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2.2 Security Protocols & PKI: SSO, OAuth, TLS & SRTP

Cisco 350-801 CLCOR CCNP/CCIE Collaboration Core v2.0

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1 Chapter 1: Collaboration Architecture, Deployment Models, Sizing & Upgrades

1.1 Collaboration Architecture & Deployment Models 1.2 Capacity Planning, Sizing & Bandwidth Considerations 1.3 High Availability, Redundancy & Disaster Recovery 1.4 Cisco Unified CM Cluster Upgrade Process

2 Chapter 2: Edge Architecture, Security & Network Services

2.1 Collaboration Edge Architecture: CUBE & Expressway 2.2 Security Protocols & PKI: SSO, OAuth, TLS & SRTP 2.3 Network Infrastructure Services: DNS, NTP, DHCP & LDAP

3 Chapter 3: Protocols, Codecs & Endpoint Provisioning

3.1 SIP Signaling Architecture & Call Flows 3.2 Session Description Protocol (SDP) & Early Offer vs. Delayed Offer 3.3 Audio/Video Codecs & DTMF Relay 3.4 Endpoint Deployment, Onboarding & Troubleshooting

4 Chapter 4: CUCM Dial Plan Fundamentals & Digit Analysis

4.1 Partitions and Calling Search Spaces (CSS) 4.2 Route Patterns, Route Groups & Route Lists 4.3 Translation Patterns, Transformation Patterns & Digit Manipulation 4.4 Globalized Call Routing & Local Route Group (LRG)

5 Chapter 5: Advanced Call Control, Call Routing & User Management

5.1 Call Admission Control (CAC), Locations & AAR 5.2 Toll Fraud Prevention & Call Privileges 5.3 CUCM User Management, LDAP Integration & RBAC 5.4 Administrative XML (AXL) API & Dial-Plan Troubleshooting Tools

6 Chapter 6: Cisco Unity Connection & Voicemail Integration

6.1 Cisco Unity Connection Architecture & SIP Integration 6.2 Mailbox Provisioning, User Templates & Class of Service 6.3 Message Waiting Indication (MWI) & Troubleshooting 6.4 Call Handlers & Directory Handlers

7 Chapter 7: IOS XE Voice Gateways, CUBE & Media Resources

7.1 Cisco IOS XE Voice Gateways & Dial Peers 7.2 Voice Translation Rules and Translation Profiles 7.3 Cisco Unified Border Element (CUBE) Configuration & Redundancy 7.4 IOS XE Media Resources & DSP Management

8 Chapter 8: Webex Architecture, Control Hub, Meetings & Messaging

8.1 Webex Suite Overview & Control Hub Architecture 8.2 Cloud Identity Management, SCIM & Directory Connector 8.3 Webex Developer Platform & APIs 8.4 Configuring Webex Cloud Meetings 8.5 Configuring Webex Cloud Messaging

9 Chapter 9: Webex Calling Routing, Permissions & PSTN Connectivity

9.1 Webex Calling Architecture, Locations & Number Management 9.2 Webex Calling Routing, Trunks & Dial Plans 9.3 Webex Calling Call Routing Process & Translation Patterns 9.4 Webex Calling Toll Fraud Prevention, Call Permissions & Operating Modes 9.5 PSTN Connectivity: Cloud-Connected PSTN (CC-PSTN) & Cisco Calling Plans 9.6 Webex Calling Local Gateway (LGW) Architecture & Configuration

10 Chapter 10: Webex Hybrid Services & Cloud Connected UC

10.1 Cloud-Connected UC (CCUC) Architecture & Telemetry 10.2 Webex Hybrid Calendar & Hybrid Directory Services 10.3 Webex Video Mesh & Hybrid Data Security

11 Chapter 11: Media Quality, QoS Engineering & Troubleshooting

11.1 Real-Time Media Characteristics & Impairments 11.2 QoS Classification, Marking & Trust Boundaries 11.3 Low Latency Queuing (LLQ) Configuration on Cisco IOS XE 11.4 Troubleshooting Media Quality & Call Failures

2.2 Security Protocols & PKI: SSO, OAuth, TLS & SRTP

Key Takeaways Explain This Topic AI

CUCM keeps separate certificate and trust stores per service (tomcat, callmanager, ipsec, TVS, CAPF; IM and Presence adds cup-xmpp): tomcat secures web interfaces, UDS, and SSO, while callmanager secures SIP/SCCP TLS signaling and signs TFTP configuration files and the ITL.

Deploying Certificate Authority (CA) signed certificates across a multi-node CUCM cluster requires Subject Alternative Names (SANs) containing the FQDNs of all nodes, eliminating the need to generate separate CSRs for individual servers.

Mutual TLS (mTLS) requires bidirectional certificate validation, where both client and server present X.509 certificates authenticated against trusted Certificate Authority roots installed in their respective trust stores.

Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol (SRTP) encrypts audio and video payloads using AES-128 Counter Mode (AES-128-CM) and provides integrity verification via HMAC-SHA1 tags, negotiated via SDES ( a=crypto ) or DTLS-SRTP.

SAML 2.0 Single Sign-On decouples user authentication from CUCM by delegating credentials to an enterprise Identity Provider (IdP), exchanging cryptographically signed XML assertions over HTTPS with support for both SP-initiated and IdP-initiated authentication.

Last updated: October 2026

Security Protocols & PKI: SSO, OAuth, TLS & SRTP

Important

Unified communications security relies on a multi-tiered cryptographic foundation: X.509 certificates and PKI trust stores in CUCM ( tomcat , callmanager , ipsec , tvs , capf , cup-xmpp ), mutual TLS (mTLS) for authenticated signaling, SRTP (AES-128-CM and HMAC-SHA1) for encrypted voice and video media, SAML 2.0 for centralized Single Sign-On (SSO) with enterprise Identity Providers, and OAuth 2.0 token-based authentication for client applications.

Securing real-time collaboration requires protecting signaling channels, user credentials, media transport, and administrative management interfaces. Cisco Unified Communications Manager (CUCM) implements a modular Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) architecture where distinct cryptographic services are isolated into dedicated certificate stores to prevent cross-service compromise.

CUCM Certificate Stores and PKI Architecture

CUCM separates cryptographic keys into an Identity Store (containing the private key and server certificate) and a Trust Store (containing trusted Certificate Authority root and intermediate certificates). The six core certificate functions in CUCM include:

Certificate Role Primary Store Trust Store Services and Protocols Secured

Tomcat tomcat tomcat-trust Cisco Unified OS Administration, CUCM Administration web GUI, Disaster Recovery System (DRS), User Data Services (UDS) for Jabber/Webex directory discovery, and SAML 2.0 SSO assertion endpoints.

CallManager callmanager callmanager-trust Cisco CallManager service, SIP TLS signaling (TCP port 5061), SCCP TLS, signing of TFTP configuration files and the ITL, and secure SIP trunks to peers such as CUBE.

IPsec ipsec ipsec-trust IPsec policies with gateways and other peers, and Disaster Recovery System (DRS) communication between the master and local agents.

TVS tvs tvs-trust Trust Verification Service (TCP port 2445); acts as a central certificate validation broker for endpoints that lack sufficient storage to store full enterprise CA trust lists.

CAPF capf capf-trust Certificate Authority Proxy Function (TCP port 3804); generates, installs, and updates Locally Significant Certificates (LSCs) on Cisco IP phones.

XMPP cup-xmpp cup-xmpp-trust Cisco Unified CM IM and Presence Service XMPP protocol signaling for instant messaging, group chat, and presence federation.

Self-Signed vs. CA-Signed Certificates

Self-Signed Certificates : Generated automatically during initial CUCM installation with a default validity period of 5 years. While functional for isolated labs, self-signed certificates require manual certificate exchange across all cluster nodes and cause untrusted certificate warnings in browsers and Jabber clients.

Certificate Authority (CA) Signed Certificates : Generated by submitting a Certificate Signing Request (CSR) to an Enterprise CA (e.g., Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services) or a Public Third-Party CA (e.g., DigiCert, Sectigo). CA-signed certificates establish an unbroken chain of trust back to a trusted root.

Multi-Server Subject Alternative Name (SAN) Certificates

In a multi-node CUCM cluster (Publisher and multiple Subscribers), managing individual certificates for each node creates significant operational overhead. Cisco Unified Communications Manager supports Multi-Server (SAN) certificates:

The administrator generates a single CSR on the Publisher node selecting Distribution: Multi-Server (SAN) .

CUCM automatically populates the Subject Alternative Name (SAN) extension with the hostnames and Fully Qualified Domain Names (FQDNs) of the Publisher and all Subscribers within the cluster.

When the signed certificate is uploaded to the Publisher, CUCM automatically replicates and installs the certificate across all Subscriber nodes in the cluster, reducing certificate administration from dozens of per-server operations down to a single cluster-wide task. CLI Verification Command: show cert own tomcat

  • =========================================================================
  • Certificate: tomcat.der
  • Subject: CN=cucm-pub.example.com, OU=Voice, O=Enterprise, C=US

SAN Extension:

  • DNS: cucm-pub.example.com
  • DNS: cucm-sub1.example.com
  • DNS: cucm-sub2.example.com
  • DNS: cucm-tftp.example.com
  • Issuer: CN=Enterprise-Sub-CA, O=Enterprise, C=US
  • Validity: Not Before: Oct 01 00:00:00 2026 GMT; Not After: Oct 01 00:00:00 2028 GMT
  • Key Usage: Digital Signature, Key Encipherment
  • =========================================================================
  • Mutual TLS (mTLS) Signaling Architecture

Standard TLS (unilateral TLS) validates only the identity of the server. Signaling between infrastructure devices, such as CUCM to CUBE or CUCM to Cisco Expressway, commonly uses Mutual TLS (mTLS) , where both parties cryptographically verify each other before establishing a session. A certificate-based Webex Calling Local Gateway trunk also uses mTLS.

mTLS Handshake Sequence (TLS 1.2 message flow)

TLS 1.3 shortens this exchange: it drops ServerHelloDone and ChangeCipherSpec and encrypts the certificate messages, but mutual authentication still works through CertificateRequest, Certificate, and CertificateVerify.

ClientHello : The client sends supported TLS versions, cipher suites, and a random byte string.

ServerHello : The server selects the highest common TLS version (TLS 1.2 or TLS 1.3) and cipher suite.

Server Certificate & CertificateRequest : The server sends its X.509 certificate and issues a CertificateRequest specifying acceptable Certificate Authority distinguished names (DNs).

ServerHelloDone : The server signals completion of the initial negotiation phase.

Client Certificate & CertificateVerify : The client sends its X.509 certificate, followed by a CertificateVerify message containing a cryptographic signature generated using the client's private key.

Key Derivation and Finished : Both nodes exchange ChangeCipherSpec messages and verify the integrity of the handshake using the derived symmetric session keys.

Tip

For an mTLS session between CUCM and CUBE to succeed, the root or intermediate CA that signed the CUBE certificate must reside in the CUCM callmanager-trust store, and the CA that signed the CUCM CallManager certificate must reside in the CUBE router's trustpool or trustpoint.

Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol (SRTP)

While SIP TLS secures the call setup signaling, voice and video RTP payloads remain unencrypted unless protected by Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol (SRTP) , defined in RFC 3711.

Cryptographic Specifications

Payload Encryption : Advanced Encryption Standard in Counter Mode ( AES-128-CM ). AES-CM generates an encrypted pseudorandom keystream that is XORed with the RTP payload bytes. The RTP packet header is deliberately left unencrypted so intermediate network switches and routers can read the sequence numbers, timestamps, SSRC identifiers, and DiffServ QoS markings.

Message Authentication and Integrity : Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code using SHA-1 ( HMAC-SHA1 ). An authentication tag is calculated over the RTP header, header extensions, and encrypted payload, then appended to the end of the packet.

AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_80 : Produces an 80-bit (10-octet) authentication tag (standard for voice and video media).

AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_32 : Produces a 32-bit (4-octet) authentication tag (used when conserving bandwidth, though less secure against forgery).

Current Cisco releases also negotiate the AEAD suites AEAD_AES_128_GCM and AEAD_AES_256_GCM , which combine encryption and integrity in one algorithm.

Replay Protection : SRTP maintains a 32-bit Rollover Counter (ROC) combined with the 16-bit RTP sequence number to form a 48-bit index, preventing replay attacks across long-lived sessions.

SRTP Key Exchange: SDES vs. DTLS-SRTP

To establish SRTP encryption, the two communication endpoints must exchange cryptographic keys. Two mechanisms exist: +---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

  • | SRTP Key Exchange Protocols Comparison |
  • +------------------------------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------+
  • | SDES (RFC 4568) | - Transmits Master Key and Salt in plaintext inside SDP a=crypto: |
  • | (Session Description Protocol | - Mandatory: SIP signaling MUST be encrypted with TLS! |
  • | Security Descriptions) | - Common in on-premise CUCM, Cisco IP phones, and CUBE trunks. |
  • +------------------------------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------+
  • | DTLS-SRTP (RFC 5764) | - Dedicated DTLS handshake executed directly over UDP media ports. |
  • | (Datagram Transport Layer Security | - Keys derived out-of-band; SIP signaling never sees key material. |
  • | for SRTP) | - Mandatory for WebRTC endpoints and gateways (RFC 8827). |

+------------------------------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------+ Sample SDES a=crypto line in SIP SDP:

a=crypto:1 AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_80 inline:PS1uQCVeeCFCanVmcjkpPywjNWhcYD0mXXtxaVBR|2^20|1:32

Caution

If SDES is configured over an unencrypted SIP signaling path (UDP/TCP port 5060), an attacker sniffing network traffic can read the base64-encoded inline: master key directly from the SDP payload and decrypt the entire voice conversation. Never enable SDES without TLS signaling.

SAML 2.0 Single Sign-On (SSO)

Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 2.0 provides centralized authentication across Cisco Collaboration applications, allowing users to authenticate against an enterprise Identity Provider (IdP) (e.g., Microsoft Entra ID / Azure AD, Okta, PingFederate) rather than maintaining separate credentials in CUCM.

Core SAML Roles and Metadata Exchange

Service Provider (SP) : CUCM, Cisco Unity Connection, or Cisco Expressway. The SP hosts the protected collaboration resources.

Identity Provider (IdP) : The external authentication authority holding the user directory and multi-factor authentication (MFA) policies.

Federation Metadata Exchange : The SP and IdP establish mutual trust by exchanging XML metadata:

The CUCM SP metadata contains the Entity ID (e.g., https://cucm-pub.example.com/sso/metadata ), the Assertion Consumer Service (ACS) URL (where the IdP sends assertions), and the SP public signing certificate.

The IdP metadata contains the IdP Entity ID, the Single Sign-On URL, and the IdP X.509 public signing certificate.

SP-Initiated Login Flow

The user navigates to the CUCM Administration portal or connects via Cisco Jabber.

CUCM detects that the session is unauthenticated, generates a cryptographically signed SAML AuthnRequest XML document, and redirects the client's browser to the IdP SSO URL via HTTP 302.

The user authenticates against the IdP (entering credentials, completing MFA, or satisfying Conditional Access policies).

Upon successful validation, the IdP constructs a signed SAML Response containing a SAML Assertion . The assertion includes user attributes such as uid , mail , or userPrincipalName .

The user's browser posts the signed SAML assertion to the CUCM ACS URL via HTTP POST.

CUCM verifies the IdP digital signature against its stored IdP public certificate. It extracts the username attribute, verifies that the user exists in the local database or synced LDAP directory, and issues an authenticated session cookie.

OAuth 2.0 Token-Based Authentication

While SAML SSO handles web browser and interactive user logins, modern soft clients (Cisco Jabber and Cisco Webex App) use OAuth 2.0 (RFC 6749) for ongoing API authentication with CUCM and Webex cloud services.

Access Tokens : Short-lived cryptographic bearer tokens (typically valid for 60 minutes). Clients present the access token in HTTP Authorization: Bearer <token> headers when invoking User Data Services (UDS) or REST APIs.

Refresh Tokens : Long-lived cryptographic tokens (valid for 60 days) stored securely in the client operating system's credential vault (such as macOS Keychain or Windows Credential Manager). When an access token expires, the client submits the refresh token to obtain a fresh access token without prompting the user for credentials.

Enterprise Benefits : OAuth token authentication prevents repeated LDAP password challenges, eliminates account lockouts caused by cached desktop passwords during enterprise password rotations, and supports instant session revocation from the administrative console.

Troubleshooting Security Components (Blueprint 1.4)

The exam asks you to troubleshoot, not just describe, these mechanisms. Start from the symptom and check the matching component:

Symptom Likely cause What to check

SSO sign-in fails with an assertion or time error Clock skew between CUCM and the IdP, an expired IdP signing certificate, or a user attribute that does not match a CUCM user ID NTP on both systems, re-import IdP metadata, rerun the SSO test (System > SAML Single Sign-On), confirm the UID mapping

TLS handshake fails with an unknown-CA alert The peer's issuing CA is missing from the receiving trust store (callmanager-trust for SIP TLS, tomcat-trust for HTTPS and LDAPS) Upload the root and intermediate CA certificates, then restart the affected service

TLS fails right after a certificate renewal The FQDN the peer dials is not in the certificate CN/SAN, or the certificate expired show cert own tomcat (or callmanager ), then reissue the CSR with the correct SAN entries

Secure call fails with 488 or falls back to RTP One side offers RTP/AVP while the other requires SRTP, or the crypto suites do not overlap The SIP trunk's SRTP Allowed setting, CUBE srtp and voice class srtp-crypto , then debug ccsip messages to compare the a=crypto lines

Jabber or Webex App keeps asking for credentials The OAuth refresh token expired or was revoked OAuth enterprise parameters (access token 60 minutes, refresh token 60 days by default) and the client's Refresh Login Flow setting

A useful habit is to read the TLS alert in a packet capture: "unknown CA" points to a trust store, "certificate expired" to the identity certificate, and "handshake failure" with no certificate exchanged usually means the two sides share no TLS version or cipher suite.

Loading diagram... SAML 2.0 SP-Initiated Single Sign-On Authentication Flow