
- | +-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |
- | * Inter-VRF traffic is completely blocked unless routed via an external Firewall | |
- +-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
- SGT Classification Methods
Endpoints can be classified and mapped to SGTs using dynamic or static mechanisms:
Dynamic SGT Classification (Recommended):
802.1X / MAB / WebAuth: When an endpoint authenticates through Cisco ISE, ISE evaluates authorization policies (user group, device OS, posture compliance, location) and returns a RADIUS Access-Accept message with the Cisco vendor-specific attribute ( Cisco AV-Pair ): cisco-av-pair = cts:security-group-tag=0004-00
The switch assigns SGT 4 to the ingress physical port or authenticated MAC session dynamically.
Static SGT Classification:
IP-to-SGT Mapping: Statically binds a single host IP address to an SGT ( cts role-based ip-to-sgt 10.2.2.100 tag 10 ). Typically used for legacy data center servers.
Subnet-to-SGT Mapping: Binds an entire IP subnet CIDR block to an SGT ( cts role-based ip-to-sgt 10.5.0.0/16 tag 20 ).
VLAN-to-SGT Mapping: Assigns an SGT to all unauthenticated packets arriving on a specific VLAN ( cts role-based vlan-to-sgt 100 tag 30 ). Useful during brownfield migrations.
Port/Interface-to-SGT Mapping: Statically assigns an SGT to all traffic entering a physical switch port ( cts role-based sgt 50 ). Ideal for dedicated server or WAN uplinks.
3. Scalable Group ACLs (SGACLs) & The Policy Matrix
Traditional ACLs evaluate standard 5-tuple packet headers (Source IP, Destination IP, Protocol, Source Port, Destination Port). A policy matrix between M M M source subnets and N N N destination subnets requires M × N M \times N M × N separate ACL lines, causing rule explosion.
In contrast, Scalable Group ACLs (SGACLs) evaluate access permissions based on Source SGT and Destination SGT .
The TrustSec Policy Matrix
The security matrix is a 2-dimensional grid where rows represent Source SGTs (Initiators) and columns represent Destination SGTs (Targets) . Each cell at the intersection contains an SGACL policy rule. +-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
- | TRUSTSEC SECURITY POLICY MATRIX |
- +-----------------------+--------------------+------------------+-------------------+
- | Source SGT \ Dest SGT | SGT 4 (Employees) | SGT 5 (Contract) | SGT 10 (HR Serv) |
- +-----------------------+--------------------+------------------+-------------------+
- | SGT 4 (Employees) | PERMIT ALL | PERMIT (Web/ICMP)| PERMIT (HTTPS/SSH)|
- | SGT 5 (Contractors) | DENY ALL | PERMIT ALL | DENY ALL |
- | SGT 10 (HR Servers) | PERMIT (Return) | DENY ALL | PERMIT ALL |
- +-----------------------+--------------------+------------------+-------------------+
SGACL Rule Definition Example ! Define an SGACL permitting HTTPS (TCP 443) and SSH (TCP 22) while denying all other IP traffic
- Switch(config)# ip access-list role-based SGACL_HR_ACCESS
- Switch(config-ext-nacl)# permit tcp dst eq 443
- Switch(config-ext-nacl)# permit tcp dst eq 22
- Switch(config-ext-nacl)# deny ip
- ! Apply the SGACL to the matrix cell: Source SGT 4 (Employees) -> Destination SGT 10 (HR Servers)
- Switch(config)# cts role-based permissions from 4 to 10 SGACL_HR_ACCESS
- Matrix Enforcement Actions
Permit: All traffic between the SGT pair is allowed.
Deny: All traffic between the SGT pair is dropped at the egress switch ASIC.
SGACL Filter: Traffic is evaluated against specific Layer 4 protocol and port rules.
Default Action: If no specific cell rule is provisioned, the switch falls back to the globally configured TrustSec default action (typically Default Permit during initial rollout, transitioning to Default Deny in mature zero-trust environments).
Loading diagram... TrustSec Matrix Policy and Egress Hardware TCAM Evaluation
4. SGT Transport: Inline Tagging vs. SGT Exchange Protocol (SXP)
To enforce SGACLs at the egress edge, the egress switch must know the Source SGT of every arriving packet. There are two primary mechanisms to convey SGT information across the network: +-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
- | INLINE SGT TAGGING VS. SXP PROTOCOL |
- +-----------------------+----------------------------------+------------------------+
- | Feature | Inline SGT Tagging | SXP (IETF Draft) |
- +-----------------------+----------------------------------+------------------------+
- | Transport Mode | In-Band (Inside Packet Header) | Out-of-Band (TCP 64999)|
- | Protocol / Framing | VXLAN-GPO (SD-Access) or CMD/MACsec| TCP Control Session |
- | Hardware Dependency | Requires TrustSec/ASIC support | Works over ANY IP net |
- | Intermediate Switches | Must support & preserve tags | Completely unaware |
- | Scalability | Infinite (Line-rate in ASICs) | Bound by TCP/BGP table |
- | Primary Deployment | Greenfield SD-Access / Catalyst | Brownfield & Firewalls |
- +-----------------------+----------------------------------+------------------------+
- 1. Inline SGT Tagging
SD-Access Fabrics: The 16-bit SGT is embedded directly inside the Group Policy ID field of the VXLAN-GPO header (UDP 4789).
Classical Ethernet Campuses: SGT is carried in the Cisco Meta Data (CMD) field inserted into the Layer 2 Ethernet frame (EtherType 0x8909 or IEEE 802.1AE MACsec WAN tag). Every intermediate switch along the path must support TrustSec hardware tagging to retain and forward the CMD header.
2. SGT Exchange Protocol (SXP - draft-smith-kandula-sxp )
When intermediate routers, firewalls, MPLS WAN providers, or legacy switches do not support inline TrustSec hardware tagging, CMD headers are stripped or dropped.
SXP bridges this gap by creating an out-of-band control connection over TCP port 64999 . SXP propagates IP-to-SGT binding tables from authentication points (such as Cisco ISE or access switches) directly to egress enforcement devices (such as data center firewalls or core switches).
5. SGT Exchange Protocol (SXP) Deep Dive
SXP is a Cisco-originated control protocol, documented in the IETF Internet-Draft draft-smith-kandula-sxp ("Scalable-Group Tag eXchange Protocol"), specifically engineered to transport IP-to-SGT mappings across non-TrustSec networks. Note that SXP has never been published as an RFC — it remains an expired informational draft, and the authoritative specification for production behaviour is the Cisco TrustSec configuration guide for your platform. Treat any exam-prep source that cites an RFC number for SXP as unreliable. +-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
- | SXP PEERING ROLES & ARCHITECTURE |
- +-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
- | |
- | +------------------------+ SXP over TCP 64999 +----------------------+ |
- | | SXP SPEAKER |============================>| SXP LISTENER | |
- | | - Learns IP-SGT binding| (MD5 Auth Protected) | - Receives bindings | |
- | | via 802.1X / ISE | | - Programs TCAM | |
- | | - Advertises bindings | | - Enforces SGACLs | |
- | +------------------------+ +----------------------+ |
- | (Access Switch) (Data Center Firewall) |
- +-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
- SXP Peering Roles
SXP Speaker: The device that learns IP-to-SGT bindings (e.g., via local 802.1X authentications, Cisco ISE pxGrid, or static configurations) and transmits them across the SXP connection to its configured peer.
SXP Listener: The device that receives IP-to-SGT binding updates from an SXP speaker and installs them into its local IP-to-SGT database and hardware forwarding tables for SGACL enforcement.
Both (Bi-directional): A device configured to act simultaneously as both an SXP Speaker and an SXP Listener with its peer, exchanging local bindings in both directions.
SXP Protocol Versions
Version Key Architectural Capabilities
SXP v1 Transports IPv4 host ( /32 ) IP-to-SGT bindings only.
SXP v2 Adds support for IPv6 host ( /128 ) IP-to-SGT bindings.
SXP v3 Introduces support for Subnet/Prefix bindings (IPv4 CIDR blocks) and bidirectional connection negotiation.
SXP v4 Adds Loop Detection (SXP Path attribute), Subnet/Range bindings, SXP domains, and multi-hop route-reflector distribution architecture.
SXP Connection Mechanics & Timers
Transport: TCP Port 64999 .
Authentication: Protected via TCP MD5 shared secret passwords configured on both peers.
Keepalive & Hold Timers:
Hold Time: Default 120 seconds (negotiated during connection setup; defines how long a listener waits before tearing down bindings if keepalives cease).
Keepalive Time: Default 30 seconds (or 1 / 3 1/3 1/3 of the negotiated hold time).
Loading diagram... SXP Peering Architecture Across Legacy Non-TrustSec Underlay
- 6. Cisco IOS-XE CLI Configuration & Verification for TrustSec and SXP
- 1. Configuring TrustSec SXP Peering ! Enable SXP globally on the switch
- Switch(config)# cts sxp enable
- ! Configure switch source IP for SXP connections
- Switch(config)# cts sxp default source-ip 192.168.100.1
- ! Configure an SXP connection to Data Center Firewall (Listener) with MD5 password
- Switch(config)# cts sxp connection peer 192.168.200.10 password CiscoPass123 mode speaker
- 2. Configuring Static IP-to-SGT Mappings ! Map a specific server IP to SGT 10 (Finance-Servers)
- Switch(config)# cts role-based ip-to-sgt 10.2.2.100 tag 10
- ! Map an entire subnet to SGT 20 (Engineering)
- Switch(config)# cts role-based ip-to-sgt 10.5.0.0/16 tag 20
- 3. Verifying SXP Connections and Binding Tables ! Verify SXP peering connection status
- Switch# show cts sxp connections
- Peer IP Source IP Mode Version Status HoldTime (sec)
- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
- 192.168.200.10 192.168.100.1 Speaker 4 ON 120
- ! Verify learned IP-to-SGT binding database
- Switch# show cts sxp sgt-map
- IPv4 SGT-to-IP Binding Table
- ============================
- IP Address SGT Source Instance ID
- ---------------------------------------------------
- 10.1.1.50/32 4 LOCAL CORP
- 10.2.2.100/32 10 SXP CORP
- 10.5.0.0/16 20 CONFIG CORP
- ! Verify TrustSec Role-Based Permissions (SGACL Matrix)
- Switch# show cts role-based permissions
IPv4 Role-based permissions from group 4:Employees to group 10:Finance-Servers:
SGACL_HR_ACCESS (Configured / Active)
- ! Verify hardware TCAM enforcement counters for SGACL drops and permits
- Switch# show cts role-based counters
- Role-based IPv4 counters
- From To Permit-Packets Deny-Packets
- -------------------------------------------
- 4 10 42890 142
- 5 10 0 5912
- * * 1204890 0
7. IEEE 802.1AE MACsec: Link-Layer Encryption for TrustSec
ENCOR v1.2 topic 5.4.d names "TrustSec and MACsec" together as one component of network security design. They are complementary, not alternatives: TrustSec answers who may talk to whom , MACsec answers can anyone read it on the wire .
7.1 What MACsec Actually Is
MACsec is IEEE 802.1AE , a Layer 2 encryption standard that protects an Ethernet frame hop by hop . Each device decrypts the frame on ingress, processes it normally, and re-encrypts it on egress toward the next MACsec peer. That single property drives every design decision:
- Property MACsec (802.1AE) IPsec
- Scope Hop by hop (one Ethernet link) End to end (between tunnel endpoints)
- Layer 2 3
- Line-rate at 10/40/100G Yes — ASIC-implemented Depends on crypto engine
- Protects Layer 2 control frames Yes (CDP, LLDP, DTP, STP BPDUs) No
- Intermediate device can read headers Yes — it decrypts No
Typical use Campus uplinks, host-to-switch, DCI, Carrier Ethernet Site-to-site and remote access over untrusted transit
Because each hop decrypts, the switch in the middle can still read the CMD header (EtherType 0x8909) that carries the SGT and can therefore enforce an SGACL. An IPsec tunnel would hide that tag from every transit device. This is exactly why Cisco pairs MACsec with TrustSec rather than substituting one for the other.
- 7.2 The MACsec Frame Format +---------+---------+-----------------+---------+-----------------+-------+-----+
- | DMAC | SMAC | SecTAG | 802.1Q | CMD (SGT) | ICV | CRC |
- | | | EtherType | + | + | 16 B | |
- | | | 0x88E5 | Payload | Payload | | |
- +---------+---------+-----------------+---------+-----------------+-------+-----+
- |<-- 8 or 16 B -->|<---- encrypted region --->|
- |<--------- integrity-protected ------------->|
SecTAG — 8 bytes, or 16 bytes when the optional 8-byte Secure Channel Identifier (SCI) is carried. It holds MACsec EtherType 0x88E5 , the TCI/AN flags, the Short Length field, and the Packet Number (PN) used for replay protection.
ICV — a 16-byte Integrity Check Value appended to every frame.
Total overhead — Cisco's guidance is to budget 32 bytes and raise the interface MTU accordingly. The encryption itself happens below the IP layer so the endpoints are unaffected, but an intermediate service provider router will drop the enlarged frame if its MTU was not adjusted. This is the classic "MACsec came up and large transfers broke" symptom, and it is the same PMTU failure mode covered in Section 14.1.
7.3 Key Agreement: MKA vs. Cisco SAP
Encryption is worthless without a way to agree on keys. There are two mechanisms, and confusing them is a reliable exam trap.
MKA (MACsec Key Agreement) Cisco SAP (Security Association Protocol)
Standard IEEE 802.1X-2010 , carried in EAPOL-MKA frames Cisco proprietary , derived from a draft of IEEE 802.11i
Use case Switch-to-host and switch-to-switch Switch-to-switch only, inside TrustSec NDAC
Key source CAK/CKN pre-shared key pair, or an MSK derived from 802.1X/EAP Pairwise Master Key from 802.1X NDAC or a manual PMK
- Ciphers GCM-AES-128, GCM-AES-256, GCM-AES-XPN-128, GCM-AES-XPN-256 GCM-AES-128 ( sap modelist gcm-encrypt )
- Topology Point-to-point links only Point-to-point links only
- Direction of travel The standards-based, forward-looking choice Legacy; being displaced by MKA
Under MKA one participant is elected Key Server (lowest key-server priority wins) and it generates and distributes the Secure Association Key (SAK) to its peers, rekeying periodically.
Downlink vs. uplink MACsec: downlink MACsec protects the switch-to-host link and is normally keyed by MKA using the MSK produced by an 802.1X EAP-TLS session (Section 16.5). Uplink MACsec protects switch-to-switch links and is keyed either by MKA with a pre-shared CAK/CKN or by SAP under TrustSec NDAC.
7.4 Cipher Suites and Extended Packet Numbering
The default cipher in an MKA policy is always GCM-AES-128 . On Catalyst 9000 platforms, GCM-AES-256 and both XPN suites require a Network Advantage license.
XPN stands for Extended Packet Numbering and exists for one reason: the standard 32-bit Packet Number space is exhausted quickly on 40G and 100G links, forcing frequent SAK rekeys. XPN widens the packet number to 64 bits so a high-speed link can run far longer between rekeys. Two documented restrictions matter:
XPN cipher suites do not support a confidentiality offset — the two features cannot be combined.
XPN cipher suites are not supported on switch-to-host MACsec connections.
7.5 Confidentiality Offset
confidentiality-offset accepts 0, 30, or 50 bytes. A non-zero offset leaves the first N bytes of the frame authenticated but not encrypted , so an intermediate device that is not a MACsec peer can still read the IP and Layer 4 headers for load-balancing or flow analysis. Offset 30 typically exposes the IPv4 header; offset 50 typically exposes the IPv6 header. The 50-byte offset is not supported with XPN cipher suites, and Cisco recommends offset 0 when AnyConnect is in use on the client.
7.6 should-secure vs. must-secure
macsec access-control controls what happens to unencrypted frames arriving on a MACsec-enabled interface:
must-secure — the default. Unencrypted frames are dropped. This is the correct production posture.
should-secure — unencrypted frames are permitted to pass in the clear. Cisco explicitly recommends configuring should-secure while first enabling MACsec or migrating a link , then removing it once the session establishes, because otherwise a one-sided configuration silently black-holes the link.
This is the highest-value operational fact in the topic. Enabling MACsec on one end of a production uplink with the default must-secure takes the link down instantly.
7.7 Configuration and Verification ! ---- Switch-to-switch uplink MACsec using MKA with a pre-shared CAK/CKN ----
- key chain MACSEC-UPLINK-KC macsec
- key 01
- cryptographic-algorithm aes-256-cmac
- key-string 7 <encrypted-hex-CAK>
!
- mka policy UPLINK-MKA
- key-server priority 10
- macsec-cipher-suite gcm-aes-256
- confidentiality-offset 0
!
- interface TenGigabitEthernet1/0/1
- description MACsec uplink to Distribution-1
- mtu 1532 ! 1500 + 32 bytes MACsec overhead
- mka policy UPLINK-MKA
- mka pre-shared-key key-chain MACSEC-UPLINK-KC
- macsec network-link
- macsec access-control should-secure ! REMOVE once the session is Secured
!
- ! ---- Verification ----
- Switch# show mka sessions interface TenGigabitEthernet1/0/1 detail
- Status ................ Secured - Secured MKA Session with MACsec
- Local Tx-SCI .......... 00a3.8e1c.4401/0001
- Peer Tx-SCI ........... 00a3.8e1c.9c01/0001
- MKA Policy Name ....... UPLINK-MKA
- Key Server Priority ... 10
- Latest SAK Status ..... Rx & Tx
- Latest SAK KI ......... ... AN 0
!
- Switch# show macsec interface TenGigabitEthernet1/0/1
- MACsec is enabled
- Replay protect : enabled Replay window : 0
- Cipher : GCM-AES-256 Confidentiality Offset : 0
- Transmit Secure Channels: encrypt pkts 88214093, protected pkts 0
- Receive Secure Channels: decrypt pkts 91043221, invalid pkts 0, not valid 0
Reading that output: Status: Secured is the only healthy state — Pending or Init means the peers never agreed on a key, almost always a CKN/CAK mismatch or a cipher-suite mismatch. A rising not valid counter on the receive channel indicates ICV failures, which point at a key mismatch or corruption rather than a configuration error.