Study guide
7.2 Section 172, the G20/OECD Principles, and Global Benchmarking
CPA Program Ethics and Governance Exam
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1 Chapter 1: The Accounting Profession and the Public Interest
1.1 What Distinguishes a Profession and the Social Contract 1.2 The Public Interest and the Profession as a Positive Social Force 1.3 The Four Sectors Where Accountants Work 1.4 Capabilities, Modern Roles, and Sector-Specific Dilemmas
2 Chapter 2: Professional Regulation, Co-Regulation, and Discipline
2.1 IFAC, the Professional Bodies, and Australian Standard Setters 2.2 Australia's Co-Regulatory Model in Practice 2.3 Statutory Regulation and Co-Regulatory Models in Australia 2.4 Quality Assurance, Professional Conduct, and Disciplinary Processes
3 Chapter 3: Ethical Theories and Decision-Making Frameworks
3.1 Teleological (Consequentialist) Ethics and Utilitarianism 3.2 Deontological Ethics and Virtue Ethics 3.3 Relativism, Egoism, and Comparing the Ethical Theories 3.4 Individual, Organisational, and Societal Influences on Ethical Behaviour 3.5 Structured Ethical Decision-Making Models (AAA and Tucker Models)
4 Chapter 4: The APES 110 Code of Ethics
4.1 Structure and Legal Authority of APES 110 4.2 The Five Fundamental Principles 4.3 The Conceptual Framework: Identifying Threats and Applying Safeguards 4.4 Resolving Ethical Conflicts and Responding to NOCLAR 4.5 Independence Standards for Audit and Assurance Engagements
5 Chapter 5: The Corporate Form and Governance Theories
5.1 The Corporate Form: Five Foundational Characteristics 5.2 Separation of Ownership and Control and Defining Corporate Governance 5.3 Agency Theory and Stewardship Theory 5.4 Stakeholder, Resource Dependency, and Managerial Hegemony Theories 5.5 Comparative Corporate Governance: Anglo-American, European, and Asian Models
6 Chapter 6: The ASX Corporate Governance Principles
6.1 The ASX Corporate Governance Council and 'If Not, Why Not' 6.2 The Corporate Governance Statement and the Quality of Explanation 6.3 ASX Principles 1 to 4: Board Foundations, Structure, Culture, and Financial Integrity 6.4 ASX Principles 5 to 8: Disclosure, Shareholder Rights, Risk, and Remuneration
7 Chapter 7: Global Codes, Regulators, and Governance Beyond Listed Companies
7.1 The UK Corporate Governance Code and 'Comply or Explain' 7.2 Section 172, the G20/OECD Principles, and Global Benchmarking 7.3 Regulatory Architecture: ASIC, APRA, ACCC, and the Banking Royal Commission 7.4 Governance in the Public Sector, Charities, NFPs, and SMEs
8 Chapter 8: The Board, Committees, and Executive Remuneration
8.1 Board Role, Appointment, Cessation, and the Chair-CEO Division 8.2 Director Independence, Board Skills, and Diversity 8.3 Audit, Remuneration, Nomination, and Risk Committees 8.4 Executive Remuneration Structure, Malus, and Clawback 8.5 Remuneration Reporting and the Two-Strikes Rule
9 Chapter 9: Security Holders, Risk Oversight, and Market Integrity
9.1 Security Holder Rights, Engagement, and Shareholder Activism 9.2 Risk Governance, the Three Lines of Defence, and COSO ERM 9.3 Continuous Disclosure, Insider Trading, and Market Conduct
10 Chapter 10: Legal Duties, Whistleblowing, Cyber Risk, and Culture
10.1 Competition and Consumer Law and the Criminal-Civil Liability Divide 10.2 Directors' Statutory Duties and Their Enforcement 10.3 Whistleblower Protection Framework under the Corporations Act (Part 9.4AAA) 10.4 Cybersecurity, Privacy Principles (APPs), and Critical Infrastructure 10.5 Modern Slavery, Workplace Protections, and Instilling Ethical Corporate Culture
11 Chapter 11: Corporate Accountability and Reporting Theory
11.1 Conceptual Foundations and Evolution of Corporate Accountability 11.2 The Social Contract and the Social Licence to Operate 11.3 Limitations of Financial Accounting and the Problem of Externalities 11.4 Bridging the Reporting Gap: The Accountant's Role 11.5 Theoretical Perspectives: Legitimacy, Stakeholder, and Institutional Theories
12 Chapter 12: Sustainability Reporting Frameworks and Climate Disclosures
12.1 CSR Models: Carroll's Pyramid, Triple Bottom Line, and Shared Value 12.2 The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and Integrated Reporting (<IR>) Framework 12.3 The ISSB Standards (IFRS S1/S2), Australian Climate Disclosures, and Sustainability Assurance
7.2 Section 172, the G20/OECD Principles, and Global Benchmarking
Key Takeaways Explain This Topic AI
Section 172 of the UK Companies Act 2006 codifies Enlightened Shareholder Value: directors must promote the success of the company for the members while having regard to employees, suppliers, customers, community, and the environment.
Australia has no statutory equivalent of section 172; under section 181(1) a director must act in good faith in the best interests of the corporation and for a proper purpose.
The OECD Principles were first issued in 1999 and comprehensively revised as the G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance in September 2023.
The 2023 revision added sustainability and resilience as a dedicated chapter, addressing digital transformation, climate transition risk, and capital market concentration.
The G20/OECD Principles are a policy benchmark for legislators and regulators rather than a code binding individual companies, which distinguishes them from the UK Code and the ASX Principles.
Last updated: September 2026
- 7.2 Section 172, the G20/OECD Principles, and Global Benchmarking
- 1. Section 172 of the UK Companies Act 2006: Enlightened Shareholder Value
A central innovation of modern UK corporate law is Section 172 of the Companies Act 2006 , which codified the doctrine of Enlightened Shareholder Value (ESV) into statutory director duties.
The Statutory Text and Scope of Section 172(1)
Section 172(1) provides:
"A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in doing so have regard (amongst other matters) to: (a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term, (b) the interests of the company's employees, (c) the need to foster the company's business relationships with suppliers, customers and others, (d) the impact of the company's operations on the community and the environment, (e) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high standards of business conduct, and (f) the need to act fairly as between members of the company." +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
- | ENLIGHTENED SHAREHOLDER VALUE: SECTION 172 ARCHITECTURE |
- +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
- | ULTIMATE STATUTORY OBJECTIVE: |
- | Promote the success of the company for the BENEFIT OF MEMBERS AS A WHOLE (Shareholder Primacy) |
- | |
- | ^ |
- | | MANDATORY STATUTORY CONSIDERATIONS ("HAVE REGARD TO"): |
- | +-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+ |
- | | | | | |
- | Long-term consequences Employees Suppliers/Customers Community & Environment |
- | s 172(1)(a) s 172(1)(b) s 172(1)(c) s 172(1)(d) |
- | |
- | +---------------------------------------+---------------------------------------+ |
- | | | |
- | Reputation for high standards of conduct (s 172(1)(e)) Fairness between members (s 172(1)(f))|
- +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
- Enlightened Shareholder Value vs. Pluralist Stakeholder Theory
Candidates must distinguish between Enlightened Shareholder Value and pure Pluralist Stakeholder Theory:
Pluralist Stakeholder Theory: Directs that all stakeholders (employees, creditors, community, shareholders) possess equal legal standing. The board balances competing interests without subordinating one to another.
Enlightened Shareholder Value (Section 172): Retains shareholder primacy as the ultimate objective . The company exists for the benefit of its members. However, it recognizes that long-term shareholder wealth cannot be generated by exploiting workers, defrauding suppliers, or destroying the environment. Stakeholder interests are mandatory considerations essential to achieving the primary goal of corporate success.
The Section 172(1) Statement
Under UK reporting regulations, large companies must include a dedicated Section 172(1) Statement within their Strategic Report in the annual report. This statement must explain how the directors had regard to the matters in subsections (a) to (f) when making major strategic decisions during the year (e.g., executing an acquisition, closing a factory, or responding to supply chain disruptions).
Contrast with Australian Law (Section 181)
Under section 181(1) of the Australian Corporations Act 2001 , a director must exercise their powers and discharge their duties in good faith in the best interests of the corporation and for a proper purpose. Australian courts have consistently held that "the corporation" equates to the shareholders as a collective economic body. While Australian directors may consider stakeholder impacts where doing so advances corporate reputation and long-term shareholder value, Australian statutory law has not codified an explicit list of non-shareholder factors comparable to Section 172 of the UK Act.
2. Global Benchmarks: The G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance
The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance , first issued in 1999 and subsequently endorsed by the G20, represent the premier multilateral benchmark for corporate governance globally. They serve as the foundation for the Financial Stability Board's (FSB) Key Standards for Sound Financial Systems and guide international institutions (such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund) when assessing national financial sectors.
In September 2023, the OECD released a comprehensive revision—the G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2023 Edition) —to address digital transformation, climate transition risks, cross-border corporate groups, and capital market concentration. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
- | THE SIX PILLARS OF THE G20/OECD PRINCIPLES (2023) |
- +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
- | I. ENSURING THE BASIS FOR AN EFFECTIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK |
- | Rule of law, clear regulatory divisions, economic efficiency, and institutional integrity |
- | |
- | II. THE RIGHTS AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT OF SHAREHOLDERS AND KEY OWNERSHIP FUNCTIONS |
- | Voting rights, equitable treatment of minority/foreign holders, anti-dilution, AGMs |
- | |
- | III. INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, STOCK MARKETS, AND OTHER INTERMEDIARIES |
- | Fiduciary disclosure, voting policies, stewardship, managing cross-border market frictions |
- | |
- | IV. DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY |
- | Material financial and non-financial data, sustainability disclosures, audit quality |
- | |
- | V. THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE BOARD |
- | Strategic guidance, executive monitoring, risk management, board independence, ESG duties |
- | |
- | VI. SUSTAINABILITY AND RESILIENCE |
- | Climate risks, human capital, stakeholder engagement, long-term environmental viability |
- +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
- Analysis of the Six Pillars
Ensuring the Basis for an Effective Framework: Corporate governance frameworks must promote transparent, fair, and efficient markets, align with the rule of law, and articulate clear supervisory responsibilities between regulatory agencies.
Shareholder Rights and Equitable Treatment: All shareholders—including minority and foreign investors—must enjoy equitable treatment. Frameworks must guarantee secure ownership registration, timely voting rights, transparent capital changes, and effective remedies against insider self-dealing.
Institutional Investors and Intermediaries: Institutional investors acting in a fiduciary capacity should disclose their corporate governance and voting policies. Proxy advisers and research analysts must disclose and manage conflicts of interest that could bias market guidance.
Disclosure and Transparency: Timely and accurate disclosure must be made on all material matters regarding the corporation, including financial results, company objectives, major share ownership, governance structures, and material sustainability/climate risks. Audits must be conducted by independent, competent auditors applying high-quality standards.
Responsibilities of the Board: The board carries fiduciary responsibilities to guide corporate strategy, monitor executive management, oversee internal controls and risk management, and prevent conflicts of interest. Boards must exercise independent judgment, particularly where minority shareholders require protection.
Sustainability and Resilience (Elevated in 2023): Recognizes that long-term corporate viability hinges on managing sustainability risks. Frameworks must encourage constructive dialogue with stakeholders (workforce, creditors, communities) and mandate transparent, comparable sustainability-related financial disclosures aligned with international standards (e.g., ISSB).
3. Comparative Analysis Matrix: UK Code vs. ASX Principles vs. G20/OECD Principles
Governance Dimension UK Corporate Governance Code (2024) ASX Corporate Governance Principles (4th Ed) G20/OECD Principles (2023)
Governing Philosophy "Comply or explain" principles-based approach. "If not, why not" disclosure framework. High-level multilateral policy benchmark for national law and regulation.
Legal & Regulatory Anchor FCA Listing Rules (LR 9.8.6R) via Financial Reporting Council. ASX Listing Rule 4.10.3 backed by Corporations Act ss 793C/1101B. Non-binding international standard; implemented via national statutes and treaties.
Target Entities Premium listed commercial equity issuers on the LSE. All entities admitted to the official listing of the ASX. All public corporations; guidance adaptable to state-owned and private firms.
Board Composition At least 50% independent NEDs (excluding Chair); Chair independent on appointment. Majority of the board should be independent directors; Chair independent. Sufficient number of non-executive board members capable of independent judgment.
Chair and CEO Split Explicitly prohibits combining Chair and CEO roles (Provision 9). Strong recommendation that Chair and CEO must not be the same person (Rec 2.5). Clear division of responsibilities at board and executive level recommended.
Senior Independent Director Mandatory recommendation: Appoint a Senior Independent Director (SID). No explicit requirement or recommendation for a SID. Recommended mechanism to resolve conflicts and board dysfunction.
Director Tenure Limits Chair tenure capped at 9 years; NED independence questioned after 9 years. 9-to-12-year tenure triggers close board review of independence, but no hard cap. Periodic board renewal recommended; excessive tenure noted as an independence risk.
Workforce Voice Mechanism Mandatory provision: Choose worker-director, advisory panel, or designated NED. Culture and values focus; whistleblower policy (Rec 3.3); no mandated worker panel. Emphasizes stakeholder cooperation and employee participation mechanisms.
Stakeholder Legal Codification Codified in statute: Section 172 Companies Act 2006 (ESV). Common law interpretation of s 181 (best interests of company as a whole). Explicit chapter on stakeholder role and sustainability/resilience.
External Board Evaluation FTSE 350 companies must undergo external evaluation every 3 years. Recommends annual performance review; external facilitation encouraged, not mandated. Recommends regular board evaluation to assess collective skills and effectiveness.
Remuneration Discipline 5-year vesting/holding periods; extensive malus and clawback policies. Executive pay split (FAR, STI, LTI); hedging ban; statutory 'two-strikes' rule. Link pay to long-term sustainable performance; transparent disclosure of remuneration.
- 4. Practical Scenarios and Exam Traps
- Practical Scenario: Dual-Listed Governance Divergence
Scenario: Pacific Lithium PLC is a dual-listed resources company incorporated in the United Kingdom and listed on both the London Stock Exchange (LSE Premium List) and the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). The board comprises six directors:
- Lord Arthur Vance (Executive Chairman and founder)
- Dr. Alistair Finch (Managing Director / CEO)
- Two Non-Executive Directors who are former executives of the company
- Two Independent Non-Executive Directors
Analysis:
UK Code Non-Compliance: Pacific Lithium faces severe governance issues under the UK Code. First, Lord Vance is an Executive Chairman , directly violating Provision 9, which requires the Chair to be independent on appointment and prohibits combining executive leadership with board leadership. Second, only two of six directors (33%) are independent NEDs, breaching Provision 11 (minimum 50% independent NEDs excluding the Chair). Third, the company lacks a Senior Independent Director (SID) (Provision 12).
ASX Principles Non-Compliance: Under ASX Recommendation 2.4, the board lacks a majority of independent directors. Under Recommendation 2.5, the Chair is not independent. Under Listing Rule 4.10.3, the board must provide a detailed "if not, why not" justification in its Corporate Governance Statement and Appendix 4G.
Regulatory Strategy: If Pacific Lithium fails to appoint a Senior Independent Director, fails to transition Lord Vance to a non-executive role, and provides boilerplate explanations, UK institutional investors governed by the UK Stewardship Code and Australian superannuation funds (ACSI) will vote against director re-elections and demand board reconstitution.
⚠️ Exam Alert: Critical Distinctions and Pitfalls
Trap 1: Confusing Section 172 ESV with Pluralist Stakeholder Theory. In an examination, never write that Section 172 makes shareholders and external stakeholders equal. Section 172 codifies Enlightened Shareholder Value : the overriding duty is to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members (shareholders) . Employee, environmental, and supplier interests must be considered in service of that long-term corporate success.
Trap 2: Assuming "Comply or Explain" Means Compliance is Purely Voluntary Without Penalties. While choosing not to comply is legally permissible, an entity cannot remain silent. Omitting an explanation violates Listing Rules. Furthermore, explanations are aggressively interrogated by proxy advisers, institutional shareholders, and regulatory authorities.
Trap 3: Overlooking the Senior Independent Director (SID). CPA candidates frequently confuse UK and Australian board structures. The Senior Independent Director (SID) is a cornerstone of the UK Code (providing an alternative channel for shareholders and evaluating the Chair), whereas the ASX Corporate Governance Principles do not explicitly recommend or define a SID role.