Study guide
8.1 PSM Architecture, Jump Host Isolation & Service Accounts
CyberArk Defender - PAM PAM-DEF
Track your progress as you read
Finished sections get a check mark.
1 Chapter 1: Vault Architecture, Network & Security
1.1 CyberArk PAS Core Architecture & Component Topology 1.2 Vault OS Hardening, Network Isolation & Port Requirements 1.3 Vault Cryptography, Encryption Keys & Master User Recovery
2 Chapter 2: Vault Configuration, Administration & CLI Utilities
2.1 Vault Server Configuration Files & DBParm.ini Tuning 2.2 Vault Administrative Utilities & PARClient Commands 2.3 Event Notification Engine (ENE) & Notification Administration
3 Chapter 3: Password Vault Web Access (PVWA) Administration
3.1 PVWA Web Portal Architecture & Interface Configuration 3.2 PVWA REST API Administration & Lifecycle Automation 3.3 PVWA Security Settings, User Access & Session Timeouts
4 Chapter 4: Central Policy Manager (CPM) Architecture & Operations
4.1 CPM Service Architecture, Logs & Multi-CPM Load Distribution 4.2 The Credential Management State Machine: Change, Verify & Reconcile 4.3 CPM Plug-in Architecture, Process/Prompts Files & Custom Plug-in Troubleshooting 4.4 Loosely Connected Devices: Rotating Laptop & Workstation Credentials
5 Chapter 5: Safe Design, RBAC & Account Governance
5.1 Enterprise Safe Architecture & Naming Conventions 5.2 Safe Permissions, Authorizations & Safe Handler Delegation 5.3 Object Versioning, Retention Policies & Storage Quotas 5.4 Mandatory Account Properties, Account Types & Linked Accounts 5.5 Vault Users, Predefined Groups & Vault-Level Authorizations
6 Chapter 6: Account Discovery & Lifecycle Workflows
6.1 Automated Account Discovery, Detection Rules & Pending Accounts 6.2 Dual Control Workflows, Multi-Level Approvals & Master Approver 6.3 Exclusive Access, One-Time Passwords (OTP) & Check-out Automation 6.4 Bulk Onboarding: Password Upload Utility, Bulk Upload REST API & AccountUploader
7 Chapter 7: Master Policy & Platform Management
7.1 Master Policy Framework & Enterprise Compliance Rules 7.2 Platform Architecture, Settings Tree & Platform Duplication 7.3 Platform Policy Overrides, Advanced Settings & Target Tuning
8 Chapter 8: Privileged Session Manager (PSM) Core Architecture
8.1 PSM Architecture, Jump Host Isolation & Service Accounts 8.2 PSM Connection Components (PSM-RDP, PSM-SSH, PSM-Web) 8.3 PSM Universal Connector Framework & Custom Integrations 8.4 Split Workflow: Separating Session Use from Credential Retrieval
9 Chapter 9: PSMP, HTML5 Gateway & Session Security
9.1 PSM for SSH (PSMP) Architecture & Unix Proxy Brokering 9.2 PSM HTML5 Gateway Architecture & Clientless Web Access 9.3 Session Recording, Storage in Recordings Safes & Vault Retention 9.4 CyberArk Remote Access (Vendor PAM): Administering Third-Party Privileged Access
10 Chapter 10: Live Session Auditing, Reporting & Privileged Threat Analytics
10.1 Live Session Monitoring, Shadowing & Active Termination 10.2 Privileged Threat Analytics (PTA) Behavioral Anomaly Detection 10.3 PTA Automated Incident Response & SIEM Integration (CEF/Syslog) 10.4 Vault Reports, Report Authorizations & the Export Vault Data (EVD) Utility
11 Chapter 11: Application Access Manager (AAM) & Secrets Management
11.1 AAM Credential Provider (CP) Architecture & Local Memory Cache 11.2 Central Credential Provider (CCP) & Web Service Integration 11.3 Application Server Credential Provider (ASCP) & Application Authentication (AppID) 11.4 Conjur Secrets Manager & Cloud-Native DevOps Workflows
12 Chapter 12: Directory Integration, Disaster Recovery & Troubleshooting
12.1 Directory Integration: LDAP Mapping, RADIUS MFA & SAML 2.0 SSO 12.2 Disaster Recovery (DR) Vault & PADR Replication Architecture 12.3 Vault Backup Operations with PAReplicate & Safe Recovery 12.4 Diagnostic Procedures, Vault/CPM/PSM Error Codes & System Recovery
8.1 PSM Architecture, Jump Host Isolation & Service Accounts
Key Takeaways Explain This Topic AI
The PSM jump host isolation architecture enforces complete network segmentation: user workstations connect to the PSM server via RDP (TCP 3389), while PSM establishes an independent connection to the target system, preventing client-side malware, keyloggers, and network worms from reaching critical infrastructure.
Transparent credential injection decouples administrative access from credential knowledge; privileged passwords or SSH keys are retrieved directly from the Vault and injected into the target client process without exposing cleartext credentials to the end user or client clipboard.
The PSM server relies on the Windows Remote Desktop Services (RDS) session host role and undergoes automated OS hardening, restricting local drive redirection, clipboard sharing, command prompt access, and enforcing AppLocker software restriction policies.
PSM utilizes two dedicated Vault service accounts bound by machine-specific credential files: PSMApp_<hostname> (responsible for retrieving account credentials and platform configurations) and PSMGw_<hostname> (responsible for initial handshake, session establishment, and recording upload).
The enterprise network perimeter requires inbound RDP (TCP 3389) from client subnets, outbound PrivateArk (TCP 1858) to the Digital Vault, and specific outbound application protocols from PSM to target resources (e.g., RDP 3389, SSH 22, SQL 1433, HTTPS 443).
Last updated: September 2026
8.1 PSM Architecture, Jump Host Isolation & Service Accounts
Quick Answer: The CyberArk Privileged Session Manager (PSM) serves as an isolated jump-server proxy between user workstations and critical target infrastructure. Administrators initiate an RDP connection over TCP port 3389 to the PSM host, which retrieves privileged credentials from the Digital Vault over TCP port 1858 and establishes an independent session to the target system. Through transparent credential injection , secrets are injected directly into client process memory without ever being revealed to the user. The PSM runs on hardened Windows Server with Remote Desktop Services (RDS) and utilizes two dedicated service accounts: PSMApp_<hostname> for retrieving Vault secrets and PSMGw_<hostname> for session brokering and token validation.
The Jump Host Isolation Paradigm
In standard enterprise environments, direct administrative access from user workstations to production servers introduces grave security risks:
Endpoint Compromise & Keylogging: Workstations run email clients and web browsers exposed to phishing and malware. Keyloggers on compromised endpoints easily intercept typed administrative credentials.
Memory Scraping: Attackers use tools like Mimikatz to scrape plaintext credentials, NTLM hashes, and Kerberos tickets from endpoint memory.
Network Traversal: Direct routing between user subnets and sensitive management subnets allows ransomware and worms to propagate laterally.
The CyberArk PSM eliminates these risks by enforcing a dual-session isolation architecture :
Client-to-PSM Session (Session 1): The user connects from their workstation to the PSM jump host via standard RDP (TCP port 3389) or browser-based HTML5 Gateway.
PSM-to-Target Session (Session 2): The PSM independently initiates a secondary connection to the target system using the target's native protocol (such as RDP on 3389, SSH on 22, or HTTPS on 443).
Because the two sessions terminate on the PSM host, there is zero direct IP routing between the client subnet and the target system. Malware on the client endpoint cannot traverse the network boundary. Additionally, PSM sanitizes the connection by stripping risky virtual channels—such as local drive redirection and client printer sharing—preventing unauthorized file transfers and device exploitation.
Transparent Credential Injection Mechanics
CyberArk PSM decouples administrative access from credential knowledge through transparent credential injection :
No Cleartext Exposure: Privileged passwords, SSH keys, and cloud API tokens are managed and rotated in the Vault. The user never views, types, or knows the secret.
In-Memory Injection: When a session launches, the PSM retrieves the credential payload into volatile memory and injects it directly into the target client process via Windows API hooks. Credentials never touch the client clipboard or endpoint disk.
Ephemeral Token Validation: During launch, PVWA validates user permissions, writes a short-lived session token to the Vault, and embeds it into a dynamic .rdp file. The PSM validates this token against the Vault over TCP port 1858 before fetching credentials.
Session Auditing: PSM attaches video recording, keystroke logging, and window title monitors directly to the target process, persisting audit logs into the PSMRecordings Safe.
Windows Server Hardening & Remote Desktop Services (RDS) Role
The PSM server is installed on Windows Server configured with the Remote Desktop Services (RDS) Session Host role and requires valid RDS Client Access Licenses (CALs). To prevent users from escaping the proxied session, the host undergoes rigorous hardening:
Automated Hardening & Security Controls
PSMHardening.ps1 Script: Executes post-installation to apply local security templates, disable unused Windows features, and lock down user rights.
AppLocker Enforcement: Windows AppLocker rules ( PSMConfigureAppLocker.xml ) enforce a strict whitelist, blocking unauthorized binaries, DLLs, and scripts. Only approved CyberArk dispatchers and target client executables can run.
Shell Lockdown: Standard Windows Explorer shell, taskbar, Start menu, and system hotkeys ( Win+R , Ctrl+Alt+Del ) are disabled for standard sessions. Users interact solely with the assigned client window.
Virtual Channel Restriction: Group policies disable client drive mapping, clipboard redirection (or restrict to unidirectional text auditing), smart cards, and serial COM ports.
Local Service Accounts: The installation creates two local user accounts:
PSMConnect : Low-privilege local user executing RDS sessions and connection dispatchers.
PSMAdminConnect : Used exclusively for administrative sessions, session shadowing, and live monitoring.
Dedicated PSM Service Accounts: PSMApp and PSMGw
During installation, two dedicated machine identities are created in the Digital Vault: PSMApp_<hostname> and PSMGw_<hostname> .
- Attribute PSMApp_<hostname> PSMGw_<hostname>
- Vault Group PSMAppUsers PSMGWUsers
Operational Purpose Retrieves target credentials and reads platform configurations Validates session tokens and brokers PVWA/RDP handshake
Safe Permissions Use , Retrieve , List on account Safes; Store , Delete on PSMRecordings List , Retrieve on configuration Safes and token Safes
Credential File Encrypted locally in psmapp.cred Encrypted locally in psmgw.cred
Runtime Context Background Windows service ( CyberArk Privileged Session Manager ) Handshake and connection brokering routines
Both .cred files are bound to the PSM host using local cryptographic entropy, preventing offline extraction if files are moved.
Network Port Matrix & Enterprise Traffic Flow
Proper firewall rules are essential for establishing the PSM security perimeter:
- Traffic Path Source Destination Protocol / Port Purpose
- Client Access User Workstation PSM Server TCP 3389 (RDP) User connects to PSM jump host
- Portal Access User Workstation PVWA Server TCP 443 (HTTPS) Authentication and session initiation
- Vault Integration PSM Server Digital Vault TCP 1858 (PrivateArk) Credential retrieval and recording upload
- Windows Target PSM Server Windows Target TCP 3389 (RDP) Proxied Windows administration
- Linux Target PSM Server Linux/Unix Host TCP 22 (SSH) Proxied terminal session
- Database Target PSM Server Database Server TCP 1433 / 1521 Proxied SQL management session
- Web Target PSM Server Cloud / Web Console TCP 443 (HTTPS) Proxied browser session
- RDS Licensing PSM Server RDS License Server TCP 135 / RPC Remote Desktop CAL license checkout
The Digital Vault never initiates connections to the PSM server; all Vault traffic is initiated outbound from PSM over TCP port 1858. Workstations never route directly to target ports or Vault TCP 1858.