Study guide

16.1 Fly-By-Wire Flight Control

EASA Part-66 Module 05 — Digital Techniques / Electronic Instrument Systems Exam

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1 Chapter 1: Numbering Systems

1.1 Numbering Systems: Decimal, Binary, Octal and Hexadecimal 1.2 Binary Arithmetic and Signed Number Representation 1.3 Binary Coded Decimal, Gray Code and Alphanumeric Codes

2 Chapter 2: Data Conversion

2.1 Analogue and Digital Signals, Sampling and Quantisation 2.2 Digital-to-Analogue Converters 2.3 Analogue-to-Digital Converters

3 Chapter 3: ARINC 429 Data Buses

3.1 ARINC 429 Specification, Physical Layer and Topology 3.2 ARINC 429 32-Bit Word Architecture 3.3 ARINC 429 Transmission, Timing and Troubleshooting

4 Chapter 4: Advanced Avionics Data Buses and Aircraft Ethernet

4.1 ARINC 629 Digital Autonomous Terminal Access 4.2 MIL-STD-1553B Military Avionics Data Bus 4.3 AFDX / ARINC 664 Part 7 Avionics Full-Duplex Switched Ethernet

5 Chapter 5: Combinational Logic Gates and Boolean Algebra

5.1 Basic Logic Gates, Truth Tables and Logic Levels 5.2 Boolean Algebra, De Morgan Theorems and Logic Simplification 5.3 Universal Gates and Aircraft Combinational Applications

6 Chapter 6: Sequential Logic, Registers and Logic Diagrams

6.1 Bistable Multivibrators: SR, JK, D and T Flip-Flops 6.2 Shift Registers and Data Storage Elements 6.3 Asynchronous and Synchronous Counters and Logic-Diagram Interpretation

7 Chapter 7: Computer Structure and Microprocessors

7.1 Computer Architecture, Terminology and the Bus System 7.2 Semiconductor Memory Technologies 7.3 Microprocessor Operation, Instruction Cycles and I/O

8 Chapter 8: Integrated Circuits, Multiplexing and Integrated Modular Avionics

8.1 Integrated Circuit Technology, Encoders, Decoders and Scale of Integration 8.2 Multiplexing and Demultiplexing Techniques 8.3 Remote Data Concentrators and Integrated Modular Avionics

9 Chapter 9: Fibre Optics in Aviation

9.1 Physics of Light Transmission and Optical Fibres 9.2 Fibre Cable Types, Signal Degradation and Optical Components 9.3 Fibre Optic Maintenance, Termination, Splicing and Inspection

10 Chapter 10: Electronic Displays and Flight Instrument Layout

10.1 Display Technologies: CRT, LED and LCD 10.2 Electronic Flight Instrument System Architecture 10.3 Cockpit Symbology, Colour Standards and Display Reversion

11 Chapter 11: Electrostatic Sensitive Devices

11.1 Physics of Electrostatic Charge and Device Susceptibility 11.2 ESDS Damage Mechanisms: Catastrophic versus Latent Failures 11.3 ESDS Handling, Storage, Packaging and Workshop Procedures

12 Chapter 12: Software Management Control and Airworthiness

12.1 Aviation Software Classification and RTCA DO-178C / EUROCAE ED-12C 12.2 Software Configuration Management and Part Numbering 12.3 Data Loading, Integrity Verification and Unapproved Changes

13 Chapter 13: Electromagnetic Environment

13.1 Electromagnetic Interference and Compatibility 13.2 High Intensity Radiated Fields and RF Hazards 13.3 Lightning Protection, Bonding and Static Dischargers

14 Chapter 14: Engine Indication, Warning and Monitoring Systems

14.1 Airbus ECAM — Electronic Centralised Aircraft Monitoring 14.2 Boeing EICAS — Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System 14.3 Comparison, Failure Reversion and Sensor Interfacing

15 Chapter 15: Flight Management, Navigation and Surveillance Systems

15.1 Flight Management System and Control Display Unit 15.2 Inertial Reference, AHRS/ADIRU Context and GPS 15.3 Traffic Collision Avoidance and Terrain Awareness

16 Chapter 16: Fly-By-Wire, BITE, ACARS, Cabin and Information Systems

16.1 Fly-By-Wire Flight Control 16.2 Built-In Test Equipment and Central Maintenance Computers 16.3 ACARS, Cabin Systems and Information Systems

16.1 Fly-By-Wire Flight Control

Key Takeaways Explain This Topic AI

The former detailed 5.15 description listed fly-by-wire with general arrangement and associated BITE; study it at familiarisation level rather than as a type-rating of every interlock.

Flight-control computers electrically command hydraulic or electro-hydrostatic actuators; Airbus classroom names are ELAC, SEC and FAC (or PRIM/SEC), while Boeing FBW teaching uses FCC/PFC computers plus ACE at the actuators.

Typical Airbus laws are normal (load-factor demand with protections), alternate (protections degraded) and direct (stick-to-surface); Boeing teaching uses normal, secondary and direct modes.

Independence and redundancy split electrical buses, computer lanes, sensors and hydraulic supplies so one failure cannot remove all signalling, computation and actuation.

Sidestick versus control column (yoke) is type context: Airbus sticks are typically unlinked with priority logic; Boeing FBW typically keeps a mechanically linked, back-driven column.

Last updated: September 2026

16.1 Fly-By-Wire Flight Control

Current Appendix I gives only the broad topic 5.15 heading at level 1. The pre-12 June 2024 detailed description named Fly-By-Wire (FBW) among its typical systems, so this section retains FBW as a representative study example. Knowledge level 1 applies for categories A, B3, B1 and B2/B2L: familiarisation with the general arrangement and associated Built-In Test Equipment (BITE) . This section explains how flight-control computers, electrical signalling and powered actuators replace a continuous mechanical cable run from the cockpit inceptors to the primary surfaces, how flight-control laws shape the relationship between sidestick or column and the aeroplane, and why independence and redundancy are part of the architecture. Airbus names such as ELAC, SEC and FAC, and Boeing Flight Control Computer (FCC) / Actuator Control Electronics (ACE) names, are classroom examples of typical installations, not a claim that every type uses the same boxes.

From mechanical signalling to electrical command

On a conventional mechanically signalled aeroplane, the captain's control column and rudder pedals move cables, quadrants and pulleys that position hydraulic servo valves. Artificial feel comes from springs, bob-weights and, on larger types, a Q-feel unit. FBW keeps the powered actuators but replaces the signalling path with electrical commands . Position transducers on the sidestick or control column, and on the pedals, send analogue or digital demand to flight-control computers. Those computers output commands to actuator servo valves or to Actuator Control Electronics. Hydraulic, electro-hydrostatic or electrical actuators then move the elevators, ailerons, spoilers and rudder.

Three maintenance-relevant consequences follow. First, a broken cable is no longer the typical jam: a failed computer, a lost electrical bus, a failed actuator transducer or a hydraulic shut-off becomes the typical fault. Second, the relationship between inceptor deflection and surface angle is software-defined , so the same physical stick movement can mean load-factor demand in one law and a direct surface command in another. Third, there is no single mechanical path that a technician can trace from stick to surface with a torch: isolation uses BITE, computer reset, hydraulic status and actuator position feedback.

Computers and actuators — typical arrangements

Classroom teaching uses two transport families as the general arrangement.

Airbus types (A320 family as the usual example) place multiple dissimilar computers between the sidesticks and the surfaces. Typical names are two Elevator Aileron Computers (ELAC) , three Spoiler Elevator Computers (SEC) and two Flight Augmentation Computers (FAC) . ELACs normally compute elevator and aileron orders and autotrim of the Trimmable Horizontal Stabiliser (THS). SECs compute spoiler orders and provide standby elevator command. FACs compute rudder trim, yaw damper and characteristic speeds. Later Airbus types keep the same idea with different names (PRIM/SEC). Each computer is a Line Replaceable Unit (LRU) with its own power supply, data-bus connections and BITE.

Boeing fly-by-wire types (777 and 787 as the usual examples) split computation from actuation electronics. Primary Flight Computers (PFC) or Flight Control Computers (FCC) compute the control laws. Actuator Control Electronics (ACE) convert those digital commands into analogue drive for the hydraulic actuators and return position feedback. If the PFCs are lost, the ACEs can provide a direct electrical path from the column transducers to the actuators so that the aeroplane remains controllable. The conventional control column is retained.

Actuators are typically dual-chamber hydraulic units, or later electro-hydrostatic actuators, fed from independent hydraulic systems (Airbus Green/Blue/Yellow teaching, or Boeing Left/Centre/Right). Position is closed-loop: the computer or ACE compares commanded versus actual surface position. Uncommanded movement is detected by monitoring, dual transducers or comparison between computers, and the offending actuator is bypassed or shut off.

Flight-control laws (typical Airbus teaching)

A control law is the computed relationship between inceptor demand, aircraft motion and surface command. Airbus classroom teaching uses three electrical laws plus a mechanical backup. These names are type teaching, not an EASA-issued law table.

Normal law is the dispatched electrical law when computers, sensors and hydraulics are serviceable. Pitch is typically a load-factor (C ) demand *: stick displacement commands g, not a fixed elevator angle, and autotrim holds the demanded trajectory. Roll is typically a roll-rate demand . Protections are active: high angle of attack, high speed, excessive pitch attitude and excessive bank are limited so that full stick cannot easily stall or overspeed the aeroplane in the protected envelope.

Alternate law is entered after specified dual failures (for example dual air-data or dual inertial, or certain hydraulic and computer combinations — exact logic is type-specific). Some or all hard protections drop out. Load-factor demand may remain, but the stall and overspeed protections of normal law are typically lost or reduced to warnings. The crew is told that protections are degraded.

Direct law makes sidestick deflection proportional to control-surface deflection . Autotrim of the THS is lost, so the crew uses manual pitch trim. A characteristic memo (often taught as USE MAN PITCH TRIM) appears. Direct law is the electrical last resort before mechanical backup.

Mechanical backup on many Airbus types is a cable path to the THS trim wheel and to the rudder, allowing the aeroplane to be kept in a stable attitude if electrical signalling of the elevators is lost. It is a survival mode, not a dispatch law.

Boeing FBW teaching uses normal , secondary and direct modes rather than Airbus law names. Envelope protection is generally soft : the column can be overpowered through a protection. Module 5 requires recognition that laws and modes exist and that they degrade with failures, not memorising every interlock.

Independence, redundancy and inceptor philosophy

Independence means that one failure must not remove all signalling, all computation and all actuation together. Typical provisions include:

Electrical independence: computers and ACEs are fed from different AC and DC buses so that a single generator or bus loss does not blank every computer.

Hydraulic independence: surfaces that must keep working after one system loss are powered from more than one hydraulic system, or have backup electrical actuation.

Computational redundancy: multiple computers, often with dissimilar hardware or dissimilar software , compute in parallel. Voting or monitoring isolates a failed lane.

Sensor redundancy: air data and inertial sources are triplex or better; a single bad angle-of-attack vane must not command a false protection.

Sidestick versus yoke is type context , not a syllabus preference. Airbus uses a sidestick with no mechanical link between captain and first-officer sticks; dual-input is resolved by priority pushbuttons and by summing logic until priority is taken. There is no tactile column fight. Boeing FBW retains a control column (yoke) that is mechanically linked and often back-driven , so each pilot feels the other's input and the autopilot's commands. Neither inceptor proves that the computers are healthy: a sidestick that moves freely can still sit in front of a failed ELAC, and a moving Boeing column can still sit in front of a failed ACE.

Associated BITE and the hangar close-out

FBW computers run power-up and continuous BITE. Typical hangar evidence is a flight-control fault on ECAM or EICAS, a computer-reset procedure, a hydraulic-page disagreement, or a CMC/CFDS fault history naming an ELAC, SEC, PFC or ACE. Replacing a computer is a configuration-controlled LRU change: software part numbers must match the approved standard (Chapter 12). After replacement, a BITE-initiated test, actuator cycling as required by the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM), and confirmation that the law or mode is again normal are the familiarisation-level close-out. Do not treat a law degradation as a simple display fault: the law is the computers' assessment of remaining redundancy.

Warning

A flight-control computer swap is not complete when the box is seated. Confirm electrical connectors, hydraulic status, BITE pass, software identity and that the aeroplane has returned to the dispatched law or mode before signing the task.

Element Typical Airbus teaching Typical Boeing FBW teaching

Inceptor Sidestick, not mechanically linked; priority logic Control column (yoke), mechanically linked; back-drive feel

  • Computers ELAC, SEC, FAC (or PRIM/SEC on later types) PFC/FCC computing; ACE at the actuators
  • Laws / modes Normal, alternate, direct; mechanical backup Normal, secondary, direct

Pitch in normal Load-factor (C*) demand with autotrim Column commands through computers; protections generally soft

  • Actuation Hydraulic (Green/Blue/Yellow) or later EHA Hydraulic (Left/Centre/Right) via ACE
  • BITE Computer BITE to CFDS/CMS Computer and ACE BITE to CMC

Level 1 does not require a type-course memory of every law interlock. It does require you to know that computers command actuators electrically, that laws or modes degrade after failures, that power, computation and hydraulics are split on purpose, and that sidestick versus yoke is only type context around the same FBW idea.

Loading diagram... Typical fly-by-wire arrangement: inceptors, computers, ACE/actuators and laws