Study guide
4.1 WHOIS Records, Domain Registrars & Autonomous Systems
CREST Practitioner Security Analyst CPSA
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1 Chapter 1: Soft Skills, Legal Framework & Assessment Management
1.1 The Penetration Testing Engagement Lifecycle & Scoping 1.2 Legal Framework: Computer Misuse Act & Compliance 1.3 Understanding, Explaining & Managing Technical Risk 1.4 Record Keeping, Interim Escalation & Reporting Standards
2 Chapter 2: Core Networking: IP Protocols & Network Architectures
2.1 IPv4 and IPv6 Addressing, Subnetting & Header Architecture 2.2 TCP and UDP Transport Protocols & Handshake Mechanics 2.3 ICMP Protocol, Network Diagnostics & Error Messages 2.4 Network Topologies, Switched Media & VLAN Segmentation 2.5 Network Media, Ethernet Standards & Physical Topologies
3 Chapter 3: Cryptography & Secure Communication Protocols
3.1 Symmetric & Asymmetric Cryptographic Algorithms 3.2 Cryptographic Hash Functions, MACs & Digital Signatures 3.3 Secure Protocols: SSL/TLS, IPsec & SSH
4 Chapter 4: Background Information Gathering & OSINT Reconnaissance
4.1 WHOIS Records, Domain Registrars & Autonomous Systems 4.2 DNS Infrastructure, Record Types & Zone Transfers 4.3 Search Engine Reconnaissance, Google Dorking & Information Leakage 4.4 Newsgroups, Mailing Lists & Public Archive Reconnaissance
5 Chapter 5: Networking Equipment & Infrastructure Protocols
5.1 Router & Switch Management: SNMP, SSH & Authentication 5.2 Layer 2 Protocols: ARP, CDP, STP, VTP & Redundancy 5.3 Core Network Services: DHCP, NTP & TFTP 5.4 Wireless Security (802.11) & VoIP Assessment 5.5 Out-of-Band Management, Console Access & Cisco Reverse Telnet
6 Chapter 6: Network Mapping, Nmap Techniques & Target Identification
6.1 Host Discovery Techniques & Ping Sweep Methodologies 6.2 Port Scanning Mechanics: TCP, UDP & Stealth Scans 6.3 OS Fingerprinting, Service Detection & Timing Templates 6.4 Firewall and IDS/IPS Evasion Techniques 6.5 Passive OS & Service Fingerprinting 6.6 Network Access Control Analysis & Firewall Rule Base Review
7 Chapter 7: Vulnerability Identification & Tool Output Analysis
7.1 Vulnerability Scanning Principles & Methodology 7.2 CVE Referencing, CVSS Scoring & Risk Prioritisation 7.3 Banner Grabbing, Service Verification & Manual Triage 7.4 Host Audit Techniques: Processes, Sockets, Patch Levels & Interesting Files
8 Chapter 8: Microsoft Windows Security Assessment & Active Directory
8.1 Active Directory Architecture & Domain Reconnaissance 8.2 Windows User & Group Enumeration via SMB & RPC 8.3 Windows Authentication: NTLM, Kerberos & Password Security 8.4 Windows Patch Management, Local Security & Common Services 8.5 Windows File System, Share & Registry Permissions 8.6 Desktop Lockdown, Citrix Breakout & Common Windows Applications
9 Chapter 9: Unix & Linux Security Assessment & Legacy Services
9.1 Linux/Unix Security Architecture, Permissions & Filesystem 9.2 Unix User Enumeration & Service Discovery 9.3 Network File System (NFS) & RPC Services Assessment 9.4 Legacy Unix Services: R-Services, X11, FTP & Modern SSH 9.5 Unix Remote Information Services: rusers, rwho, finger & systat 9.6 Unix Vulnerability Exploitation & Post-Exploitation Workflow
10 Chapter 10: Web Architectures, Technologies & Testing Methodologies
10.1 Web Server Architecture & the HTTP/HTTPS Protocol 10.2 Web Application Components, Frameworks & State Management 10.3 Web Reconnaissance, Content Discovery & Threat Modelling 10.4 Testing Authentication, Authorization & Session Management 10.5 Web Service Protocols: SOAP, REST & XML Messaging 10.6 Web APIs, Server Extensions & Client-Side Sub-Components
11 Chapter 11: Web Testing Techniques & OWASP Top Vulnerabilities
11.1 Input Validation Vulnerabilities & Parameter Manipulation 11.2 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS): Types, Impact & Defenses 11.3 Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) & Client-Side Attacks 11.4 Command Injection, File Upload Vulnerabilities & API Flaws 11.5 Information Disclosure: Error Messages & Mark-up Leakage 11.6 Injection Beyond SQL: LDAP, XPath, Code & Template Injection 11.7 Source Code Review & Encoded/Cryptographic Value Analysis
12 Chapter 12: Database Security Assessment & SQL Injection
12.1 Database Architectures, Default Ports & Authentication 12.2 SQL Injection (SQLi) Foundations & In-Band Techniques 12.3 Blind SQL Injection & Database Enumeration 12.4 Database Attack Vectors, Stored Procedures & Hardening
4.1 WHOIS Records, Domain Registrars & Autonomous Systems
Key Takeaways Explain This Topic AI
The five Regional Internet Registries (RIRs)—RIPE NCC, ARIN, APNIC, LACNIC, and AFRINIC—manage global allocation of IP address space and Autonomous System Numbers (ASNs) under IANA oversight.
Legacy WHOIS operates over TCP port 43 (RFC 3912) as unstructured plain text, whereas RDAP (RFC 7480–7484) delivers structured, RESTful JSON with authenticated access tiers and standardized error handling.
Domain registrations follow a hierarchical tripartite model—Registry (TLD operator), Registrar (commercial retailer), and Registrant (purchaser)—governed by ICANN EPP status codes such as ClientTransferProhibited and ClientHold.
Autonomous Systems use 16-bit (historical) or 32-bit identifiers to exchange IP prefix reachability via BGP; analysts query routing databases (RADb) and tools (whois -h whois.radb.net, bgp.he.net) to map an organization's entire routable IP footprint.
WHOIS privacy shields and post-GDPR redactions obscure registrant identity, necessitating historical WHOIS analysis (e.g., SecurityTrails, DomainTools, Whoxy) to uncover original corporate registrations, employee emails, and forgotten infrastructure.
Last updated: September 2026
4.1 WHOIS Records, Domain Registrars & Autonomous Systems
Passive reconnaissance is the initial phase of an ethical hacking or penetration testing engagement. Under the CREST Practitioner Security Analyst (CPSA) framework, passive reconnaissance requires gathering intelligence about the target organization without transmitting packets directly to their network gateways or security perimeters. By leveraging public registries, routing databases, and historical administrative archives, a penetration tester can establish the boundaries of an organization's digital footprint, discover unpublicized IP allocations, and identify potential attack surfaces before active probing begins.
1. Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) & Global IP Allocation
The allocation of global Internet Protocol (IPv4 and IPv6) address space and Autonomous System Numbers (ASNs) is governed hierarchically. At the root sits the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) , operated by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) . IANA delegates large regional pools of addresses to five Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) , each responsible for a distinct geographic jurisdiction. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------+
- | IANA / ICANN (Global Root Allocation & Policy Oversight) |
- +-------------------------------------------------------------------------+
- |
- +------------+------------+-----+------+------------+
- | | | | |
- v v v v v
- +---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+
- | RIPE NCC| | ARIN | | APNIC | | LACNIC | | AFRINIC |
- | (Europe/| | (North | | (Asia- | | (Latin | | (Africa)|
- | MidEast)| | America)| | Pacific)| | America)| +---------+
- +---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+
- The Five Regional Internet Registries
RIR Full Name Geographic Jurisdiction Primary WHOIS Server
RIPE NCC Réseaux IP Européens Network Coordination Centre Europe, Middle East, and parts of Central Asia whois.ripe.net
ARIN American Registry for Internet Numbers United States, Canada, and parts of the Caribbean whois.arin.net
APNIC Asia-Pacific Network Information Centre East Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Oceania whois.apnic.net
LACNIC Latin American and Caribbean IP Address Regional Registry Latin America and the Caribbean whois.lacnic.net
- AFRINIC African Network Information Centre African continent and Indian Ocean region whois.afrinic.net
- Database Query Mechanics & Referral Chains
When querying IP allocations, client tools must connect to the appropriate RIR database. If an analyst queries ARIN for an IP address owned by a European entity, ARIN's server returns a referral pointer to whois.ripe.net .
Command-line WHOIS clients query specific RIRs using server flags: # Querying ARIN directly for an IPv4 prefix with detailed network information
whois -h whois.arin.net "n + NET-198-51-100-0-1"
- # Querying RIPE NCC directly with recursion disabled to inspect the exact inetnum record
- whois -h whois.ripe.net -- "-r -T inetnum 198.51.100.0/24"
- # Querying APNIC for autonomous system allocations
- whois -h whois.apnic.net "AS13335"
Within RIR databases, objects are categorized into distinct types:
- inetnum (IPv4 address range) and inet6num (IPv6 address range)
- aut-num (Autonomous System record, including BGP routing policies import and export )
- person (Individual administrative or technical contact)
- role (Functional contact group, such as NOC-ROLE or SOC-TEAM )
- route (BGP route object binding an IP prefix to an origin ASN)
- 2. The WHOIS Protocol (RFC 3912) vs. RDAP
For decades, directory lookups across domain names and IP addresses relied on the legacy WHOIS protocol .
The Legacy WHOIS Protocol (RFC 3912)
Transport: Operates over TCP port 43 .
Protocol Architecture: Connection-oriented, human-readable text exchange. The client opens a TCP connection to port 43, transmits a query string terminated by a carriage return line feed ( CRLF / \r\n ), and the server responds with unstructured text before terminating the TCP connection.
Architectural Limitations:
Unstructured Data: Output varies significantly between registrars and RIRs, making programmatic parsing fragile.
Lack of Authentication: No built-in authentication mechanism; cannot support role-based access control.
No Internationalization: RFC 3912 lacks native support for non-ASCII characters, creating failures with Internationalized Domain Names (IDNs).
No Standardized Error Handling: Errors are delivered as conversational text rather than programmatic response codes. Legacy WHOIS Transaction (RFC 3912):
- Client ──[ TCP Syn: Port 43 ]──► Server
- Client ◄──[ TCP Syn/Ack ]─────── Server
- Client ──[ "target.com\r\n" ]──► Server
- Client ◄──[ Plaintext Response ]─ Server
- Server ──[ TCP FIN / Close ]───► Client
- Modern RDAP (Registration Data Access Protocol)
To overcome the structural deficiencies of RFC 3912, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) standardized the Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) in RFCs 7480–7484.
Transport & Structure: Uses HTTPS (TCP port 443) delivering structured JSON payloads via RESTful API endpoints.
Standardized Bootstrapping (RFC 7484): Allows clients to determine the authoritative RDAP server for any domain or IP prefix automatically via central IANA bootstrap registries (e.g., https://rdap.iana.org/ ).
Tiered & Authenticated Access (RFC 7481): Enables registries to provide basic redacted data to anonymous public queries while granting authorized penetration testers, incident responders, or law enforcement access to full registrant records using OAuth tokens or client certificates.
Standardized Error Handling: Leverages standard HTTP status codes ( 200 OK , 400 Bad Request , 404 Not Found , 429 Too Many Requests ). # Querying RDAP via curl for structured JSON domain data
curl -s -H "Accept: application/rdap+json" https://rdap.org/domain/example.com | jq .
# Querying RDAP for network block allocation
curl -s -H "Accept: application/rdap+json" https://rdap.arin.net/registry/ip/198.51.100.0 | jq '.name, .startAddress, .endAddress'
3. Domain Registration Mechanics & EPP Status Codes
Domain name administration operates on a tripartite model coordinating three separate entities: +-------------------------------------------------------------------------+
- | REGISTRY (Authoritative TLD Database Manager) |
- | Examples: Verisign (.com, .net), Nominet (.uk) |
- +-------------------------------------------------------------------------+
- ▲
- │ EPP Protocol (TCP Port 700)
- ▼
- +-------------------------------------------------------------------------+
- | REGISTRAR (ICANN-Accredited Commercial Retailer) |
- | Examples: MarkMonitor, Cloudflare, GoDaddy, Namecheap |
- +-------------------------------------------------------------------------+
- ▲
- │ Retail Web Interface / API
- ▼
- +-------------------------------------------------------------------------+
- | REGISTRANT (Domain Licensee / Purchaser) |
- | Examples: Corporate Entity, Penetration Testing Client |
- +-------------------------------------------------------------------------+
The Registry: The master operator maintaining the central database for an entire Top-Level Domain (TLD). For example, Verisign operates .com and .net ; Nominet operates .uk .
The Registrar: An ICANN-accredited commercial organization licensed to sell domain registrations to consumers and businesses. Registrars submit registration orders to registries using the Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) over TCP port 700.
The Registrant: The individual or corporate entity purchasing the right to use the domain name for an agreed lease term.
Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) Domain Status Codes
When reviewing WHOIS or RDAP records during reconnaissance, penetration testers inspect domain status codes. These codes reflect the domain's operational state, security locks, and renewal lifecycle:
EPP Status Code Operational Meaning Penetration Testing Relevance
ok or active Domain is in normal operational standing with no locks or pending operations. Fully functional; nameservers are active and resolvable.
clientTransferProhibited Set by the Registrar to block unauthorized transfer requests to another registrar. Standard security posture preventing unauthorized domain hijacking.
serverTransferProhibited Set by the Registry to override and prohibit transfers. High-security lockdown enforced directly at the TLD registry level.
clientHold The Registrar has instructed the Registry to suspend DNS resolution for the domain. Domain will not resolve in global DNS; may indicate fraud investigation, billing lapse, or abuse suspension.
serverHold The Registry has suspended DNS resolution. Name resolution stopped by registry authority; common in legal takedowns or copyright actions.
clientUpdateProhibited Registrar blocks modifications to domain details (contacts, nameservers). Prevents unauthorized modification of authoritative nameservers.
clientDeleteProhibited Registrar prevents deletion of the domain. Protects the domain from accidental or malicious cancellation.
pendingDelete Domain has expired, redemption period elapsed, and is queued for purging. Domain is about to drop into public availability; prime target for domain squatting/takeover.
4. Autonomous System Numbers (ASNs) & BGP Routing Analysis
An Autonomous System (AS) is a collection of connected IP routing prefixes under the control of one or more network operators that presents a common, clearly defined routing policy to the Internet. Autonomous Systems exchange routing reachability using the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) .
16-Bit vs. 32-Bit ASNs
16-Bit ASNs (RFC 1771): Historically, ASNs were 16-bit integers providing 2 16 = 65 , 536 2^{16} = 65,536 2 16 = 65 , 536 unique identifiers. Under RFC 6996, the range 64512 to 65534 is reserved for private use (analogous to RFC 1918 private IP addresses) and cannot be advertised to the global Internet routing table. ASN 65535 is reserved.
32-Bit ASNs (RFC 4893 / 6793): To avert ASN exhaustion, the pool was expanded to 32-bit integers, yielding over 4.29 billion identifiers ( 0 to 4294967295 ). Within this space, the range 4200000000 to 4294967294 is reserved for private use.
BGP Routing Tables & Prefix Mapping
To discover an organization's complete internet-facing footprint, a penetration tester maps the target's Autonomous System Number. An organization might run hundreds of scattered web services across dozens of separate Class C ( /24 ) blocks. Looking up a single domain reveals only one IP address; looking up the ASN reveals all IP prefixes announced by that organization across global BGP tables . Target FQDN: portal.target.com ──► Resolves to: 198.51.100.25
- │
- ▼
- BGP Origin Lookup ───────────────► Maps to Origin: AS15169
- │
- ▼
BGP Announcement Enumeration ────► Discovers All Announced Prefixes:
- ├── 198.51.100.0/24 (Target Primary)
- ├── 203.0.113.0/23 (Forgotten Data Center)
- └── 2001:db8:a00::/48 (IPv6 Infrastructure)
- Practical IP-to-ASN & Routing Database Queries
Team Cymru IP-to-ASN Lookup Service: Operates a high-performance DNS and WHOIS interface allowing analysts to map individual IPs or lists of addresses to ASNs and allocations: # Querying Team Cymru via whois for an IP address
- whois -h whois.cymru.com " -v 198.51.100.25"
- # Output returns: ASN | IP | BGP Prefix | CC | Registry | Allocated
- # Example: 15169 | 198.51.100.25 | 198.51.100.0/24 | US | arin | 2012-04-10
Routing Assets Database (RADb): RADb is the commercial Internet Routing Registry (IRR) used by network operators to publish routing policies and prefix announcements. Querying RADb reveals all IP prefixes registered to an origin ASN: # Enumerate all IPv4 prefixes announced by AS15169
whois -h whois.radb.net -- "-i origin AS15169"
Online Routing Intelligence Portals:
bgp.he.net (Hurricane Electric BGP Toolkit): Displays visual graphs of an AS's BGP peers, upstream transit providers, downstream customers, announced prefixes, and historical IXP connections.
PeeringDB ( peeringdb.com ): Lists peering locations, public data center presences, and internet exchange points (IXPs) where target organizations maintain physical switching fabrics.
5. WHOIS Privacy Shielding & Historical WHOIS Mining
Modern privacy laws and commercial shielding services have dramatically transformed WHOIS reconnaissance.
Privacy Proxy Services & GDPR Impact
Privacy / Proxy Shielding Services: Services such as DomainsByProxy , WhoisGuard , or registrar-specific proxies replace the registrant's name, physical address, email, and phone number with corporate placeholder data (e.g., Domains By Proxy, LLC, Scottsdale, Arizona ).
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) Impact: Enforced in May 2018, the EU GDPR mandated data minimization. In response, ICANN adopted the Temporary Specification for gTLD Registration Data , leading to ubiquitous redaction across all public WHOIS queries. Fields like Registrant Name , Registrant Street , and Registrant Phone now routinely show REDACTED FOR PRIVACY or Contact Privacy Inc. even for domains that did not purchase commercial privacy shields.
Bypassing Privacy via Historical WHOIS Analysis
While modern WHOIS lookups are frequently redacted, organizations typically owned domains for years—often decades—before enabling privacy proxies or before GDPR enforcement in 2018. During initial registration, IT staff or founders frequently used real personal or corporate information. +-------------------------------------------------------------------------+
- | HISTORICAL WHOIS TIMELINE |
- +-------------------------------------------------------------------------+
- 2012: Initial Registration ──► Registrant: john.smith@targetcorp.co.uk
- Physical Address: 124 Fleet St, London
- DNS: ns1.internal-datacenter.net
- │
- ▼
- 2016: Privacy Proxy Purchased ──► Registrant: WhoisPrivacyCorp LLC
- Physical Address: Redacted
- │
- ▼
- 2018: GDPR Enforcement ──► Registrant: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY
- (Current Public WHOIS)
- Intelligence Yielded by Historical WHOIS Records
Personal Identity & Social Engineering: Early records reveal names, direct-dial phone numbers, and personal email addresses ( target_founder@gmail.com ) used to bootstrap the company.
Corporate Entity Linkages: Historical records link subsidiary companies, former corporate names, and acquisitions that may host forgotten external assets.
Reverse-WHOIS Pivoting: Using tools like SecurityTrails , DomainTools Iris , or Whoxy , a tester takes a historical administrator email ( admin@targetcorp.co.uk ) and queries for all other domains ever registered using that specific email address . This technique frequently uncovers:
Development portals and staging environments ( target-dev-app.com ).
Unlinked microsites, marketing campaigns, and abandoned brand domains.
Shadow IT assets running out-of-date, unpatched software completely absent from the client's official scoping inventory.