Study guide

1.2 Vault OS Hardening, Network Isolation & Port Requirements

CyberArk Defender - PAM PAM-DEF

Track your progress as you read

Finished sections get a check mark.

1 Chapter 1: Vault Architecture, Network & Security

1.1 CyberArk PAS Core Architecture & Component Topology 1.2 Vault OS Hardening, Network Isolation & Port Requirements 1.3 Vault Cryptography, Encryption Keys & Master User Recovery

2 Chapter 2: Vault Configuration, Administration & CLI Utilities

2.1 Vault Server Configuration Files & DBParm.ini Tuning 2.2 Vault Administrative Utilities & PARClient Commands 2.3 Event Notification Engine (ENE) & Notification Administration

3 Chapter 3: Password Vault Web Access (PVWA) Administration

3.1 PVWA Web Portal Architecture & Interface Configuration 3.2 PVWA REST API Administration & Lifecycle Automation 3.3 PVWA Security Settings, User Access & Session Timeouts

4 Chapter 4: Central Policy Manager (CPM) Architecture & Operations

4.1 CPM Service Architecture, Logs & Multi-CPM Load Distribution 4.2 The Credential Management State Machine: Change, Verify & Reconcile 4.3 CPM Plug-in Architecture, Process/Prompts Files & Custom Plug-in Troubleshooting 4.4 Loosely Connected Devices: Rotating Laptop & Workstation Credentials

5 Chapter 5: Safe Design, RBAC & Account Governance

5.1 Enterprise Safe Architecture & Naming Conventions 5.2 Safe Permissions, Authorizations & Safe Handler Delegation 5.3 Object Versioning, Retention Policies & Storage Quotas 5.4 Mandatory Account Properties, Account Types & Linked Accounts 5.5 Vault Users, Predefined Groups & Vault-Level Authorizations

6 Chapter 6: Account Discovery & Lifecycle Workflows

6.1 Automated Account Discovery, Detection Rules & Pending Accounts 6.2 Dual Control Workflows, Multi-Level Approvals & Master Approver 6.3 Exclusive Access, One-Time Passwords (OTP) & Check-out Automation 6.4 Bulk Onboarding: Password Upload Utility, Bulk Upload REST API & AccountUploader

7 Chapter 7: Master Policy & Platform Management

7.1 Master Policy Framework & Enterprise Compliance Rules 7.2 Platform Architecture, Settings Tree & Platform Duplication 7.3 Platform Policy Overrides, Advanced Settings & Target Tuning

8 Chapter 8: Privileged Session Manager (PSM) Core Architecture

8.1 PSM Architecture, Jump Host Isolation & Service Accounts 8.2 PSM Connection Components (PSM-RDP, PSM-SSH, PSM-Web) 8.3 PSM Universal Connector Framework & Custom Integrations 8.4 Split Workflow: Separating Session Use from Credential Retrieval

9 Chapter 9: PSMP, HTML5 Gateway & Session Security

9.1 PSM for SSH (PSMP) Architecture & Unix Proxy Brokering 9.2 PSM HTML5 Gateway Architecture & Clientless Web Access 9.3 Session Recording, Storage in Recordings Safes & Vault Retention 9.4 CyberArk Remote Access (Vendor PAM): Administering Third-Party Privileged Access

10 Chapter 10: Live Session Auditing, Reporting & Privileged Threat Analytics

10.1 Live Session Monitoring, Shadowing & Active Termination 10.2 Privileged Threat Analytics (PTA) Behavioral Anomaly Detection 10.3 PTA Automated Incident Response & SIEM Integration (CEF/Syslog) 10.4 Vault Reports, Report Authorizations & the Export Vault Data (EVD) Utility

11 Chapter 11: Application Access Manager (AAM) & Secrets Management

11.1 AAM Credential Provider (CP) Architecture & Local Memory Cache 11.2 Central Credential Provider (CCP) & Web Service Integration 11.3 Application Server Credential Provider (ASCP) & Application Authentication (AppID) 11.4 Conjur Secrets Manager & Cloud-Native DevOps Workflows

12 Chapter 12: Directory Integration, Disaster Recovery & Troubleshooting

12.1 Directory Integration: LDAP Mapping, RADIUS MFA & SAML 2.0 SSO 12.2 Disaster Recovery (DR) Vault & PADR Replication Architecture 12.3 Vault Backup Operations with PAReplicate & Safe Recovery 12.4 Diagnostic Procedures, Vault/CPM/PSM Error Codes & System Recovery

1.2 Vault OS Hardening, Network Isolation & Port Requirements

Key Takeaways Explain This Topic AI

The Digital Vault must be installed as a standalone workgroup server and never joined to an Active Directory domain to prevent directory compromises from breaching the Vault OS.

CyberArk post-installation hardening scripts strip the Windows host of unnecessary services, disabling Print Spooler, LanmanServer (SMB), Remote Registry, and interactive RDP.

The Windows Defender Firewall on the Vault blocks all incoming network traffic across all interfaces except inbound TCP port 1858 from explicitly whitelisted component IP addresses.

Outbound network traffic from the Vault is restricted to predefined integration channels configured in DBParm.ini, including SIEM syslog (514/6514), NTP (UDP 123), and RADIUS (UDP 1812).

Standard client PSM connections require end-user workstations to route RDP over TCP port 3389 to the PSM jump server, which establishes an isolated secondary RDP connection to the target.

Last updated: September 2026

1.2 Vault OS Hardening, Network Isolation & Port Requirements

Quick Answer: The CyberArk Digital Vault is a dedicated security appliance built on Windows Server, hardened via automated PowerShell scripts that eliminate non-essential services, roles, and protocols. The Vault must remain a standalone Workgroup server and never join an Active Directory domain, preventing domain-level compromises (such as Golden Tickets or compromised Domain Admins) from affecting the Vault host. Network isolation is enforced by the Windows Defender Firewall, which blocks all inbound traffic except TCP port 1858 from authorized component IPs, while disabling remote access protocols including RDP and SMB.

The Standalone Workgroup Mandate

A foundational requirement on the CyberArk PAM-DEF exam is that the Digital Vault server must NEVER be joined to an Active Directory (AD) domain. It must always operate as a standalone server in a local Windows Workgroup.

The technical justifications include:

Eliminating Transitive Privilege Escalation: If the Vault were domain-joined, Active Directory Domain Admins would automatically gain membership in the Vault local Administrators group. Any attacker who compromised a Domain Controller or forged a Kerberos Golden Ticket would obtain administrative control over the Vault host operating system.

Preventing Group Policy Overrides: Domain-joined servers apply Group Policy Objects (GPOs) from domain controllers. Malicious or misconfigured enterprise GPOs could overwrite CyberArk local security policies, re-enable disabled services (such as SMB or Remote Registry), or weaken audit logging.

Eliminating Domain Protocol Vulnerabilities: Operating in a domain forces participation in Kerberos and NTLM handshakes, exposing the Vault to credential relay attacks, Kerberoasting, and memory-based ticket extraction.

Directory integration for user authentication is performed at the application layer , not the OS layer. The Vault acts as an LDAP/LDAPS client querying Active Directory over TCP port 389/636, remaining an isolated cryptographic island at the host OS level.

CyberArk OS Hardening Framework

During and after installation, CyberArk executes automated hardening scripts ( Hardening.ps1 and PostInstall.ps1 , alongside security templates) to strip Windows Server down to a least-privilege appliance profile.

1. User Rights & Local Policies

Deny Network Access: The Access this computer from the network right is revoked for standard accounts, while Deny access to this computer from the network is enforced.

Console-Only Logon: Logon rights are restricted strictly to Allow log on locally at the physical or hypervisor console for the local Administrator.

Deny Remote Desktop: The Allow log on through Remote Desktop Services right is cleared, and Remote Desktop is disabled.

2. Registry Hardening & Protocol Lockdown

Protocols Disabled: SMBv1, SMBv2, NetBIOS over TCP/IP, and LLMNR are deactivated across all adapters.

Authentication Standards: LanManager and NTLMv1 are blocked, enforcing strict NTLMv2 with 128-bit minimum session security.

Anonymous Enumeration: Strict settings block anonymous enumeration of SAM accounts and shares ( RestrictAnonymous = 2 ).

3. Disabling Non-Essential Services

Windows services outside the core PrivateArk engine are disabled:

Service Name Windows Identifier Security Rationale

Print Spooler Spooler Mitigates remote code execution exploits (e.g., PrintNightmare).

Server Service LanmanServer Disables SMB file sharing (TCP 445), stopping lateral movement.

Workstation LanmanWorkstation Blocks outbound SMB connections to external network shares.

Remote Registry RemoteRegistry Prevents network querying or editing of the Windows registry.

Remote Desktop TermService Closes RDP listener (TCP 3389); console-only access allowed.

Secondary Logon seclogon Blocks process execution under alternate credentials ( RunAs ).

Windows Audio AudioSrv Strips unnecessary multimedia services to reduce attack surface.

Error Reporting WerSvc Prevents automated transmission of memory dumps or telemetry.

Automatic Windows Update reboots are disabled via local policies; OS patching requires manual maintenance and database health verification.

Vault Network Isolation & Firewall Architecture

CyberArk takes complete control over the native Windows Defender Firewall :

Inbound Lockdown: All default inbound rules are removed. The firewall blocks all unsolicited inbound packets across all interfaces.

The Sole Inbound Exception: A single inbound rule permits TCP port 1858 (PrivateArk Server), strictly restricted to static IP addresses of authorized CyberArk components (PVWA, CPM, PSM, PSMP, AAM, DR Vault). Packets from unlisted IPs are dropped.

Outbound Lockdown: All outbound traffic is blocked by default, with exceptions explicitly defined in DBParm.ini .

Authorized Outbound Integration Ports

Specific outbound rules support enterprise integrations:

SIEM / Syslog: UDP 514, TCP 514, or TLS 6514 outbound to SIEM platforms (Splunk, QRadar, Sentinel) for real-time audit streaming.

NTP: UDP 123 outbound to time servers. Clock skew exceeding 5 minutes invalidates MFA tokens, SAML assertions, and Kerberos tickets.

SNMP Traps: UDP 162 outbound for operational monitoring alerts.

RADIUS MFA: UDP 1812 or 1645 outbound for multi-factor authentication.

SMTP Alerts: TCP 25 outbound to internal mail relays for Event Notification Engine (ENE) notifications.

LDAP / LDAPS: TCP 389 / 636 outbound to Domain Controllers for user authentication.

DR Replication: TCP 1858 between DR Vault and Primary Vault (DR Vault initiates inbound to Primary).

Component Port Requirements Matrix

The port topology across the PAS ecosystem is a primary focus on the Defender exam:

Source Destination Port / Protocol Purpose

User Browser PVWA Server TCP 443 (HTTPS) Web portal access, REST API, session launch.

User Workstation PSM Server TCP 3389 (RDP) Direct RDP connection to PSM jump host.

User Client PSMP Server TCP 22 (SSH) Native SSH connection to Linux proxy.

PVWA Server Digital Vault TCP 1858 (PrivateArk) Safe queries, user auth, policy retrieval.

CPM Server Digital Vault TCP 1858 (PrivateArk) Task polling and credential updates.

PSM Server Digital Vault TCP 1858 (PrivateArk) Token validation, secret retrieval, recordings.

PSMP Server Digital Vault TCP 1858 (PrivateArk) Fetching credentials, audit upload.

AAM Provider Digital Vault TCP 1858 (PrivateArk) Local credential cache synchronization.

CPM Server Target Windows TCP 445 / 135 (SMB/RPC) Password changes, verification, reconciliation.

CPM Server Target Linux TCP 22 (SSH) Password and SSH key management.

PSM Server Target Windows TCP 3389 (RDP) Proxied administrative RDP session.

PSM Server Target Linux TCP 22 (SSH) Proxied SSH sessions via client tools.

DR Vault Primary Vault TCP 1858 (PrivateArk) Database and safe replication via PADR.

Loading diagram... Vault Network Isolation & Component Firewall Port Topology