Study guide

6.1 The ASX Corporate Governance Council and 'If Not, Why Not'

CPA Program Ethics and Governance Exam

Track your progress as you read

Finished sections get a check mark.

1 Chapter 1: The Accounting Profession and the Public Interest

1.1 What Distinguishes a Profession and the Social Contract 1.2 The Public Interest and the Profession as a Positive Social Force 1.3 The Four Sectors Where Accountants Work 1.4 Capabilities, Modern Roles, and Sector-Specific Dilemmas

2 Chapter 2: Professional Regulation, Co-Regulation, and Discipline

2.1 IFAC, the Professional Bodies, and Australian Standard Setters 2.2 Australia's Co-Regulatory Model in Practice 2.3 Statutory Regulation and Co-Regulatory Models in Australia 2.4 Quality Assurance, Professional Conduct, and Disciplinary Processes

3 Chapter 3: Ethical Theories and Decision-Making Frameworks

3.1 Teleological (Consequentialist) Ethics and Utilitarianism 3.2 Deontological Ethics and Virtue Ethics 3.3 Relativism, Egoism, and Comparing the Ethical Theories 3.4 Individual, Organisational, and Societal Influences on Ethical Behaviour 3.5 Structured Ethical Decision-Making Models (AAA and Tucker Models)

4 Chapter 4: The APES 110 Code of Ethics

4.1 Structure and Legal Authority of APES 110 4.2 The Five Fundamental Principles 4.3 The Conceptual Framework: Identifying Threats and Applying Safeguards 4.4 Resolving Ethical Conflicts and Responding to NOCLAR 4.5 Independence Standards for Audit and Assurance Engagements

5 Chapter 5: The Corporate Form and Governance Theories

5.1 The Corporate Form: Five Foundational Characteristics 5.2 Separation of Ownership and Control and Defining Corporate Governance 5.3 Agency Theory and Stewardship Theory 5.4 Stakeholder, Resource Dependency, and Managerial Hegemony Theories 5.5 Comparative Corporate Governance: Anglo-American, European, and Asian Models

6 Chapter 6: The ASX Corporate Governance Principles

6.1 The ASX Corporate Governance Council and 'If Not, Why Not' 6.2 The Corporate Governance Statement and the Quality of Explanation 6.3 ASX Principles 1 to 4: Board Foundations, Structure, Culture, and Financial Integrity 6.4 ASX Principles 5 to 8: Disclosure, Shareholder Rights, Risk, and Remuneration

7 Chapter 7: Global Codes, Regulators, and Governance Beyond Listed Companies

7.1 The UK Corporate Governance Code and 'Comply or Explain' 7.2 Section 172, the G20/OECD Principles, and Global Benchmarking 7.3 Regulatory Architecture: ASIC, APRA, ACCC, and the Banking Royal Commission 7.4 Governance in the Public Sector, Charities, NFPs, and SMEs

8 Chapter 8: The Board, Committees, and Executive Remuneration

8.1 Board Role, Appointment, Cessation, and the Chair-CEO Division 8.2 Director Independence, Board Skills, and Diversity 8.3 Audit, Remuneration, Nomination, and Risk Committees 8.4 Executive Remuneration Structure, Malus, and Clawback 8.5 Remuneration Reporting and the Two-Strikes Rule

9 Chapter 9: Security Holders, Risk Oversight, and Market Integrity

9.1 Security Holder Rights, Engagement, and Shareholder Activism 9.2 Risk Governance, the Three Lines of Defence, and COSO ERM 9.3 Continuous Disclosure, Insider Trading, and Market Conduct

10 Chapter 10: Legal Duties, Whistleblowing, Cyber Risk, and Culture

10.1 Competition and Consumer Law and the Criminal-Civil Liability Divide 10.2 Directors' Statutory Duties and Their Enforcement 10.3 Whistleblower Protection Framework under the Corporations Act (Part 9.4AAA) 10.4 Cybersecurity, Privacy Principles (APPs), and Critical Infrastructure 10.5 Modern Slavery, Workplace Protections, and Instilling Ethical Corporate Culture

11 Chapter 11: Corporate Accountability and Reporting Theory

11.1 Conceptual Foundations and Evolution of Corporate Accountability 11.2 The Social Contract and the Social Licence to Operate 11.3 Limitations of Financial Accounting and the Problem of Externalities 11.4 Bridging the Reporting Gap: The Accountant's Role 11.5 Theoretical Perspectives: Legitimacy, Stakeholder, and Institutional Theories

12 Chapter 12: Sustainability Reporting Frameworks and Climate Disclosures

12.1 CSR Models: Carroll's Pyramid, Triple Bottom Line, and Shared Value 12.2 The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and Integrated Reporting (<IR>) Framework 12.3 The ISSB Standards (IFRS S1/S2), Australian Climate Disclosures, and Sustainability Assurance

6.1 The ASX Corporate Governance Council and 'If Not, Why Not'

Key Takeaways Explain This Topic AI

The ASX convened the Corporate Governance Council in August 2002 following Enron and HIH, and it now brings together industry, investor, and professional bodies to set non-prescriptive recommendations.

The Fourth Edition (February 2019, effective 1 January 2020) contains 8 Principles and 35 Recommendations, with heightened emphasis on culture, lawful and ethical behaviour, and whistleblower protection.

Under ASX Listing Rule 4.10.3, an entity that does not follow a recommendation must identify it, give reasons, and disclose any alternative practice adopted for the reporting period.

Departing from a recommendation is not a contravention of the Corporations Act 2001; the sanction is market scrutiny rather than statutory penalty.

The 'if not, why not' regime exists because one governance structure cannot suit a market spanning multi-billion-dollar conglomerates and small-cap exploration entities alike.

Last updated: September 2026

6.1 The ASX Corporate Governance Council and 'If Not, Why Not'

Core Principle: Corporate governance in Australia operates under a co-regulatory, market-based disclosure model. Rather than imposing rigid, uniform statutory mandates on every listed company regardless of scale, the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance Council establishes principles and recommendations governed by the flexible "if not, why not" reporting framework under ASX Listing Rule 4.10.3. Listed entities retain the freedom to adopt alternative governance arrangements suited to their operational maturity, provided they fully disclose and justify their departures to the capital market.

1. Genesis, History, and Authority of the ASX Corporate Governance Council

Corporate governance in Australia underwent a fundamental transformation at the turn of the millennium. The catastrophic collapses of prominent Australian corporations in 2001—most notably HIH Insurance , One.Tel , and Harris Scarfe —coincided with major international corporate governance failures, including Enron and WorldCom in the United States. While the United States responded with the highly prescriptive, statutory command-and-control framework of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), Australia adopted a hybrid regulatory architecture combining statutory reform ( Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Act 2004 - CLERP 9) with market-led self-regulation.

In August 2002, the Australian Securities Exchange convened the ASX Corporate Governance Council (the Council). The Council was designed as an independent, multi-stakeholder body bringing together peak business, professional, and shareholder associations to formulate a comprehensive framework of corporate governance principles and recommendations.

Composition of the Council

The Council does not consist of government bureaucrats; rather, it reflects a broad consensus across the Australian business and financial community. Its 21+ member organisations include:

Professional Accounting Bodies: CPA Australia, Chartered Accountants Australia and New Zealand (CA ANZ), and the Institute of Public Accountants (IPA).

Director and Governance Institutes: Australian Institute of Company Directors (AICD) and the Governance Institute of Australia.

Institutional Investor Groups: Australian Council of Superannuation Investors (ACSI) and the Australasian Investor Relations Association (AIRA).

Legal and Market Bodies: Law Council of Australia, Financial Services Council (FSC), and the Australian Shareholders' Association (ASA).

The Evolution of the Principles

The Council periodically updates the Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations to reflect evolving market expectations, international standards, and insights from royal commissions:

First Edition (March 2003): Introduced the core framework of 10 overarching principles and 28 recommendations under the "if not, why not" regime.

Second Edition (August 2007, updated 2010): Streamlined the framework into 8 principles and introduced recommendations regarding board diversity and female workforce participation.

Third Edition (March 2014): Strengthened requirements regarding risk management, internal audit, and the disclosure of economic, environmental, and social sustainability risks.

Fourth Edition (February 2019, effective 1 January 2020): Placed heightened emphasis on corporate culture, lawful and ethical behaviour, whistleblower protections, anti-bribery policies, and board skills matrices, directly responding to the findings of the 2018–2019 Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services Industry (the Hayne Royal Commission). +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

  • | EVOLUTION OF THE ASX CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES |
  • +-------------------+--------------------+--------------------+-----------------------------------+
  • | 1st Edition (2003)| 2nd Edition (2007) | 3rd Edition (2014) | 4th Edition (2019/2020) |
  • | * 10 Principles | * 8 Principles | * 8 Principles | * 8 Principles (35 Recomms) |
  • | * Post-HIH/Enron | * Diversity focus | * Risk & ESG focus | * Culture, Values, Whistleblowing |
  • | * "If Not, Why Not"| * Risk management | * Internal audit | * Anti-Bribery, Virtual Polls |
  • +-------------------+--------------------+--------------------+-----------------------------------+
  • 2. The "If Not, Why Not" Regulatory Mechanism
  • The Mechanics of ASX Listing Rule 4.10.3

The recommendations formulated by the Council do not have the direct force of statutory law. A failure to follow a recommendation does not constitute a breach of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Instead, the framework derives its regulatory authority through the ASX Listing Rules , which are enforceable contracts between the ASX and listed entities backed by statutory force under section 793C and section 1101B of the Corporations Act .

Under ASX Listing Rule 4.10.3 , an entity admitted to the official list of the ASX must include in its annual report (or publish on its website with a cross-reference in the annual report):

"A corporate governance statement disclosing the extent to which the entity has followed the recommendations set by the ASX Corporate Governance Council during the reporting period. If the entity has not followed all of the recommendations the entity must identify those recommendations that have not been followed and give reasons for not following them."

This reporting architecture is universally known as the "if not, why not" approach. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

  • | THE "IF NOT, WHY NOT" DECISION FRAMEWORK |
  • +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
  • | 1. BENCHMARKING: Entity compares governance against Council's 35 Recommendations |
  • | |
  • | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ |
  • | | | | |
  • | v v | |
  • | [ADOPT RECOMMENDATION] [DEPART FROM RECOMMENDATION] | |
  • | Disclose compliance in Provide comprehensive "If Not, Why Not" | |
  • | Corporate Governance justification in Statement: | |
  • | Statement & Appendix 4G * Identify specific recommendation departed | |
  • | * Articulate commercial/operational rationale | |
  • | * Detail alternative governance safeguards | |
  • | * Outline future transition/adoption timeline | |
  • +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
  • Mandatory Rules vs. Flexible Recommendations

To succeed in CPA examinations, candidates must distinguish between mandatory listing requirements and flexible recommendations:

Regulatory Layer Instrument Nature of Obligation Legal / Regulatory Consequence of Non-Compliance

Mandatory Listing Rule ASX Listing Rule 4.10.3 Absolute obligation to report Breach of contract with ASX; potential trading suspension under Listing Rule 17.3; court orders under s 793C.

Mandatory Specific Rule ASX Listing Rule 12.7 (Audit Committees) S&P/ASX 300 entities MUST establish an audit committee Direct breach of listing rules; entity cannot trade out of this requirement via "if not, why not".

Council Recommendation ASX Recommendation 2.4 (Majority Independent) Flexible best-practice guideline Fully permissible to depart, provided a transparent, robust explanation is disclosed to the market.

Why Flexibility Is Essential: Market Heterogeneity

The Australian capital market is characterized by extreme heterogeneity. It hosts multi-billion-dollar global banking and resource conglomerates (e.g., BHP, Commonwealth Bank) alongside hundreds of small-cap junior exploration entities, early-stage biotechnology startups, and closely held technology firms with market capitalizations under $30 million.

Imposing an identical, rigid corporate governance blueprint across all entities would introduce acute structural distortions:

Disproportionate Compliance Burden: Establishing separate audit, risk, nomination, and remuneration committees populated entirely by non-executive directors would exhaust the financial and managerial resources of a micro-cap explorer.

Commercial Value Destruction: In an entrepreneurial startup, the founding inventor or chief technologist may be essential as Executive Chair. Forcing immediate separation of the Chair and CEO roles could derail commercial strategy.

Form Over Substance: Rigid statutory rules encourage mechanical "tick-box" compliance, where companies recruit compliant independent directors who lack the technical expertise required to govern a specialized enterprise.

The "if not, why not" model accommodates diversity by allowing an entity to adopt governance structures aligned with its scale, industry complexity, and developmental lifecycle.