Study guide
10.2 Timestomping Countermeasures: Comparing $STANDARD_INFORMATION vs $FILE_NAME Timestamps
Computer Hacking Forensic Investigator CHFI 312-49
Track your progress as you read
Finished sections get a check mark.
1 Chapter 1: Foundations of Digital Forensics & Cybercrime Investigation
1.1 Cybercrime Classifications, Forensic Science Principles & Legal Admissibility 1.2 RFC 3227 Order of Volatility, Live vs. Dead Acquisition & Forensic Readiness 1.3 Indicators of Compromise (IoCs), Cyber Attribution & Threat Intelligence 1.4 AI-Assisted Forensics, GitOps, Automation/Orchestration & Forensics-as-a-Service (FaaS)
2 Chapter 2: Modern Forensic Environments & Emerging Threats
2.1 Fileless Malware, In-Memory Execution & Living-off-the-Land (LotL) 2.2 IoT & Operational Technology (OT/SCADA) Forensic Fundamentals 2.3 Dark Web, Tor Network, Onion Routing & Hidden Services Forensics 2.4 Blockchain Transactions, Cryptocurrency Tracing & Digital Asset Investigations
3 Chapter 3: Legal Frameworks, Search Warrants & Evidence Rules
3.1 Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE 702, 901, 902, 1001-1003) & Daubert/Frye Standards 3.2 Fourth Amendment, Warrant Exceptions, Workplace Search & Consent Protocols 3.3 International Standards: ISO/IEC 27037, ACPO Principles & ENFSI Guidelines 3.4 Cybercrime Statutes, Privacy Compliance, CAN-SPAM & International Cooperation
4 Chapter 4: eDiscovery, Chain of Custody & Professional Ethics
4.1 Electronic Discovery Reference Model (EDRM) & Legal Spoliation Holds 4.2 Chain of Custody Documentation, Evidence Packaging & Tamper-Evident Handling 4.3 Expert Witness Testimony, Report Writing Standards & EC-Council Code of Ethics
5 Chapter 5: Storage Architecture, Boot Sequences & Media Forensics
5.1 Storage Media Architecture: Sectors, Clusters, RAM/File Slack & Unallocated Space 5.2 Partition Tables & Boot Structures: MBR, GPT, VBR, BIOS vs. UEFI Secure Boot 5.3 RAID Reconstruction (RAID 0, 1, 5, 6, 10) & SSD Forensic Challenges (TRIM, Wear Leveling)
6 Chapter 6: Windows File Systems: NTFS & FAT
6.1 NTFS Architecture: Master File Table ($MFT) Record Structure & Attribute Headers 6.2 NTFS Artifacts: Alternate Data Streams (ADS), Volume Shadow Copies (VSS) & $LogFile 6.3 FAT12/16/32 and exFAT Architecture, Directory Entries & File Deletion Mechanics
7 Chapter 7: Non-Windows File Systems & File Signatures
7.1 Linux File Systems: ext2/ext3/ext4 Inode Architecture, Superblocks & Journaling Forensics 7.2 macOS File Systems: HFS+ and Apple File System (APFS) Architecture & Snapshots 7.3 File Signatures, Magic Bytes, Hex Headers/Footers & File Carving Techniques
8 Chapter 8: Investigation Lifecycle, Lab Setup & First Response
8.1 Forensic Laboratory Accreditation: ISO/IEC 17025 Standards & Hardware/Software Controls 8.2 First Responder Duties: Crime Scene Containment, Electronic Triage & Volatile Triage 8.3 Physical Evidence Packaging, Anti-Static/Faraday Protection & Transport Security
9 Chapter 9: Forensic Acquisition & Verification Methodology
9.1 Hardware and Software Write-Blockers: Operational Validation & Bridge Verification 9.2 Bit-Stream Disk Imaging, Physical vs. Logical vs. Targeted Acquisition Methodology 9.3 Forensic Image Formats (RAW/DD, E01, AFF) & Cryptographic Hashing Verification (MD5, SHA-256)
10 Chapter 10: Anti-Forensics Techniques & Countermeasures
10.1 Steganography Detection: Spatial/Frequency Domain Steganalysis & Hidden Carrier Extraction 10.2 Timestomping Countermeasures: Comparing $STANDARD_INFORMATION vs $FILE_NAME Timestamps 10.3 Secure Wiping, Degaussing, File Shredding Countermeasures & Residual Artifact Recovery
11 Chapter 11: Windows Operating System Forensics
11.1 Windows Registry Forensics: SYSTEM, SOFTWARE, SAM & NTUSER.DAT Hive Analysis 11.2 Execution Artifacts: Prefetch (.pf), Shimcache (AppCompatCache), Amcache.hve & UserAssist 11.3 User Activity Artifacts: ShellBags, LNK Shortcut Files, Jump Lists & Recycle Bin ($I/$R) 11.4 Windows Event Log Forensics: Security Audit IDs (4624, 4625, 4688, 4720, 7045) & EVTX Parsing
12 Chapter 12: Memory Forensics & Malware Analysis
12.1 Volatile Memory Acquisition: RAM Capture, Crash Dumps, Hiberfil.sys & Pagefile.sys 12.2 Memory Analysis with Volatility 3: pslist, pstree, malfind, netscan & Vadinfo 12.3 Static Malware Triage: Strings, PE Headers, Import Tables, Hashes & YARA Rule Matching 12.4 Dynamic Malware Analysis: Sandboxing, Process Monitor (Procmon), Regshot & Network Callouts 12.5 .NET Managed Malware Analysis & the GOOTLOADER Fileless Infection Chain
13 Chapter 13: Network, Web Application & Email Forensics
13.1 Network Forensics: PCAP Analysis, Protocol Dissection, Snort/Suricata & Flow Analysis 13.2 Web Server Forensics: Apache/IIS Access Logs, SQL Injection, XSS & Web Shell Detection 13.3 Email Forensics: RFC 5322 Headers, Authentication (SPF, DKIM, DMARC) & Mbox/PST Extraction 13.4 SIEM Event Correlation, Cross-Source Timeline Analysis & Super-Timeline Construction 13.5 Investigating Directory Traversal, Command Injection, Parameter Tampering, XXE, Cookie Poisoning & Brute Force 13.6 Network Device & Service Log Forensics: Firewall, IDS, Honeypot, Router, DHCP, Switch, VPN, DNS & SSH 13.7 Wireless Network Forensics: Rogue APs, Evil Twins, MAC Spoofing, Deauthentication & Jamming
14 Chapter 14: Mobile, Cloud & IoT Forensics
14.1 Mobile Device Forensics: Manual, Logical, File System & Physical Extraction (Android/iOS) 14.2 Mobile Artifact Analysis: Call Logs, SMS/Chat SQLite Databases, Location Data & Plists 14.3 Cloud Forensics: AWS CloudTrail, Azure Activity Logs & Multi-Tenant Evidence Collection 14.4 IoT Forensics: UART/JTAG Physical Interfaces, Firmware Extraction & Sensor Telemetry
15 Chapter 15: Commercial & Open-Source Forensic Suites
15.1 Commercial Forensic Platforms: EnCase Forensic, FTK (Forensic Toolkit) & FTK Imager 15.2 Open-Source Forensic Platforms: Autopsy, The Sleuth Kit (TSK) & SIFT/CAINE Workstations 15.3 Specialized DFIR Utilities: Eric Zimmerman Tools (EZ Tools) & Sysinternals Forensic Suite
16 Chapter 16: Analysis Toolkits, Python Scripting & Tool Validation
16.1 Reverse Engineering & Password Cracking: Ghidra, IDA Pro, Hashcat & John the Ripper 16.2 Python for Digital Forensics: Parsing Raw Artifacts, Custom Scapy Scripts & Evidence Automation 16.3 Forensic Tool Testing & Validation: NIST CFTT Methodology, ISO/IEC 17025 Standards & Daubert Compliance
17 Chapter 17: Database Forensics & Web Application Firewalls
17.1 MySQL Forensics: Internal Architecture, Data Directory, Information Schema & Utility Programs 17.2 SQL Server Forensics: SSMS, ApexSQL, SQLCMD Transaction-Log Collection, Plan Cache & Trace Files 17.3 Web Application Firewall (WAF) Architecture, Audit Logs, Benefits & Limitations
18 Chapter 18: Social, Virtualized, Multimedia & Browser Investigations
18.1 Social Media, Social Engineering, Insider Threat & Identity Theft Forensics 18.2 Virtualization, Container & Microservices Forensics, Bluetooth and Electron Chat Applications 18.3 Multimedia Forensics: Image, Audio & Video Authentication, EXIF, PRNU and Deepfake Detection 18.4 Browser Artifact Recovery, Private Browsing, USB Enumeration, Partition Recovery & Packer Unpacking Tools
10.2 Timestomping Countermeasures: Comparing $STANDARD_INFORMATION vs $FILE_NAME Timestamps
Key Takeaways Explain This Topic AI
Timestomping is an anti-forensic evasion technique used to alter file temporal metadata (Modified, Accessed, Created, Born/MFT Altered - MACB) to camouflage malicious binaries within historical system baselines.
NTFS maintains temporal metadata in two separate Master File Table ($MFT) attributes: $STANDARD_INFORMATION (Type 0x10) and $FILE_NAME (Type 0x30).
Standard user-space Win32 APIs (such as SetFileTime) modify only the $STANDARD_INFORMATION attribute, leaving the $FILE_NAME attribute untouched because it is protected and updated exclusively by the Windows kernel (ntfs.sys).
Key forensic indicators of timestomping include chronological inversion ($STANDARD_INFORMATION preceding $FILE_NAME), sub-millisecond zero-padding (.0000000Z), and out-of-sequence MFT Record Numbers.
The NTFS Update Sequence Number Journal ( U s n J r n l : UsnJrnl: U s n J r n l : J) and $LogFile provide tamper-resistant transaction histories that capture the true operational timeline of files regardless of MFT attribute modification.
Last updated: September 2026
10.2 Timestomping Countermeasures: Comparing $STANDARD_INFORMATION vs $FILE_NAME Timestamps
Quick Answer: Timestomping is an anti-forensic technique where an adversary deliberately modifies a file's MACB timestamps (Modified, Accessed, Created, Born/MFT Altered) to camouflage malicious executables within legitimate operating system directories (such as C:\Windows\System32 ). Because standard user-space tools and APIs (like kernel32!SetFileTime or Meterpreter's timestomp ) alter only the $STANDARD_INFORMATION (Attribute 0x10 ) attribute, they leave the kernel-protected $FILE_NAME (Attribute 0x30 ) attribute untouched. Forensic examiners expose timestomping by comparing 0x10 and 0x30 timestamps, identifying nanosecond rounding anomalies ( .0000000Z ), and cross-referencing file activity against the non-volatile $UsnJrnl:$J journal.
Timestomping Mechanics & Threat Actor Motivations
When threat actors deploy backdoors, web shells, or privilege escalation tools to disk, standard operating system file creation timestamps immediately draw forensic scrutiny during initial incident triage. Investigators routinely sort files chronologically to identify binaries introduced during the suspected window of intrusion.
To subvert temporal analysis, threat actors execute timestomping to achieve three tactical goals:
Baseline Blending: Forging a malicious binary's creation date to match surrounding operating system components (e.g., matching the installation date of cmd.exe or kernel32.dll ).
Super-Timeline Subversion: Evading time-windowed forensic queries (such as hunting for files created between 02:00 and 04:00 on the day of an alert).
Incident Response Frustration: Confusing incident responders, leading them to believe that an attacker binary has been dormant for years rather than introduced hours prior. Target Directory: C:\Windows\System32\
Actual Intrusion Window: September 22, 2026 at 03:14:22 UTC
- File Name Reported Timestamp (Explorer) Status / True State
- -------- ----------------------------- -------------------
- svchost.exe 2021-05-18 12:45:00 UTC Legitimate Windows Binary
- kernel32.dll 2021-05-18 12:45:00 UTC Legitimate Windows Binary
beacon.dll 2021-05-18 12:45:00 UTC <------- FORGED VIA TIMESTOMPING!
- cmd.exe 2021-05-18 12:45:00 UTC Legitimate Windows Binary
- NTFS Timestamp Architecture: Attribute 0x10 vs. Attribute 0x30
To understand why timestomping fails under rigorous forensic scrutiny, an investigator must understand how the New Technology File System (NTFS) records file metadata inside the Master File Table ($MFT) . Every file and directory on an NTFS volume is allocated at least one 1024-byte record in the $MFT .
NTFS maintains four timestamps for every file, universally designated by the acronym MACB :
- M: Modified (Last Data Written / Content Modified)
- A: Accessed (Last Read / Touched by OS or Application)
- C: MFT Altered / Changed (Metadata modified in $MFT)
- B: Born (Created / Original Inception on Volume)
Crucially, NTFS stores these four timestamps in two separate MFT attributes for every single file: +-------------------------------------------------------------------------+
- | 1024-BYTE MFT RECORD LAYOUT |
- | |
- | +-------------------+ Offset 0x00 - 0x2F: Record Header |
- | | Record Header | Magic 'FILE', Sequence Number, Flags (In-Use) |
- | +-------------------+ |
- | | | Offset 0x30+: ATTRIBUTE 0x10 |
- | | $STANDARD_INFO | • MACB Timestamps (Modifiable by User-Space) |
- | | (0x10) | • File Attributes (Read-only, Hidden, System) |
- | | | • Visible to Windows Explorer & CLI 'dir' |
- | +-------------------+ |
- | | | Variable Offset: ATTRIBUTE 0x30 |
- | | $FILE_NAME | • MACB Timestamps (KERNEL PROTECTED) |
- | | (0x30) | • UTF-16 File Name & Length |
- | | | • Parent Directory Inode Reference |
- | +-------------------+ |
- | | $DATA (0x80) | Variable Offset: File Content Data Runs |
- | +-------------------+ |
- +-------------------------------------------------------------------------+
- Comparing $STANDARD_INFORMATION (0x10) and $FILE_NAME (0x30)
Technical Attribute $STANDARD_INFORMATION (Type 0x10 ) $FILE_NAME (Type 0x30 )
Primary Role General file properties, DOS flags, security descriptors Namespace representation, directory links, file naming
User-Space Modifiability Full Access: Readily modified via standard Win32 APIs ( SetFileTime ) Restricted: Blocked by Win32 subsystem; updated exclusively by kernel
Enforcing Entity User-mode applications, PowerShell, scripting engines NTFS Kernel Driver ( ntfs.sys )
Visible To Windows File Explorer, PowerShell Get-ChildItem , dir command Digital forensic suites (FTK, EnCase, X-Ways, MFTECmd, TSK)
Update Triggers File read, write, attribute change, user-space timestamp alteration File creation, file renaming, file relocation across directories
Timestamp Scope Reflects current, operational state of the file Anchors historical baseline established at creation or rename
- Resolution 100-nanosecond intervals (10 million ticks per second) 100-nanosecond intervals
- The Critical Architectural Vulnerability in Timestomping
When a threat actor uses automated post-exploitation modules (such as Metasploit's timestomp or PowerShell (Get-Item payload.exe).CreationTime = '01/01/2021' ), the tool calls the standard Win32 function: BOOL SetFileTime(
- HANDLE hFile,
- const FILETIME *lpCreationTime,
- const FILETIME *lpLastAccessTime,
- const FILETIME *lpLastWriteTime
- );
The Windows subsystem directs SetFileTime exclusively to the $STANDARD_INFORMATION (0x10) attribute. The Windows kernel API explicitly denies user-mode processes the ability to modify $FILE_NAME (0x30) timestamps . As a result, the forged timestamps appear in Windows Explorer, but the genuine historical creation and modification times remain permanently recorded in the 0x30 attribute.
The Four Definitive Signatures of Timestomping
Forensic examiners detect timestomping by evaluating four distinct anomalous signatures: +-------------------------------------------------------------------------+
- | TIMESTOMPING ANOMALY TAXONOMY |
- +-------------------------------------------------------------------------+
- | 1. 0x10 vs 0x30 CHRONOLOGICAL INVERSION |
- | $STANDARD_INFO Born date precedes $FILE_NAME Born date. |
- | Logically impossible: a file's metadata cannot exist before its |
- | directory filename entry is allocated by the kernel. |
- | |
- | 2. NANOSECOND ZERO-PADDING TRUNCATION (.0000000Z) |
- | Win32 APIs round time values to seconds or milliseconds. |
- | True NTFS timestamps record 7 decimal places (100-nanosecond). |
- | |
- | 3. MFT RECORD NUMBER VS. CREATION DATE SKEW |
- | High MFT Record Number (e.g., #185,420) paired with an ancient |
- | creation date (e.g., 2021 OS install) among low MFT records. |
- | |
- | 4. $UsnJrnl / $LogFile TRANSACTION DISCREPANCIES |
- | Non-volatile transaction records reveal true file creation events |
- | and file system operations that bypass MFT timestamp alterations. |
- +-------------------------------------------------------------------------+
- 1. Chronological Inversion ($STANDARD_INFO vs. $FILE_NAME)
When an attacker copies a staging payload ( dropper.exe ) to a system on September 22, 2026, and timestomps its creation date to match a 2021 operating system baseline:
- $STANDARD_INFORMATION (0x10) Created: 2021-05-18 12:45:00 UTC
- $FILE_NAME (0x30) Created: 2026-09-22 03:14:22 UTC
Forensic Rule: In an unmanipulated NTFS file system, $FILE_NAME timestamps are established when the file is created on that volume. $STANDARD_INFORMATION timestamps can be modified during standard copy/move operations, but a file's $STANDARD_INFORMATION creation timestamp can never legitimately predate its $FILE_NAME creation timestamp on the target volume. A discrepancy where 0 x 10 < 0 x 30 0x10 < 0x30 0 x 10 < 0 x 30 is definitive proof of timestamp manipulation.
2. Nanosecond / Millisecond Zero-Padding Anomalies
Windows NTFS represents time as a 64-bit integer tracking the number of 100-nanosecond intervals that have elapsed since January 1, 1601 (UTC). This provides a temporal precision of seven decimal places: Timestamp Format: YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS.1234567Z \text{Timestamp Format: } \text{YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS.1234567Z} Timestamp Format: YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS.1234567Z
When legitimate operating system processes create or modify files, the lower-order sub-millisecond nanosecond counters contain genuine, high-entropy clock ticks. However, when user-space APIs (such as older versions of Metasploit timestomp , standard PowerShell assignments, or command-line wrappers) write timestamps:
The API truncates or zeroes out the sub-millisecond resolution.
The resulting timestamp ends with unnatural trailing zeroes (e.g., .0000000Z or .1230000Z ). Legitimate Windows Binary (svchost.exe):
Created: 2021-05-18 12:45:03.8492015Z <-- Authentic 100-ns tick entropy
Timestomped Binary (beacon.dll):
Created: 2021-05-18 12:45:00.0000000Z <-- Truncated: Nanoseconds zero-padded!
Modified: 2021-05-18 12:45:00.0000000Z <-- Truncated: Nanoseconds zero-padded!
3. MFT Record Sequencing Inconsistencies
The Master File Table allocates 1024-byte record structures sequentially. As files are written to disk over time, newly allocated MFT records receive monotonically increasing MFT Entry Indices (Record Numbers):
Records 0–15: Reserved for NTFS system metadata files ( $MFT , $LogFile , $Volume , $Bitmap ).
Records 16–45,000: Typical allocation range for the base operating system installation.
Records 100,000+: Files created weeks, months, or years after initial deployment.
If an examiner encounters a file claiming to have been created during the initial operating system installation (e.g., May 2021) with an MFT Record Number of #189,450 , while all surrounding system binaries created in May 2021 occupy MFT Record Numbers between #18,000 and #24,000 , the file is flagged for severe sequence skew, confirming late introduction to the volume.
Correlating with NTFS Transaction Journals: $UsnJrnl and $LogFile
Even when advanced adversaries attempt kernel-level direct disk writes to modify both the 0x10 and 0x30 attributes, secondary NTFS transaction logging architectures defeat the anti-forensic attempt.
The Update Sequence Number (USN) Journal ( U s n J r n l : UsnJrnl: U s n J r n l : J)
The USN Journal is an alternate data stream located at $Extend\$UsnJrnl:$J . It provides an append-only log that tracks every modification made to files and directories on the volume. Each record contains:
- MFT Record Number & Sequence Number
- Parent Directory MFT Record Number
- Timestamp of Transaction (UTC)
Update Reasons (Bitmask Flags):
USN_REASON_FILE_CREATE ( 0x00000100 ): File was created.
USN_REASON_DATA_EXTEND ( 0x00000002 ): File size increased / data written.
USN_REASON_BASIC_INFO_CHANGE ( 0x00008000 ): Metadata altered (e.g., attributes changed via SetFileTime ).
USN_REASON_FILE_DELETE ( 0x00000200 ): File deleted.
USN_REASON_CLOSE ( 0x80000000 ): Handle closed; operation finalized.
Crucially, timestomping tools do not alter the historical entries in $UsnJrnl . When a threat actor timestomps a file, the action itself triggers an operating system event that appends a new record to the journal flagged with USN_REASON_BASIC_INFO_CHANGE bearing the true current system time ! Chronological Reconstruction from $UsnJrnl:$J Parsing:
- USN Offset Timestamp (UTC) MFT Ref File Name Update Reasons
- --------- --------------- ------- --------- --------------
- 0x0041F800 2026-09-22 03:14:22.184Z #142010 beacon.dll FILE_CREATE | DATA_EXTEND
- 0x0041FA20 2026-09-22 03:14:23.901Z #142010 beacon.dll DATA_OVERWRITE | CLOSE
- 0x0041FB80 2026-09-22 03:14:28.415Z #142010 beacon.dll BASIC_INFO_CHANGE | CLOSE
Result: Proves conclusively that beacon.dll was born on Sept 22, 2026 at 03:14:22 UTC
and timestomped 6 seconds later (BASIC_INFO_CHANGE at 03:14:28 UTC)!
Forensic Tooling & Practical CLI Analysis Workflow
Digital forensic examiners utilize Eric Zimmerman's MFTECmd , The Sleuth Kit ( TSK ), and Python parsing utilities to uncover timestomping artifacts.
1. Automated Detection with Eric Zimmerman's MFTECmd :: Parse the raw $MFT into a comprehensive CSV analysis structure
MFTECmd.exe -f "E:\Evidence\C\$MFT" --csv "C:\Analysis\Output" --csvf mft_parsed.csv
MFTECmd parses both 0x10 and 0x30 attributes into adjacent columns in the output CSV:
- Created0x10 vs. Created0x30
- LastModified0x10 vs. LastModified0x30
- LastRecordChange0x10 vs. LastRecordChange0x30
- LastAccess0x10 vs. LastAccess0x30
Copied0x30 : MFTECmd flag asserting if a file was copied or altered.
PowerShell Command to Filter Timestomped Files from MFTECmd Output: # Query parsed MFT records where 0x10 Born date predates 0x30 Born date
- Import-Csv C:\Analysis\Output\mft_parsed.csv | Where-Object {
- [DateTime]$_.Created0x10 -lt [DateTime]$_.Created0x30
- } | Select-Object EntryNumber, FileName, Created0x10, Created0x30, LastModified0x10, LastModified0x30 |
- Format-Table -AutoSize
2. Low-Level Inode Inspection via The Sleuth Kit (TSK) istat # Inspect MFT record index 142010 directly from a raw bit-stream disk image
istat -o 2048 /evidence/disk_image.raw 142010 Output Analysis:
- MFT Entry: 142010
- Sequence: 1
- Allocated File
$STANDARD_INFORMATION (0x10):
- Created: 2021-05-18 12:45:00.0000000 (UTC) <-- Zero-padded sub-seconds
- File Modified: 2021-05-18 12:45:00.0000000 (UTC)
MFT Modified: 2026-09-22 03:14:28.4150124 (UTC) <-- MFT record change untouched!
Accessed: 2026-09-22 03:14:22.1841102 (UTC)
$FILE_NAME (0x30):
Name: beacon.dll
Created: 2026-09-22 03:14:22.1841102 (UTC) <-- TRUE CREATION TIME!
- File Modified: 2026-09-22 03:14:23.9014521 (UTC)
- MFT Modified: 2026-09-22 03:14:23.9014521 (UTC)
- Accessed: 2026-09-22 03:14:22.1841102 (UTC)
Notice the clear forensic proof:
The $STANDARD_INFORMATION created date was forged to 2021 with .0000000 zeroes.
The $FILE_NAME created date remains firmly anchored at 2026-09-22 03:14:22 UTC .
The $STANDARD_INFORMATION MFT Modified (C) timestamp reveals the exact moment the timestomping tool modified the record ( 2026-09-22 03:14:28 UTC ).
- Real-World Forensic Case: The Trojanized DLL in System32
- Case Background
During a suspected nation-state incident response on an Active Directory Domain Controller, threat hunters observed an unusual outbound beacon over HTTPS to an external IP. The executable communicating was identified as rundll32.exe invoking a dynamic link library: C:\Windows\System32\networkdiag.dll .
The Forensic Challenge
A preliminary triage performed by an IT administrator reported that networkdiag.dll was harmless because Windows Explorer reported its creation and modification date as April 12, 2021 09:15:22 AM —the identical date when Windows Server was initially installed on the physical host.
The Examiner's Investigation
The CHFI investigator acquired a bit-stream physical image of the system drive using a hardware write-blocker.
Running MFTECmd to parse the $MFT , the investigator queried networkdiag.dll (MFT Entry #210,482 ):
- Created0x10 : 2021-04-12 09:15:22.0000000Z
- Created0x30 : 2026-09-20 22:11:05.6124501Z
The chronological inversion ( 0 x 10 < 0 x 30 0x10 < 0x30 0 x 10 < 0 x 30 ) and nanosecond zero-padding immediately confirmed timestomping.
Parsing $Extend\$UsnJrnl:$J using Zimmerman's extractUsnJrnl revealed an entry for networkdiag.dll at 2026-09-20 22:11:05 UTC with reasons FILE_CREATE and DATA_EXTEND , followed by a BASIC_INFO_CHANGE event at 22:11:09 UTC .
Correlating with Windows Event Log ID 4688 ( A new process has been created ) and PowerShell Script Block Logging (Event ID 4104), the examiner discovered a PowerShell command that staged the DLL and immediately invoked SetFileTime using the timestamp of kernel32.dll .
The evidence of timestomping was successfully presented in court to prove deliberate manipulation and intentional concealment of malicious software.
CHFI Exam Tips & Pitfalls
Tip
0x10 vs. 0x30 MFT Attributes: Remember that 0x10 ( $STANDARD_INFORMATION ) is the attribute altered by user-space APIs and seen by Windows Explorer. 0x30 ( $FILE_NAME ) is updated exclusively by the NTFS kernel driver and cannot be modified by standard Win32 calls like SetFileTime .
The Inversion Indicator: An exam question asking for definitive proof of timestomping will frequently present timestamp tables. Look for $STANDARD_INFORMATION Created date earlier than $FILE_NAME Created date .
Sub-second Rounding: Authentic NTFS timestamps contain 7 decimal digits of precision (100-ns intervals). Timestomped entries created by standard APIs often exhibit .0000000Z or round to full seconds.
USN Journal Resilience: Even if an attacker uses direct hex editing or custom kernel drivers to overwrite both 0x10 and 0x30 , the $UsnJrnl:$J journal captures the BASIC_INFO_CHANGE and file creation transactions with non-forgeable timestamps.