Study guide

1.1 CyberArk PAS Core Architecture & Component Topology

CyberArk Defender - PAM PAM-DEF

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1 Chapter 1: Vault Architecture, Network & Security

1.1 CyberArk PAS Core Architecture & Component Topology 1.2 Vault OS Hardening, Network Isolation & Port Requirements 1.3 Vault Cryptography, Encryption Keys & Master User Recovery

2 Chapter 2: Vault Configuration, Administration & CLI Utilities

2.1 Vault Server Configuration Files & DBParm.ini Tuning 2.2 Vault Administrative Utilities & PARClient Commands 2.3 Event Notification Engine (ENE) & Notification Administration

3 Chapter 3: Password Vault Web Access (PVWA) Administration

3.1 PVWA Web Portal Architecture & Interface Configuration 3.2 PVWA REST API Administration & Lifecycle Automation 3.3 PVWA Security Settings, User Access & Session Timeouts

4 Chapter 4: Central Policy Manager (CPM) Architecture & Operations

4.1 CPM Service Architecture, Logs & Multi-CPM Load Distribution 4.2 The Credential Management State Machine: Change, Verify & Reconcile 4.3 CPM Plug-in Architecture, Process/Prompts Files & Custom Plug-in Troubleshooting 4.4 Loosely Connected Devices: Rotating Laptop & Workstation Credentials

5 Chapter 5: Safe Design, RBAC & Account Governance

5.1 Enterprise Safe Architecture & Naming Conventions 5.2 Safe Permissions, Authorizations & Safe Handler Delegation 5.3 Object Versioning, Retention Policies & Storage Quotas 5.4 Mandatory Account Properties, Account Types & Linked Accounts 5.5 Vault Users, Predefined Groups & Vault-Level Authorizations

6 Chapter 6: Account Discovery & Lifecycle Workflows

6.1 Automated Account Discovery, Detection Rules & Pending Accounts 6.2 Dual Control Workflows, Multi-Level Approvals & Master Approver 6.3 Exclusive Access, One-Time Passwords (OTP) & Check-out Automation 6.4 Bulk Onboarding: Password Upload Utility, Bulk Upload REST API & AccountUploader

7 Chapter 7: Master Policy & Platform Management

7.1 Master Policy Framework & Enterprise Compliance Rules 7.2 Platform Architecture, Settings Tree & Platform Duplication 7.3 Platform Policy Overrides, Advanced Settings & Target Tuning

8 Chapter 8: Privileged Session Manager (PSM) Core Architecture

8.1 PSM Architecture, Jump Host Isolation & Service Accounts 8.2 PSM Connection Components (PSM-RDP, PSM-SSH, PSM-Web) 8.3 PSM Universal Connector Framework & Custom Integrations 8.4 Split Workflow: Separating Session Use from Credential Retrieval

9 Chapter 9: PSMP, HTML5 Gateway & Session Security

9.1 PSM for SSH (PSMP) Architecture & Unix Proxy Brokering 9.2 PSM HTML5 Gateway Architecture & Clientless Web Access 9.3 Session Recording, Storage in Recordings Safes & Vault Retention 9.4 CyberArk Remote Access (Vendor PAM): Administering Third-Party Privileged Access

10 Chapter 10: Live Session Auditing, Reporting & Privileged Threat Analytics

10.1 Live Session Monitoring, Shadowing & Active Termination 10.2 Privileged Threat Analytics (PTA) Behavioral Anomaly Detection 10.3 PTA Automated Incident Response & SIEM Integration (CEF/Syslog) 10.4 Vault Reports, Report Authorizations & the Export Vault Data (EVD) Utility

11 Chapter 11: Application Access Manager (AAM) & Secrets Management

11.1 AAM Credential Provider (CP) Architecture & Local Memory Cache 11.2 Central Credential Provider (CCP) & Web Service Integration 11.3 Application Server Credential Provider (ASCP) & Application Authentication (AppID) 11.4 Conjur Secrets Manager & Cloud-Native DevOps Workflows

12 Chapter 12: Directory Integration, Disaster Recovery & Troubleshooting

12.1 Directory Integration: LDAP Mapping, RADIUS MFA & SAML 2.0 SSO 12.2 Disaster Recovery (DR) Vault & PADR Replication Architecture 12.3 Vault Backup Operations with PAReplicate & Safe Recovery 12.4 Diagnostic Procedures, Vault/CPM/PSM Error Codes & System Recovery

1.1 CyberArk PAS Core Architecture & Component Topology

Key Takeaways Explain This Topic AI

The Digital Vault (PrivateArk Server) serves as the central, passive security kernel of CyberArk PAS, housing encrypted Safes, metadata, and audit records while listening exclusively on TCP port 1858.

All satellite components (PVWA, CPM, PSM, PSMP, and AAM) initiate outbound sessions to the Vault; the Vault never initiates network connections to components.

The Central Policy Manager (CPM) operates on an asynchronous pull/polling loop over TCP 1858 to discover and execute password verification, change, and reconciliation workflows.

The Privileged Session Manager (PSM) and PSM for SSH (PSMP) isolate user endpoints from target systems, injecting credentials on the fly without revealing plaintext secrets to users.

Components authenticate to the Vault using dedicated machine accounts whose credentials are encrypted in local .cred files protected by local host cryptographic entropy.

Last updated: September 2026

1.1 CyberArk PAS Core Architecture & Component Topology

Quick Answer: The CyberArk Privileged Access Security (PAS) solution is anchored by the Digital Vault (PrivateArk Server) , an isolated, hardened repository listening on TCP port 1858 . All core satellite components— Password Vault Web Access (PVWA) , Central Policy Manager (CPM) , Privileged Session Manager (PSM) , PSM for SSH (PSMP) , and Application Access Manager (AAM) —function as clients that initiate outbound, encrypted, mutually authenticated connections to the Vault. The Vault operates strictly as a passive server and never initiates outbound network connections to PAM components.

The Digital Vault: The Hardened Security Kernel

At the core of the CyberArk PAS suite is the Digital Vault (internally designated as the PrivateArk Server ). Unlike general-purpose databases or directory servers, the Vault is engineered as an isolated, single-purpose security appliance designed to store, manage, and audit privileged credentials, encryption keys, and digital assets.

The Vault architecture separates responsibilities into two internal tiers:

Vault Database Engine: A customized, hardened embedded relational database (derived from MySQL/MariaDB) storing administrative metadata, access control lists (ACLs), user entitlements, policy parameters, and tamper-evident audit trails. The database engine is completely shielded from direct network exposure; external clients cannot connect directly to SQL ports.

Vault Storage (Safes): File-system repositories on NTFS storage volumes where encrypted object payloads (password objects, cryptographic keys, and session recording metadata) are persisted within logical partitions called Safes .

The PrivateArk Server Service runs in the background to arbitrate all read, write, and search requests. When a component requests an account credential, the service enforces granular Safe permissions, validates dual-control authorizations, retrieves the encrypted payload from disk, decrypts the object in volatile, non-pageable memory, and transmits the plaintext secret across the encrypted network session.

A foundational architectural principle tested on the PAM-DEF exam is the passive listener model : the Vault listens exclusively on TCP port 1858 . It maintains no inbound listeners for HTTP, HTTPS, SSH, SMB, or RPC, and never initiates network connections to PAM components. All communication flows inbound to the Vault, shielding the central repository behind rigid perimeter firewall rules.

PAS Satellite Components Overview

The CyberArk PAS ecosystem deploys specialized satellite components to deliver web access, policy enforcement, session isolation, programmatic access, and behavioral analytics.

1. Password Vault Web Access (PVWA)

Role: Primary administrative portal and end-user interface built on Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS) and ASP.NET. Provides both a responsive web interface and a full REST API endpoint.

Functionality: Used to manage Safes, onboard accounts, configure platform policies, review discovery results, check out one-time passwords, and launch privileged sessions.

Vault Connectivity: Connects over TCP port 1858 using the Vault API. Utilizes dedicated service identities— PVWAAppUser (application queries) and PVWAGWUser (user authentication pass-through)—with secrets secured in machine-bound credential files ( .cred ).

2. Central Policy Manager (CPM)

Role: Asynchronous automated credential lifecycle engine running as Windows services ( CyberArk Password Manager and CyberArk Central Policy Manager Scanner ).

Functionality: Executes periodic credential verification (confirming Vault passwords match target endpoints), password changes (generating random passwords per policy and updating both target and Vault), and password reconciliation (using administrative accounts to reset out-of-sync credentials).

Target Connectivity: Connects directly to targets via native protocols (Windows SMB/RPC ports 445/135, Unix SSH port 22, databases via SQL ports, and cloud APIs via HTTPS 443).

Vault Connectivity: Queries the Vault over TCP port 1858 to identify scheduled tasks; maintains no inbound listening ports.

3. Privileged Session Manager (PSM)

Role: Jump-server proxy installed on Windows Server with Remote Desktop Services (RDS), hardened by CyberArk scripts.

Functionality: Isolates end-user workstations from target systems. Users establish an RDP connection (TCP 3389) to the PSM server. PSM retrieves the target credential from the Vault over TCP 1858, injects it directly into the target client process ( mstsc.exe , putty.exe , web consoles) without revealing it to the user, and proxies the target session.

Auditing: Records full GUI video, text keystrokes, process invocations, and SQL queries into the PSMRecordings Safe.

4. Privileged Session Manager for SSH (PSMP)

Role: Hardened Linux proxy (RHEL/Rocky Linux) delivering native command-line session isolation for Unix environments.

Functionality: Users connect via standard SSH ( ssh vaultuser@targetuser#targethost@psmserver ). PSMP authenticates the user, retrieves credentials from the Vault over TCP 1858, enforces command whitelisting/blacklisting, logs keystrokes, and proxies the SSH stream to the target.

5. Application Access Manager (AAM)

Role: Programmatic secrets management eliminating hardcoded credentials in applications, scripts, and CI/CD pipelines.

Deployment Models: Credential Provider (CP) installs on application servers with a local encrypted in-memory cache for sub-millisecond retrieval and offline resilience. Central Credential Provider (CCP) provides an agentless REST API on IIS. Both retrieve secrets from the Vault over TCP 1858.

6. Privileged Threat Analytics (PTA)

Role: Specialized Linux appliance delivering behavioral anomaly detection.

Functionality: Analyzes audit logs and network telemetry to detect credential theft (Golden Ticket, Overpass-the-Hash), abnormal access times, and risky session commands. Ingests Vault audit logs via Syslog (UDP/TCP 514 or TLS 6514).

Vault Communication Protocol & The Pull Architecture

Understanding component interaction with the Vault is essential for the PAM-DEF exam:

  • Architecture Attribute Technical Implementation
  • Network Protocol Proprietary PrivateArk protocol running over TCP port 1858
  • Encryption Standard Symmetric payload encryption using AES-256
  • Authentication Model Mutual authentication using dedicated Vault user identities and encrypted .cred files
  • Session Directionality Unidirectional Inbound ; components connect to Vault; Vault never initiates connections
  • Work Discovery Model Asynchronous Pull (Polling) ; components poll the Vault periodically for pending tasks
  • The Asynchronous Pull Model in Practice

To preserve Vault isolation, the PAS architecture uses a pull-based dispatch model rather than an event-driven push model:

CPM Task Polling: The CPM service wakes up at configured intervals (in platform and basic_ini settings, typically every 10–60 seconds) and queries the Vault over TCP 1858 for accounts flagged for Change, Verify, or Reconcile in its assigned Safes.

Task Execution: When tasks exist, CPM locks the accounts, executes the password operation on the remote target, updates the credential in the Vault over TCP 1858, and releases the lock.

Session Initiation: When a user initiates a PSM session via PVWA, PVWA creates an ephemeral session ticket in the Vault. The user launches an RDP session to PSM (TCP 3389). PSM contacts the Vault over TCP 1858 to validate the ticket and retrieve the injection credentials.

This pull topology ensures the Vault requires zero inbound network routes into application subnets or DMZs, minimizing the attack surface across the PAM environment.

Loading diagram... CyberArk PAS Component Topology & Network Communication Flow