Study guide
9.4 CyberArk Remote Access (Vendor PAM): Administering Third-Party Privileged Access
CyberArk Defender - PAM PAM-DEF
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1 Chapter 1: Vault Architecture, Network & Security
1.1 CyberArk PAS Core Architecture & Component Topology 1.2 Vault OS Hardening, Network Isolation & Port Requirements 1.3 Vault Cryptography, Encryption Keys & Master User Recovery
2 Chapter 2: Vault Configuration, Administration & CLI Utilities
2.1 Vault Server Configuration Files & DBParm.ini Tuning 2.2 Vault Administrative Utilities & PARClient Commands 2.3 Event Notification Engine (ENE) & Notification Administration
3 Chapter 3: Password Vault Web Access (PVWA) Administration
3.1 PVWA Web Portal Architecture & Interface Configuration 3.2 PVWA REST API Administration & Lifecycle Automation 3.3 PVWA Security Settings, User Access & Session Timeouts
4 Chapter 4: Central Policy Manager (CPM) Architecture & Operations
4.1 CPM Service Architecture, Logs & Multi-CPM Load Distribution 4.2 The Credential Management State Machine: Change, Verify & Reconcile 4.3 CPM Plug-in Architecture, Process/Prompts Files & Custom Plug-in Troubleshooting 4.4 Loosely Connected Devices: Rotating Laptop & Workstation Credentials
5 Chapter 5: Safe Design, RBAC & Account Governance
5.1 Enterprise Safe Architecture & Naming Conventions 5.2 Safe Permissions, Authorizations & Safe Handler Delegation 5.3 Object Versioning, Retention Policies & Storage Quotas 5.4 Mandatory Account Properties, Account Types & Linked Accounts 5.5 Vault Users, Predefined Groups & Vault-Level Authorizations
6 Chapter 6: Account Discovery & Lifecycle Workflows
6.1 Automated Account Discovery, Detection Rules & Pending Accounts 6.2 Dual Control Workflows, Multi-Level Approvals & Master Approver 6.3 Exclusive Access, One-Time Passwords (OTP) & Check-out Automation 6.4 Bulk Onboarding: Password Upload Utility, Bulk Upload REST API & AccountUploader
7 Chapter 7: Master Policy & Platform Management
7.1 Master Policy Framework & Enterprise Compliance Rules 7.2 Platform Architecture, Settings Tree & Platform Duplication 7.3 Platform Policy Overrides, Advanced Settings & Target Tuning
8 Chapter 8: Privileged Session Manager (PSM) Core Architecture
8.1 PSM Architecture, Jump Host Isolation & Service Accounts 8.2 PSM Connection Components (PSM-RDP, PSM-SSH, PSM-Web) 8.3 PSM Universal Connector Framework & Custom Integrations 8.4 Split Workflow: Separating Session Use from Credential Retrieval
9 Chapter 9: PSMP, HTML5 Gateway & Session Security
9.1 PSM for SSH (PSMP) Architecture & Unix Proxy Brokering 9.2 PSM HTML5 Gateway Architecture & Clientless Web Access 9.3 Session Recording, Storage in Recordings Safes & Vault Retention 9.4 CyberArk Remote Access (Vendor PAM): Administering Third-Party Privileged Access
10 Chapter 10: Live Session Auditing, Reporting & Privileged Threat Analytics
10.1 Live Session Monitoring, Shadowing & Active Termination 10.2 Privileged Threat Analytics (PTA) Behavioral Anomaly Detection 10.3 PTA Automated Incident Response & SIEM Integration (CEF/Syslog) 10.4 Vault Reports, Report Authorizations & the Export Vault Data (EVD) Utility
11 Chapter 11: Application Access Manager (AAM) & Secrets Management
11.1 AAM Credential Provider (CP) Architecture & Local Memory Cache 11.2 Central Credential Provider (CCP) & Web Service Integration 11.3 Application Server Credential Provider (ASCP) & Application Authentication (AppID) 11.4 Conjur Secrets Manager & Cloud-Native DevOps Workflows
12 Chapter 12: Directory Integration, Disaster Recovery & Troubleshooting
12.1 Directory Integration: LDAP Mapping, RADIUS MFA & SAML 2.0 SSO 12.2 Disaster Recovery (DR) Vault & PADR Replication Architecture 12.3 Vault Backup Operations with PAReplicate & Safe Recovery 12.4 Diagnostic Procedures, Vault/CPM/PSM Error Codes & System Recovery
9.4 CyberArk Remote Access (Vendor PAM): Administering Third-Party Privileged Access
Key Takeaways Explain This Topic AI
CyberArk Remote Access, sold as Vendor PAM and formerly named Alero, is a SaaS service giving external vendors privileged access to PAM - Self-Hosted without VPN clients, agents, or passwords.
Vendors authenticate with native smartphone facial or fingerprint recognition through the CyberArk Mobile app and are provisioned just-in-time, so no vendor identity is added to the corporate directory.
The Remote Access connector runs in a Docker container behind the customer firewall and uses outbound-only traffic on port 443, terminating the browser tunnel and opening a new encrypted channel directly to the PVWA.
The connector acts as both a SAML identity provider and an OpenLDAP server to provision vendor users into the PVWA and Vault, and it holds the secure data keys and private certificates so customer secrets stay on-premises.
After installation, create an additional tenant admin, validate that the VendorLDAP directory mapping consumes the External User or PSMUser license type, and add connectors per Site for high availability.
Last updated: September 2026
9.4 CyberArk Remote Access (Vendor PAM): Administering Third-Party Privileged Access
Quick Answer: CyberArk Remote Access — sold as Vendor PAM , and previously named Alero — is a SaaS service that gives external vendors privileged access to PAM - Self-Hosted without VPN clients, agents, or passwords . Vendors authenticate with native smartphone facial or fingerprint recognition through the CyberArk Mobile app and are provisioned just-in-time , so no third-party identity is ever created in the corporate directory. The only on-premises component is the Remote Access connector , a Docker container behind the customer firewall that makes outbound connections on port 443 and acts as both a SAML identity provider and an OpenLDAP server to provision vendor users into the PVWA and the Vault.
The Third-Party Access Problem
Every control built in the preceding chapters assumes the user is an employee with a directory identity, a managed workstation, and a Vault user object. External parties break all three assumptions. The traditional answer — issue the vendor a VPN account and an Active Directory identity — creates exactly the conditions defenders fear:
A network foothold. A VPN drops the vendor onto the corporate network, so a compromised vendor session becomes a launchpad for lateral movement rather than a connection to one target.
A standing identity. A directory account for a contractor is one nobody remembers to disable when the engagement ends, and one an attacker can phish and reuse.
Administrative drag. Provisioning, credential distribution, and deprovisioning all require the internal identity team for people the organization does not employ.
Remote Access removes both the VPN foothold and the standing credential while preserving the isolation, recording, and audit properties PSM already provides.
Architecture: One Connector, All Secrets Retained On-Premises
Element Role
Remote Access Cloud Service The SaaS tenant where vendors, sites, and access policies are administered.
CyberArk Mobile app The vendor's authenticator. Provides biometric (face or fingerprint) authentication and QR-code authorization . Also used for connector initialization and every subsequent connector-management login.
Remote Access connector Brokers connections between the cloud service and the customer's PAM - Self-Hosted environment. Installed internally behind the customer firewall , packaged in a Docker container , and opened for outbound traffic on port 443 .
PVWA and HTML5 Gateway The existing PAM surfaces the vendor ultimately reaches, delivering the same isolated, recorded session an internal user gets.
The connector is the component exam items focus on, because it carries three distinct responsibilities at once:
Tunnel termination and re-encryption. When a remote user's authentication attempt reaches the connector, the initial encryption tunnel from the user's browser ends , and a new encrypted channel is opened directly to the PVWA . Between those two encrypted sessions the connector validates the session and user cookies and the PVWA and HTML5 Gateway certificates to confirm their authenticity.
Identity provisioning. The connector is configured as a SAML identity provider (IdP) and as an OpenLDAP server , which is how Remote Access-configured users are provisioned into the PVWA and the Vault without existing in corporate Active Directory.
Key custody. The connector holds the secure data keys and unique private certificates that validate the Remote Access end-to-end encryption chain. This is the architectural answer to the obvious objection about a SaaS broker: customer secrets remain in the customer's control and ownership , because the keys never leave the connector.
Because the connector only makes outbound connections on 443, no inbound firewall rule and no published endpoint is required — the same design principle that lets the Credential Provider and the EPM agent work through restrictive egress-only networks.
Administering Vendors
Day-to-day administration is a small set of repeatable operations:
Invite the vendor. A vendor user is created and invited from the Remote Access tenant. They install the mobile app, enrol biometrics, and are ready — no corporate account, no password, no token.
Assign a Role. Vendors are assigned a Role , which determines which applications and target systems they may reach. Access is scoped to specific systems rather than to a network segment.
Provision just-in-time. Access is granted in real time for the duration of the work, and users are removed by policy when access is no longer required — without administrator intervention and without adding vendor identities to the directory service .
Automate at scale. Remote Access exposes REST APIs for provisioning and managing users, performing bulk actions such as inviting many vendors at once or deactivating users automatically, and extracting data for audit and compliance reporting.
Post-Installation Tasks the Exam Expects
Three administrative steps appear repeatedly in CyberArk's guidance and map directly to operational failures:
Task Why it matters
Create an additional tenant admin A single administrator becomes a bottleneck and a single point of contact for every vendor access function.
Validate the VendorLDAP directory mapping Once VendorLDAP is configured, confirm that the correct EPV user license type is consumed when a vendor is provisioned. Typical configuration has the VendorLDAP directory mapping consume the External User or PSMUser license type. A mapping that consumes the wrong type silently burns full EPV licenses on contractors.
Add additional connectors Multiple connectors can be configured per Site , providing high availability and load balancing . A single connector is a single point of failure for all third-party access.
The VendorLDAP item is the one most often examined, because it ties Remote Access back to the directory-mapping mechanics of section 12.1: the mapping determines both the Vault authorizations a vendor receives and the license bucket they consume, and mapping priority order applies to vendor users exactly as it does to employees.
How Remote Access Differs from Internal PSM Access
Dimension Internal user via PSM Vendor via Remote Access
Identity source Corporate Active Directory, mapped to Vault users Remote Access tenant, provisioned through the connector acting as SAML IdP / OpenLDAP
Authentication Directory password plus RADIUS or SAML MFA Biometric face or fingerprint on the vendor's own smartphone, with QR-code authorization
Network path Internal network to PVWA and PSM Outbound-only connector on 443 ; no VPN, no inbound rule
Client software Browser, or native client for non-PSM connections Browser plus the CyberArk Mobile app; no agent
Access lifetime Standing entitlement governed by Master Policy and Safe membership Just-in-time , removed by policy when the work ends
Session isolation and recording PSM / HTML5 Gateway Identical — the vendor lands on the same PVWA and HTML5 Gateway surfaces
The last row is the point worth carrying into the exam: Remote Access changes how the vendor is identified and routed , not how the privileged session is controlled . Safes, platforms, connection components, recordings, dual control, and PTA detections all continue to apply to vendor sessions unchanged.
Naming note. Following CyberArk's acquisition by Palo Alto Networks, current product documentation is published under the Idira brand, and the same service appears as Idira Remote Access . Exam objectives and question stems still use the CyberArk names — Remote Access , Vendor PAM , and the legacy Alero — so recognize all of them as the same product.