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2.7 Pod Security Standards (PSS) & Admission Controllers

Certified Kubernetes Administrator CKA

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1 Chapter 1: CKA Exam Environment & Cluster Architecture

1.1 CKA Exam Mechanics, Scoring & Remote Terminal Environment 1.2 Kubernetes Control Plane & Worker Node Components 1.3 etcd Architecture, Clustering & Raft Consensus 1.4 Initializing Clusters with Kubeadm 1.5 Highly Available (HA) Control Plane Topologies 1.6 Cluster Lifecycle & Step-by-Step Upgrades 1.7 etcd Snapshot Backup and Restore Procedures

2 Chapter 2: Cluster Extensions, Packaging & RBAC

2.1 Kubernetes TLS Certificates & PKI Infrastructure 2.2 Managing Kubeconfig Files, Users, & Contexts 2.3 Installing Cluster Components with Helm & Kustomize 2.4 Role-Based Access Control (RBAC): Roles & RoleBindings 2.5 ClusterRoles & ClusterRoleBindings 2.6 Custom Resource Definitions (CRDs) & Operators 2.7 Pod Security Standards (PSS) & Admission Controllers

3 Chapter 3: Workloads, Lifecycle & Pod Scheduling

3.1 Pod Lifecycle, Multi-Container Patterns & Init Containers 3.2 Deployments: Rolling Updates, Rollouts & Rollbacks 3.3 DaemonSets & StatefulSets Architecture 3.4 Batch Workloads: Jobs & CronJobs 3.5 Managing ConfigMaps & Sensitive Data with Secrets 3.6 Resource Requests, Limits & Namespace ResourceQuotas 3.7 NodeSelectors, Node Affinity & Anti-Affinity 3.8 Node Taints & Pod Tolerations 3.9 Autoscaling: Horizontal Pod Autoscaler (HPA) & Custom Metrics

4 Chapter 4: Services, Networking & Ingress Architecture

4.1 Kubernetes IP-per-Pod Model & CNI Plugins (Flannel, Calico, Cilium) 4.2 Services Deep Dive: ClusterIP, NodePort, LoadBalancer & EndpointSlices 4.3 Kube-Proxy Service Dataplane: iptables, nftables, IPVS & eBPF 4.4 CoreDNS Configuration, Resolution & Custom Forwarding 4.5 NetworkPolicies: Ingress, Egress & Default-Deny Isolation 4.6 Ingress Architecture, Controllers & Path-Based Routing 4.7 Gateway API: GatewayClass, Gateway, HTTPRoute & Traffic Splitting 4.8 External Traffic Ingress: NodePort, Cloud LoadBalancers & MetalLB

5 Chapter 5: Storage Architecture & Persistent Volumes

5.1 Ephemeral Volumes, EmptyDir, HostPath & Config Volumes 5.2 PersistentVolumes (PV) & PersistentVolumeClaims (PVC) Lifecycle 5.3 StorageClasses, Dynamic Provisioning & VolumeBindingModes 5.4 Storage Access Modes, Reclaim Policies & Volume Expansion 5.5 Container Storage Interface (CSI) Architecture & Drivers 5.6 StatefulSet VolumeClaimTemplates & Persistent Storage Workflows

6 Chapter 6: Advanced Troubleshooting, Monitoring & Maintenance

6.1 Systematic Kubernetes Troubleshooting Methodology 6.2 Node Failure, Kubelet Diagnostics & Systemd Services 6.3 Control Plane Failures, Static Pods & Component Logs 6.4 etcd Troubleshooting, Quorum Loss & Database Defragmentation 6.5 Pod Startup Failures, CrashLoopBackOff & OOMKilled Diagnostics 6.6 Workload Scheduling Failures & Resource Constraint Resolution 6.7 Container & Node Logging Architecture, Journalctl & Fluentd 6.8 Metrics Server, Resource Utilization & Kubectl Top 6.9 Service, Endpoint & Ingress Connectivity Troubleshooting 6.10 Storage Failures: PVC Pending, Mount Failures & Multi-Attach Errors 6.11 NetworkPolicy Isolation & CoreDNS Resolution Diagnostics

2.7 Pod Security Standards (PSS) & Admission Controllers

Key Takeaways Explain This Topic AI

Admission controllers evaluate requests after authentication and authorization; Mutating controllers execute sequentially to modify objects, followed by Validating controllers running in parallel to accept or reject them.

Pod Security Standards (PSS) define three cumulative security profiles: Privileged (unrestricted), Baseline (prevents common escalations, default settings), and Restricted (hardened, non-root, drops all capabilities).

Pod Security Admission (PSA) applies PSS profiles at the namespace level across three distinct modes: 'enforce' (rejects violation), 'audit' (records in audit log), and 'warn' (returns visual terminal warning to user).

Configuring PSA on a namespace is performed via labels: 'pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce: restricted' and 'pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce-version: v1.35'.

The Restricted PSS profile requires setting 'runAsNonRoot: true', 'allowPrivilegeEscalation: false', dropping 'ALL' Linux capabilities, and using a 'RuntimeDefault' or 'Localhost' seccomp profile.

Last updated: August 2026

Pod Security Standards (PSS) & Admission Controllers

Securing a Kubernetes cluster requires preventing workloads from compromising node stability, escaping container boundaries, or accessing host system resources. Following the removal of legacy PodSecurityPolicy (PSP) in Kubernetes v1.25, the built-in Pod Security Standards (PSS) and Pod Security Admission (PSA) controller serve as the official mechanism for enforcing workload security constraints.

1. Admission Control Architecture: Mutating vs. Validating +---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

  • | ADMISSION CONTROL CONTROLLER FLOW |
  • | |
  • | [AUTHENTICATED & AUTHORIZED REQUEST] |
  • | | |
  • | v |
  • | +------------------------------------+ |
  • | | 1. MUTATING ADMISSION CONTROLLERS | ---> Runs SEQUENTIALLY |
  • | | - MutatingAdmissionWebhook | Can modify the incoming object manifest |
  • | | - DefaultStorageClass | (e.g., inject sidecar container, set default storage) |
  • | | - ServiceAccount controller | |
  • | +-----------------+------------------+ |
  • | | Modified Object Manifest |
  • | v |
  • | +------------------------------------+ |
  • | | 2. OBJECT SCHEMA VALIDATION | ---> Verifies field types, schemas, and OpenAPI specs |
  • | +-----------------+------------------+ |
  • | | Valid Schema |
  • | v |
  • | +------------------------------------+ |
  • | | 3. VALIDATING ADMISSION CONTROLLERS| ---> Runs IN PARALLEL |
  • | | - ValidatingAdmissionWebhook | Cannot modify object; evaluates ACCEPT or REJECT |
  • | | - PodSecurity Controller (PSA) | (e.g., PSS compliance, ResourceQuota limits) |
  • | | - NodeRestriction | |
  • | +-----------------+------------------+ |
  • | | All Passed |
  • | v |
  • | [PERSIST TO ETCD] |
  • +---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

Key Admission Controller Types:

Mutating Phase: Runs first and may alter the submitted object. Matching webhooks are called serially, but their invocation order is not a stable contract. A call error rejects by default ( failurePolicy: Fail ) or is ignored when configured with failurePolicy: Ignore ; an explicit allowed: false response rejects the request.

Validating Phase: Runs after schema validation. Evaluates whether the finalized object complies with cluster policies. Validating webhooks cannot mutate the object.

Core Built-in Admission Plugins:

NodeRestriction : Limits the Node identity to modifying its own Node and bound Pod objects and protects reserved label prefixes. Secret access restrictions are primarily enforced by the Node authorizer.

PodSecurity : Enforces Pod Security Standards based on namespace labels.

ResourceQuota & LimitRanger : Enforce resource consumption ceilings.

NamespaceLifecycle : Prevents creating objects in terminating namespaces or deleting system namespaces ( default , kube-system ).

2. Pod Security Standards (PSS) Profiles

PSS defines three progressive security profiles: +-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

  • | POD SECURITY STANDARDS (PSS) TIERS |
  • | |
  • | [PRIVILEGED] |
  • | - Completely open / unrestricted |
  • | - Allows: privileged containers, hostPID, hostNetwork, hostPath volumes, root user |
  • | - Use case: CNI network plugins, storage drivers, system daemons |
  • | | |
  • | v (Hardening Step 1) |
  • | [BASELINE] |
  • | - Prevents known privilege escalations with minimal friction |
  • | - Prohibits: privileged containers, host namespaces, forbidden volume types |
  • | - Allows: running as root (UID 0), default Linux capabilities |
  • | - Use case: Standard general-purpose microservices |
  • | | |
  • | v (Hardening Step 2) |
  • | [RESTRICTED] |
  • | - Heavily hardened; enforces cloud-native security best practices |
  • | - Requires: runAsNonRoot, no privilege escalation, seccomp, and dropping ALL capabilities |
  • | - Prohibits: privilege escalation, root execution |
  • | - Use case: Multi-tenant clusters, public-facing services, financial workloads |
  • +-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

Note

readOnlyRootFilesystem: true is valuable defense in depth and is used in the hardened example below, but it is not a required Restricted Pod Security Standard control.

Detailed PSS Profile Matrix

  • Security Control Privileged Baseline Restricted
  • Privileged Containers ( securityContext.privileged ) Allowed Prohibited Prohibited
  • Host Namespaces ( hostPID , hostIPC , hostNetwork ) Allowed Prohibited Prohibited
  • Host Ports ( hostPort ) Allowed Prohibited Prohibited
  • HostPath Volumes ( volumes.hostPath ) Allowed Prohibited Prohibited
  • Running as Root User ( runAsUser: 0 ) Allowed Allowed Prohibited ( runAsNonRoot: true )

Privilege Escalation ( allowPrivilegeEscalation ) Allowed Allowed Prohibited ( allowPrivilegeEscalation: false )

  • Linux Capabilities Any Default set Must drop ALL (can only add NET_BIND_SERVICE )
  • Seccomp Profile Any Any Must be RuntimeDefault or Localhost
  • 3. Pod Security Admission (PSA) Modes & Labeling

PSA enforces PSS profiles using three independent modes configured as labels on namespaces:

enforce : Any pod creation or update that violates the policy is rejected immediately with an HTTP 403 error.

audit : Violations are allowed , but an audit annotation is logged to the Kubernetes audit log.

warn : Violations are allowed , but an immediate warning message is returned to the user in their CLI output.

Namespace Labeling Syntax:

pod-security.kubernetes.io/<mode>: <profile> pod-security.kubernetes.io/<mode>-version: <version> (e.g., v1.35 or latest )

  • Applying PSA Labels via kubectl # 1. Enforce Baseline, while warning and auditing on Restricted
  • kubectl label namespace staging \
  • pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce=baseline \
  • pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce-version=latest \
  • pod-security.kubernetes.io/warn=restricted \
  • pod-security.kubernetes.io/warn-version=latest \
  • pod-security.kubernetes.io/audit=restricted \
  • pod-security.kubernetes.io/audit-version=latest \
  • -overwrite
  • # 2. Strict Restricted enforcement for production
  • kubectl label namespace production \
  • pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce=restricted \
  • pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce-version=latest \
  • -overwrite
  • # 3. Check labels on a namespace
  • kubectl get ns staging --show-labels
  • 4. Hardening Workloads for the Restricted Profile

To run successfully in a namespace with pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce=restricted , a Pod manifest must include explicit securityContext settings at both the pod and container levels.

  • Compliant Restricted Pod Specification apiVersion: v1
  • kind: Pod

metadata:

  • name: secure-app
  • namespace: production

spec:

# Pod-level Security Context

securityContext:

  • runAsNonRoot: true
  • runAsUser: 10001
  • runAsGroup: 10001
  • fsGroup: 10001

seccompProfile:

type: RuntimeDefault

containers:

  • name: web
  • image: nginx:1.27
  • # Container-level Security Context

securityContext:

  • allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
  • readOnlyRootFilesystem: true

capabilities:

drop:

- ALL

add:

- NET_BIND_SERVICE # Allowed exception for binding low ports

volumeMounts:

  • name: cache-volume
  • mountPath: /var/cache/nginx
  • name: run-volume
  • mountPath: /var/run

volumes:

  • name: cache-volume
  • emptyDir: {}
  • name: run-volume
  • emptyDir: {}

Loading diagram... Admission Controller Execution Pipeline & Pod Security Standards (PSS) Tiers