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5.2 Toll Fraud Prevention & Call Privileges
Cisco 350-801 CLCOR CCNP/CCIE Collaboration Core v2.0
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1 Chapter 1: Collaboration Architecture, Deployment Models, Sizing & Upgrades
1.1 Collaboration Architecture & Deployment Models 1.2 Capacity Planning, Sizing & Bandwidth Considerations 1.3 High Availability, Redundancy & Disaster Recovery 1.4 Cisco Unified CM Cluster Upgrade Process
2 Chapter 2: Edge Architecture, Security & Network Services
2.1 Collaboration Edge Architecture: CUBE & Expressway 2.2 Security Protocols & PKI: SSO, OAuth, TLS & SRTP 2.3 Network Infrastructure Services: DNS, NTP, DHCP & LDAP
3 Chapter 3: Protocols, Codecs & Endpoint Provisioning
3.1 SIP Signaling Architecture & Call Flows 3.2 Session Description Protocol (SDP) & Early Offer vs. Delayed Offer 3.3 Audio/Video Codecs & DTMF Relay 3.4 Endpoint Deployment, Onboarding & Troubleshooting
4 Chapter 4: CUCM Dial Plan Fundamentals & Digit Analysis
4.1 Partitions and Calling Search Spaces (CSS) 4.2 Route Patterns, Route Groups & Route Lists 4.3 Translation Patterns, Transformation Patterns & Digit Manipulation 4.4 Globalized Call Routing & Local Route Group (LRG)
5 Chapter 5: Advanced Call Control, Call Routing & User Management
5.1 Call Admission Control (CAC), Locations & AAR 5.2 Toll Fraud Prevention & Call Privileges 5.3 CUCM User Management, LDAP Integration & RBAC 5.4 Administrative XML (AXL) API & Dial-Plan Troubleshooting Tools
6 Chapter 6: Cisco Unity Connection & Voicemail Integration
6.1 Cisco Unity Connection Architecture & SIP Integration 6.2 Mailbox Provisioning, User Templates & Class of Service 6.3 Message Waiting Indication (MWI) & Troubleshooting 6.4 Call Handlers & Directory Handlers
7 Chapter 7: IOS XE Voice Gateways, CUBE & Media Resources
7.1 Cisco IOS XE Voice Gateways & Dial Peers 7.2 Voice Translation Rules and Translation Profiles 7.3 Cisco Unified Border Element (CUBE) Configuration & Redundancy 7.4 IOS XE Media Resources & DSP Management
8 Chapter 8: Webex Architecture, Control Hub, Meetings & Messaging
8.1 Webex Suite Overview & Control Hub Architecture 8.2 Cloud Identity Management, SCIM & Directory Connector 8.3 Webex Developer Platform & APIs 8.4 Configuring Webex Cloud Meetings 8.5 Configuring Webex Cloud Messaging
9 Chapter 9: Webex Calling Routing, Permissions & PSTN Connectivity
9.1 Webex Calling Architecture, Locations & Number Management 9.2 Webex Calling Routing, Trunks & Dial Plans 9.3 Webex Calling Call Routing Process & Translation Patterns 9.4 Webex Calling Toll Fraud Prevention, Call Permissions & Operating Modes 9.5 PSTN Connectivity: Cloud-Connected PSTN (CC-PSTN) & Cisco Calling Plans 9.6 Webex Calling Local Gateway (LGW) Architecture & Configuration
10 Chapter 10: Webex Hybrid Services & Cloud Connected UC
10.1 Cloud-Connected UC (CCUC) Architecture & Telemetry 10.2 Webex Hybrid Calendar & Hybrid Directory Services 10.3 Webex Video Mesh & Hybrid Data Security
11 Chapter 11: Media Quality, QoS Engineering & Troubleshooting
11.1 Real-Time Media Characteristics & Impairments 11.2 QoS Classification, Marking & Trust Boundaries 11.3 Low Latency Queuing (LLQ) Configuration on Cisco IOS XE 11.4 Troubleshooting Media Quality & Call Failures
5.2 Toll Fraud Prevention & Call Privileges
Key Takeaways Explain This Topic AI
Toll fraud attacks target enterprise telephony systems through voicemail port breakout, unauthenticated DISA access, conference bridges, and unauthorized hairpin trunk-to-trunk transfers.
Forced Authorization Codes (FAC) enforce access security on Route Patterns by requiring callers to enter numeric codes with assigned authorization levels (0-255), logging code usage in Call Detail Records (CDR).
Client Matter Codes (CMC) collect project or departmental accounting identifiers without evaluating authorization levels, functioning exclusively as a billing allocation mechanism.
Class of Restriction (COR) implemented using tiered Partitions and Calling Search Spaces (CSS) strictly isolates route patterns, preventing unauthorized internal or lobby phones from dialing international or premium-rate destinations.
Setting the CUCM service parameter 'Block OffNet to OffNet Transfer' to True, paired with CUBE 'ip address trusted list' authentication, neutralizes external toll fraud and unauthenticated SIP INVITE injection.
Last updated: October 2026
5.2 Toll Fraud Prevention & Call Privileges
Toll fraud—the unauthorized hijacking of enterprise telecommunications infrastructure to place high-cost long-distance, international, or premium-rate calls—represents one of the most persistent security and financial threats to enterprise collaboration systems. Attackers exploit configuration oversights, default credentials, and unrestricted routing logic to generate tens of thousands of dollars in carrier toll charges in a single weekend. Securing enterprise dial plans requires layered defenses across Cisco Unified Communications Manager (CUCM) and Cisco Unified Border Elements (CUBE).
1. Common Toll Fraud Attack Vectors
Attackers target enterprise VoIP deployments using several distinct mechanisms:
Voicemail Port Exploitation (DISA Breakout) : Automated attendant and voicemail pilot numbers often provide Direct Inward System Access (DISA) or outcall notification features. Attackers break into voicemail boxes with default PINs (such as 1234 or matching the extension) and exploit administrative transfer options (e.g., pressing * or transfer codes) to obtain a dial tone on an internal line. From there, they dial external international numbers.
Hairpin Trunk-to-Trunk Transfers : An external attacker places an inbound call over PSTN Trunk A to a corporate auto-attendant or receptionist, requests a transfer to an external number, or exploits an unauthenticated conference bridge. CUCM bridges the inbound PSTN call to an outbound PSTN call on Trunk B. The enterprise pays the toll charges for both circuits.
Lobby & Public Endpoint Abuse : Telephones located in unsecured areas (lobbies, waiting rooms, conference facilities, shipping docks) configured with unrestricted Calling Search Spaces allow unauthorized visitors to dial international ( 011+ ) or premium 900/976 services.
Unauthenticated SIP Trunk Ingress : Attackers scan public IP ranges and inject fraudulent SIP INVITE packets directly toward CUBE session border controllers, attempting to execute egress dial-peers without authentication.
2. Forced Authorization Codes (FAC) vs. Client Matter Codes (CMC)
CUCM provides two native mechanisms to prompt callers for numeric authorization codes during digit analysis: Forced Authorization Codes (FAC) and Client Matter Codes (CMC). +--------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
- | FAC vs. CMC PROCESSING |
- | |
- | User Dials Egress Route Pattern (e.g., 9.011!) |
- | | |
- | +--> Pattern Matched: Requires Code |
- | | CUCM Plays Special Tone (Beep / Interrupted Dial Tone) |
- | | |
- | +--> Caller Inputs Code + # |
- | | |
- | +--- If FAC: Compare User Level vs. Route Pattern Required Level |
- | | - User Level >= Route Pattern Level: CALL PERMITTED |
- | | - User Level < Route Pattern Level: CALL BLOCKED (Reorder) |
- | | - Code Logged in Call Detail Records (CDR) |
- | | |
- | +--- If CMC: Check Code Against Configured CMC List |
- | - NO LEVEL COMPARISON PERFORMED |
- | - Code Logged in Call Detail Records (CDR) for Billing |
- | - CALL PERMITTED IF THE CODE EXISTS |
- +--------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
- Forced Authorization Codes (FAC)
Purpose : Security access control and privilege enforcement.
Configuration : Enabled on individual Route Patterns by checking Require Forced Authorization Code and defining a Minimum Authorization Level .
Authorization Levels : Scale from 0 (lowest) to 255 (highest) .
Example: An administrator sets Local calls to Level 10, National Long Distance to Level 50, and International dialing to Level 100.
A sales representative assigned a FAC with Level 50 can dial domestic long-distance numbers, but if they attempt an international call, CUCM drops the call with a reorder tone because Level 50 < Level 100.
Accounting : The entered FAC is recorded in the CUCM Call Detail Record (CDR) database ( authCodeDescription ), linking every toll call directly to an authorized employee.
Client Matter Codes (CMC)
Purpose : Cost accounting and project/client billing allocation (common in legal, consulting, and accounting firms).
Configuration : Enabled on Route Patterns by checking Require Client Matter Code .
Operational Difference : CMC does not enforce authorization levels. The entered code must match a client matter code configured in CUCM, but every valid code is equal; CUCM does not rank codes as high or low privilege.
Accounting : The entered CMC is stamped into the CDR record ( clientMatterCode ), enabling billing applications to charge telecommunication costs back to specific clients or internal cost centers.
Architectural Comparison: FAC vs. CMC
Attribute Forced Authorization Codes (FAC) Client Matter Codes (CMC)
Primary Function Security access restriction and toll fraud prevention Client billing and departmental cost accounting
Authorization Checking Compares user level against route pattern minimum No authorization level check performed
Privilege Levels Numeric levels from 0 to 255 None (all codes are equal)
Call Rejection Logic Rejects the call if the code is invalid or its level is too low Rejects the call only if the code is not a configured CMC
CDR Logging Field authCodeDescription clientMatterCode
Typical Target Dialing International (011+), Operator (0+), Directory Assistance Standard PSTN calls charged to clients
3. Class of Restriction (COR) via Partitions and CSS
Class of Restriction (COR) defines the calling privileges of endpoints using CUCM's foundational Partition and Calling Search Space (CSS) architecture.
Partition and CSS Concatenation Rules
A Partition is a logical container holding directory numbers, translation patterns, and route patterns.
A Calling Search Space (CSS) is an ordered priority list of partitions that a device or line is permitted to reach.
Concatenation Priority : When both a Line CSS and a Device CSS are configured on a phone, CUCM searches the Line CSS partitions first , followed by the Device CSS partitions . The first matching partition with the closest pattern match wins.
Designing Tiered Enterprise Privileges
To enforce strict Class of Restriction, administrators establish hierarchical partitions and CSS assignments: +--------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
- | TIERED CALLING PRIVILEGES |
- | |
- | PARTITIONS: |
- | [Emergency_PT] --> Contains: 911, 9.911 |
- | [Internal_PT] --> Contains: 1XXX, 2XXX, 3XXX (Extensions) |
- | [Local_PT] --> Contains: 9.[2-9]XXXXXX, 9.1[2-9]XX[2-9]XXXXXX |
- | [LongDistance_PT] --> Contains: 9.1[2-9]XX[2-9]XXXXXX (Domestic LD) |
- | [International_PT] --> Contains: 9.011.! (FAC Level 100 Required) |
- | [Blocked_PT] --> Contains: 9.1900XXXXXXX, 9.1976XXXXXXX (Block Call)|
- | |
- | CALLING SEARCH SPACES: |
- | CSS_Lobby --> [Emergency_PT, Internal_PT] |
- | CSS_StandardUser --> [Emergency_PT, Internal_PT, Local_PT, LD_PT] |
- | CSS_Executive --> [Emergency_PT, Internal_PT, Local_PT, LD_PT, |
- | International_PT] |
- +--------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
- Blocking Premium & Fraudulent Numbers
To prevent toll fraud to premium 900/976 entertainment or information lines:
Create explicit Route Patterns: 9.1900XXXXXXX and 9.1976XXXXXXX .
In the Route Pattern configuration, set Route Option to Block this pattern .
Check the Urgent Priority checkbox. This instructs CUCM digit analysis to immediately execute the block without waiting for the interdigit timeout (T.302 timer), preventing callers from bypassing filters with appended digits.
4. Off-Net to Off-Net Transfer Prevention
To neutralize hairpin attacks where external callers bounce inbound calls back out to external international circuits, CUCM provides dedicated call classification controls:
Service Parameter Configuration
Navigate to System > Service Parameters > Cisco CallManager .
Find the clusterwide parameter Block OffNet To OffNet Transfer .
Set Block OffNet to OffNet Transfer to True .
Call Classification Architecture
CUCM classifies every call leg as either OnNet (internal, trusted) or OffNet (external, PSTN, untrusted):
Route patterns, gateways, and SIP trunks specify a Call Classification ( OnNet or OffNet ; gateways and trunks can also follow the system default).
Inbound calls arriving from PSTN PRI gateways or carrier SIP trunks are automatically stamped as OffNet .
When Block OffNet to OffNet Transfer is True , CUCM checks every transfer: if both legs are OffNet, the transfer is blocked. Forwarding to external numbers is controlled separately, through the forwarding CSS on each line.
5. CUBE Toll Fraud Prevention CLI Configuration
On Cisco IOS XE routers acting as Cisco Unified Border Elements (CUBE), toll fraud prevention is enabled by default to prevent rogue SIP signaling injection.
Default Security Behavior
By default, Cisco IOS XE inspects the source IPv4/IPv6 address of all incoming SIP INVITE requests. If the source address does not match an entry in the IP address trusted list or the session target of a configured VoIP dial peer, CUBE rejects the call with cause 21 (call rejected), which the SIP peer sees as 403 Forbidden . show ip address trusted list displays both the configured entries and the addresses learned from dial-peer session targets.
- CLI Configuration Syntax ! Enable VoIP border element and toll fraud checking
- voice service voip
- mode border-element
- allow-connections sip to sip
- ip address trusted authenticate
- ip address trusted list
- ipv4 198.51.100.10 255.255.255.255 ! Carrier ITSP Primary SBC
- ipv4 198.51.100.11 255.255.255.255 ! Carrier ITSP Secondary SBC
- ipv4 10.10.20.1 255.255.255.255 ! CUCM Publisher Node
- ipv4 10.10.20.2 255.255.255.255 ! CUCM Subscriber 1 Node
- ipv4 10.10.20.3 255.255.255.255 ! CUCM Subscriber 2 Node
!
- ! Restrict incoming SIP signaling to trusted interfaces
- sip
- bind control source-interface GigabitEthernet0/0/0
- bind media source-interface GigabitEthernet0/0/0
!
- ! Dial-peer configuration with explicit session target
- dial-peer voice 100 voip
- description Inbound / Outbound SIP Trunk to Carrier
- destination-pattern 011T
- session protocol sipv2
- session target ipv4:198.51.100.10
incoming called-number .
- dtmf-relay rtp-nte
- codec g711ulaw
- no vad
If administrators temporarily need to disable this security feature during lab diagnostics (never recommended in production), the command is no ip address trusted authenticate under voice service voip .