Study guide
8.5 Remuneration Reporting and the Two-Strikes Rule
CPA Program Ethics and Governance Exam
Track your progress as you read
Finished sections get a check mark.
1 Chapter 1: The Accounting Profession and the Public Interest
1.1 What Distinguishes a Profession and the Social Contract 1.2 The Public Interest and the Profession as a Positive Social Force 1.3 The Four Sectors Where Accountants Work 1.4 Capabilities, Modern Roles, and Sector-Specific Dilemmas
2 Chapter 2: Professional Regulation, Co-Regulation, and Discipline
2.1 IFAC, the Professional Bodies, and Australian Standard Setters 2.2 Australia's Co-Regulatory Model in Practice 2.3 Statutory Regulation and Co-Regulatory Models in Australia 2.4 Quality Assurance, Professional Conduct, and Disciplinary Processes
3 Chapter 3: Ethical Theories and Decision-Making Frameworks
3.1 Teleological (Consequentialist) Ethics and Utilitarianism 3.2 Deontological Ethics and Virtue Ethics 3.3 Relativism, Egoism, and Comparing the Ethical Theories 3.4 Individual, Organisational, and Societal Influences on Ethical Behaviour 3.5 Structured Ethical Decision-Making Models (AAA and Tucker Models)
4 Chapter 4: The APES 110 Code of Ethics
4.1 Structure and Legal Authority of APES 110 4.2 The Five Fundamental Principles 4.3 The Conceptual Framework: Identifying Threats and Applying Safeguards 4.4 Resolving Ethical Conflicts and Responding to NOCLAR 4.5 Independence Standards for Audit and Assurance Engagements
5 Chapter 5: The Corporate Form and Governance Theories
5.1 The Corporate Form: Five Foundational Characteristics 5.2 Separation of Ownership and Control and Defining Corporate Governance 5.3 Agency Theory and Stewardship Theory 5.4 Stakeholder, Resource Dependency, and Managerial Hegemony Theories 5.5 Comparative Corporate Governance: Anglo-American, European, and Asian Models
6 Chapter 6: The ASX Corporate Governance Principles
6.1 The ASX Corporate Governance Council and 'If Not, Why Not' 6.2 The Corporate Governance Statement and the Quality of Explanation 6.3 ASX Principles 1 to 4: Board Foundations, Structure, Culture, and Financial Integrity 6.4 ASX Principles 5 to 8: Disclosure, Shareholder Rights, Risk, and Remuneration
7 Chapter 7: Global Codes, Regulators, and Governance Beyond Listed Companies
7.1 The UK Corporate Governance Code and 'Comply or Explain' 7.2 Section 172, the G20/OECD Principles, and Global Benchmarking 7.3 Regulatory Architecture: ASIC, APRA, ACCC, and the Banking Royal Commission 7.4 Governance in the Public Sector, Charities, NFPs, and SMEs
8 Chapter 8: The Board, Committees, and Executive Remuneration
8.1 Board Role, Appointment, Cessation, and the Chair-CEO Division 8.2 Director Independence, Board Skills, and Diversity 8.3 Audit, Remuneration, Nomination, and Risk Committees 8.4 Executive Remuneration Structure, Malus, and Clawback 8.5 Remuneration Reporting and the Two-Strikes Rule
9 Chapter 9: Security Holders, Risk Oversight, and Market Integrity
9.1 Security Holder Rights, Engagement, and Shareholder Activism 9.2 Risk Governance, the Three Lines of Defence, and COSO ERM 9.3 Continuous Disclosure, Insider Trading, and Market Conduct
10 Chapter 10: Legal Duties, Whistleblowing, Cyber Risk, and Culture
10.1 Competition and Consumer Law and the Criminal-Civil Liability Divide 10.2 Directors' Statutory Duties and Their Enforcement 10.3 Whistleblower Protection Framework under the Corporations Act (Part 9.4AAA) 10.4 Cybersecurity, Privacy Principles (APPs), and Critical Infrastructure 10.5 Modern Slavery, Workplace Protections, and Instilling Ethical Corporate Culture
11 Chapter 11: Corporate Accountability and Reporting Theory
11.1 Conceptual Foundations and Evolution of Corporate Accountability 11.2 The Social Contract and the Social Licence to Operate 11.3 Limitations of Financial Accounting and the Problem of Externalities 11.4 Bridging the Reporting Gap: The Accountant's Role 11.5 Theoretical Perspectives: Legitimacy, Stakeholder, and Institutional Theories
12 Chapter 12: Sustainability Reporting Frameworks and Climate Disclosures
12.1 CSR Models: Carroll's Pyramid, Triple Bottom Line, and Shared Value 12.2 The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and Integrated Reporting (<IR>) Framework 12.3 The ISSB Standards (IFRS S1/S2), Australian Climate Disclosures, and Sustainability Assurance
8.5 Remuneration Reporting and the Two-Strikes Rule
Key Takeaways Explain This Topic AI
Section 300A requires a listed entity to include a detailed remuneration report in the directors' report, setting out key management personnel remuneration and performance hurdles.
A 'strike' occurs when 25% or more of votes cast oppose adoption of the remuneration report at the annual general meeting (section 250U).
After a first strike the board must explain in the following year's remuneration report how it responded to the concerns raised.
A second strike at the next annual general meeting triggers a conditional spill resolution, which passes on a simple majority of more than 50%.
If the spill resolution passes, the company must hold a spill meeting within 90 days at which all directors except the managing director vacate office and stand for re-election (section 250W).
Last updated: September 2026
- 8.5 Remuneration Reporting and the Two-Strikes Rule
- 1. Statutory Remuneration Reporting: Section 300A
Under Section 300A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) , every Australian listed disclosing entity must include a dedicated Remuneration Report within its annual Directors' Report.
Mandatory Section 300A Disclosures
The Remuneration Report is exhaustive and must disclose:
Board Remuneration Policy: The governance principles and strategic rationale underlying executive compensation.
Link to Corporate Performance: A detailed explanation of how remuneration policies align executive pay with company earnings and shareholder wealth creation over the last five financial years (disclosing dividends, share price movements, and EPS).
Detailed Compensation Breakdown: Exact, audited dollar figures for every director and Key Management Personnel (KMP), disaggregated into:
- Short-term benefits (cash salary, fees, STI cash bonus, non-monetary perks);
- Post-employment benefits (superannuation, pensions);
- Long-term benefits (long service leave);
- Share-based payments (value of options and performance rights granted and amortized);
Termination payouts.
Performance Hurdles: Full details of STI and LTI performance conditions, why those hurdles were chosen, and methods used to evaluate whether hurdles were satisfied.
Remuneration Consultants: Disclosure under section 206K regarding any consultants engaged, fees paid, and the board independence declaration.
Independent Audit of the Remuneration Report
Under Section 308(3C) of the Corporations Act, the company's external auditor must formally audit the Remuneration Report and issue a separate, binding audit opinion confirming whether the report complies with Section 300A. A qualified remuneration audit opinion represents a severe corporate governance crisis.
2. Australia's "Two-Strikes" Rule (Corporations Act ss 250U–250Y)
Introduced in 2011 via amendments to the Corporations Act 2001 , the Two-Strikes Rule gives shareholders unprecedented statutory authority to discipline boards over executive remuneration misalignment. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
- | THE AUSTRALIAN TWO-STRIKES ESCALATION PROCESS |
- +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
- | AGM 1: NON-BINDING VOTE ON REMUNERATION REPORT (s 250R(2)) |
- | |
- | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ |
- | | < 25% AGAINST | ≥ 25% OF VOTES CAST AGAINST | |
- | v v | |
- | [REPORT PASSED] [FIRST STRIKE INCURRED (s 250U)] | |
- | No statutory escalation Board must address shareholder concerns in | |
- | the next year's Remuneration Report | |
- | | |
- | AGM 2 (CONSECUTIVE YEAR): REPORT VOTE | |
- | +-------------------+-------------------+ | |
- | | < 25% AGAINST | ≥ 25% AGAINST | | |
- | v v | | |
- | [STRIKE CLEARED] [SECOND STRIKE (s 250V)] | | |
- | Strike count resets Board incurs Second Strike| | |
- | to zero + | | |
- | | MANDATORY SPILL MOTION | | |
- | v (Voted at same AGM) | | |
- | +-------------------+ | | |
- | | | | | |
- | v v | | |
- | [< 50% PASS] [≥ 50% PASS] | |
- | Spill fails SPILL PASSED! | |
- | Strike count (s 250V) | |
- | resets to zero | | |
- | v | |
- | [THE 90-DAY SPILL MEETING (s 250W)] | |
- | * All non-executive directors cease | |
- | office and must re-contest seats | |
- | * Managing Director (CEO) EXEMPT | |
- +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
- Detailed Step-by-Step Statutory Breakdown
- 1. The Non-Binding Advisory Resolution (s 250R(2))
At every AGM of a listed company, a resolution that the Remuneration Report be adopted must be put to a shareholder vote. Under section 250R(3), this vote is advisory only—it does not legally invalidate remuneration contracts or claw back executive pay.
2. The First Strike (Section 250U)
A company incurs a First Strike if 25% or more of the eligible votes cast on the resolution are voted AGAINST adoption of the Remuneration Report. In the subsequent year's Remuneration Report, the board must provide a dedicated section detailing the actions taken in response to shareholder concerns raised at the first strike AGM.
3. The Second Strike (Section 250V)
If, at the immediately following AGM, 25% or more of the eligible votes cast are again voted AGAINST the Remuneration Report, the company incurs a Second Strike .
4. The Conditional Spill Resolution (Section 250V)
If a company incurs a second strike, it must immediately put a Spill Resolution to shareholders at that same AGM. The spill resolution asks shareholders whether a special general meeting (the Spill Meeting ) should be convened. Unlike the 25% strike threshold, the Spill Resolution requires an ordinary majority ( more than 50% of eligible votes cast ) to pass.
5. Strict Voting Exclusions (Sections 250R(4) and 250BD)
To prevent management from using their own substantial shareholdings to defeat strikes or spill motions, the Corporations Act enforces strict voting restrictions:
Members of the Key Management Personnel (KMP) whose remuneration is disclosed in the report, and their closely related parties (spouses, children, dependent relatives, and controlled companies), are legally barred from voting their shares on the Remuneration Report resolution or the Spill Resolution.
Any votes cast by KMP or their closely related parties on these resolutions are void and disregarded.
6. The 90-Day Spill Meeting (Section 250W)
If the Spill Resolution is approved by more than 50% of voting shareholders:
The company must convene an Extraordinary General Meeting (the Spill Meeting) within 90 days .
Immediately before the end of the spill meeting, all directors who approved the directors' report at the time of the second strike cease to hold office .
These directors must stand for re-election at the spill meeting if they wish to remain on the board.
The Managing Director Exemption: Under Section 250V(1)(d), the Managing Director (CEO) is statutory-exempt and does not vacate office. This ensures executive continuity and operational stability during the board upheaval.
- 3. Practical Scenario and Worked Calculation: The Two-Strikes Lifecycle at Caledon Logistics Ltd
- Financial Year 1 (FY24 AGM)
Caledon Logistics Ltd reports a 40% decline in net profit, cancels its dividend, yet awards its CEO a $1.5 million discretionary cash bonus. At the FY24 AGM, 10,000,000 eligible votes are cast on the Remuneration Report:
- Votes For: 7,100,000 (71.0%)
- Votes Against: 2,900,000 (29.0%)
Outcome: Because the against votes exceed 25%, Caledon incurs a First Strike under section 250U. The board must explain its remuneration adjustments in the FY25 Remuneration Report.
Financial Year 2 (FY25 AGM)
In FY25, Caledon's board makes superficial changes to executive scorecards but maintains high base salaries. Institutional superannuation funds remain dissatisfied. At the FY25 AGM, 12,000,000 eligible votes are cast on the Remuneration Report:
- Votes For: 8,640,000 (72.0%)
- Votes Against: 3,360,000 (28.0%)
Outcome: Caledon incurs a Second Strike under section 250V (28.0% > 25.0%).
The Spill Resolution at FY25 AGM
Because the second strike occurred, the Chair must immediately put the Spill Resolution to the meeting. On the Spill Resolution, 11,500,000 eligible votes are cast (excluding all KMP shares):
- Votes For the Spill: 6,210,000 (54.0%)
- Votes Against the Spill: 5,290,000 (46.0%)
Outcome: The Spill Resolution passes with a simple majority (54.0% > 50.0%).
Execution of the Spill Meeting
Within 90 days , Caledon must convene the Spill Meeting.
All four non-executive directors (including the Board Chair and the Remuneration Committee Chair) automatically vacate their board seats at the conclusion of the meeting.
Institutional shareholders nominate three new independent director candidates.
At the meeting, shareholders vote on each candidate. Two incumbent directors are rejected, and two new independent directors are elected to the reconstructed board.
The Managing Director (CEO) remains in office throughout, protected by the statutory exemption under section 250V(1)(d).
Following the spill meeting, Caledon's strike tally resets to zero.
- 4. Critical Distinctions and Exam Traps
- ⚠️ Exam Alert: Common Pitfalls
Trap 1: Confusing the 25% Strike Threshold with the 50% Spill Threshold. A First Strike and a Second Strike occur at 25% against . However, the conditional Spill Resolution requires an ordinary majority (>50%) of votes cast to pass.
Trap 2: Believing the Managing Director Vacates Office at a Spill Meeting. Candidates often incorrectly assume every board member loses their seat. Under Section 250V(1)(d), the Managing Director (CEO) is exempt from the spill and does not stand for re-election, preserving managerial continuity.
Trap 3: Overlooking KMP Voting Disqualification. KMP and their closely related parties cannot vote their shares on the Remuneration Report or the Spill Motion. An exam question may list KMP holding 30% of total company shares; candidates must remember to exclude those shares when calculating the percentage of votes cast.
Trap 4: Granting Options to Non-Executive Directors. Candidates frequently assume that granting share options to NEDs is good practice to "align them with shareholders." Recommendation 8.2 explicitly opposes performance pay or options for NEDs , as it compromises their objective independence.