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11.1 Windows Registry Forensics: SYSTEM, SOFTWARE, SAM & NTUSER.DAT Hive Analysis
Computer Hacking Forensic Investigator CHFI 312-49
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1 Chapter 1: Foundations of Digital Forensics & Cybercrime Investigation
1.1 Cybercrime Classifications, Forensic Science Principles & Legal Admissibility 1.2 RFC 3227 Order of Volatility, Live vs. Dead Acquisition & Forensic Readiness 1.3 Indicators of Compromise (IoCs), Cyber Attribution & Threat Intelligence 1.4 AI-Assisted Forensics, GitOps, Automation/Orchestration & Forensics-as-a-Service (FaaS)
2 Chapter 2: Modern Forensic Environments & Emerging Threats
2.1 Fileless Malware, In-Memory Execution & Living-off-the-Land (LotL) 2.2 IoT & Operational Technology (OT/SCADA) Forensic Fundamentals 2.3 Dark Web, Tor Network, Onion Routing & Hidden Services Forensics 2.4 Blockchain Transactions, Cryptocurrency Tracing & Digital Asset Investigations
3 Chapter 3: Legal Frameworks, Search Warrants & Evidence Rules
3.1 Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE 702, 901, 902, 1001-1003) & Daubert/Frye Standards 3.2 Fourth Amendment, Warrant Exceptions, Workplace Search & Consent Protocols 3.3 International Standards: ISO/IEC 27037, ACPO Principles & ENFSI Guidelines 3.4 Cybercrime Statutes, Privacy Compliance, CAN-SPAM & International Cooperation
4 Chapter 4: eDiscovery, Chain of Custody & Professional Ethics
4.1 Electronic Discovery Reference Model (EDRM) & Legal Spoliation Holds 4.2 Chain of Custody Documentation, Evidence Packaging & Tamper-Evident Handling 4.3 Expert Witness Testimony, Report Writing Standards & EC-Council Code of Ethics
5 Chapter 5: Storage Architecture, Boot Sequences & Media Forensics
5.1 Storage Media Architecture: Sectors, Clusters, RAM/File Slack & Unallocated Space 5.2 Partition Tables & Boot Structures: MBR, GPT, VBR, BIOS vs. UEFI Secure Boot 5.3 RAID Reconstruction (RAID 0, 1, 5, 6, 10) & SSD Forensic Challenges (TRIM, Wear Leveling)
6 Chapter 6: Windows File Systems: NTFS & FAT
6.1 NTFS Architecture: Master File Table ($MFT) Record Structure & Attribute Headers 6.2 NTFS Artifacts: Alternate Data Streams (ADS), Volume Shadow Copies (VSS) & $LogFile 6.3 FAT12/16/32 and exFAT Architecture, Directory Entries & File Deletion Mechanics
7 Chapter 7: Non-Windows File Systems & File Signatures
7.1 Linux File Systems: ext2/ext3/ext4 Inode Architecture, Superblocks & Journaling Forensics 7.2 macOS File Systems: HFS+ and Apple File System (APFS) Architecture & Snapshots 7.3 File Signatures, Magic Bytes, Hex Headers/Footers & File Carving Techniques
8 Chapter 8: Investigation Lifecycle, Lab Setup & First Response
8.1 Forensic Laboratory Accreditation: ISO/IEC 17025 Standards & Hardware/Software Controls 8.2 First Responder Duties: Crime Scene Containment, Electronic Triage & Volatile Triage 8.3 Physical Evidence Packaging, Anti-Static/Faraday Protection & Transport Security
9 Chapter 9: Forensic Acquisition & Verification Methodology
9.1 Hardware and Software Write-Blockers: Operational Validation & Bridge Verification 9.2 Bit-Stream Disk Imaging, Physical vs. Logical vs. Targeted Acquisition Methodology 9.3 Forensic Image Formats (RAW/DD, E01, AFF) & Cryptographic Hashing Verification (MD5, SHA-256)
10 Chapter 10: Anti-Forensics Techniques & Countermeasures
10.1 Steganography Detection: Spatial/Frequency Domain Steganalysis & Hidden Carrier Extraction 10.2 Timestomping Countermeasures: Comparing $STANDARD_INFORMATION vs $FILE_NAME Timestamps 10.3 Secure Wiping, Degaussing, File Shredding Countermeasures & Residual Artifact Recovery
11 Chapter 11: Windows Operating System Forensics
11.1 Windows Registry Forensics: SYSTEM, SOFTWARE, SAM & NTUSER.DAT Hive Analysis 11.2 Execution Artifacts: Prefetch (.pf), Shimcache (AppCompatCache), Amcache.hve & UserAssist 11.3 User Activity Artifacts: ShellBags, LNK Shortcut Files, Jump Lists & Recycle Bin ($I/$R) 11.4 Windows Event Log Forensics: Security Audit IDs (4624, 4625, 4688, 4720, 7045) & EVTX Parsing
12 Chapter 12: Memory Forensics & Malware Analysis
12.1 Volatile Memory Acquisition: RAM Capture, Crash Dumps, Hiberfil.sys & Pagefile.sys 12.2 Memory Analysis with Volatility 3: pslist, pstree, malfind, netscan & Vadinfo 12.3 Static Malware Triage: Strings, PE Headers, Import Tables, Hashes & YARA Rule Matching 12.4 Dynamic Malware Analysis: Sandboxing, Process Monitor (Procmon), Regshot & Network Callouts 12.5 .NET Managed Malware Analysis & the GOOTLOADER Fileless Infection Chain
13 Chapter 13: Network, Web Application & Email Forensics
13.1 Network Forensics: PCAP Analysis, Protocol Dissection, Snort/Suricata & Flow Analysis 13.2 Web Server Forensics: Apache/IIS Access Logs, SQL Injection, XSS & Web Shell Detection 13.3 Email Forensics: RFC 5322 Headers, Authentication (SPF, DKIM, DMARC) & Mbox/PST Extraction 13.4 SIEM Event Correlation, Cross-Source Timeline Analysis & Super-Timeline Construction 13.5 Investigating Directory Traversal, Command Injection, Parameter Tampering, XXE, Cookie Poisoning & Brute Force 13.6 Network Device & Service Log Forensics: Firewall, IDS, Honeypot, Router, DHCP, Switch, VPN, DNS & SSH 13.7 Wireless Network Forensics: Rogue APs, Evil Twins, MAC Spoofing, Deauthentication & Jamming
14 Chapter 14: Mobile, Cloud & IoT Forensics
14.1 Mobile Device Forensics: Manual, Logical, File System & Physical Extraction (Android/iOS) 14.2 Mobile Artifact Analysis: Call Logs, SMS/Chat SQLite Databases, Location Data & Plists 14.3 Cloud Forensics: AWS CloudTrail, Azure Activity Logs & Multi-Tenant Evidence Collection 14.4 IoT Forensics: UART/JTAG Physical Interfaces, Firmware Extraction & Sensor Telemetry
15 Chapter 15: Commercial & Open-Source Forensic Suites
15.1 Commercial Forensic Platforms: EnCase Forensic, FTK (Forensic Toolkit) & FTK Imager 15.2 Open-Source Forensic Platforms: Autopsy, The Sleuth Kit (TSK) & SIFT/CAINE Workstations 15.3 Specialized DFIR Utilities: Eric Zimmerman Tools (EZ Tools) & Sysinternals Forensic Suite
16 Chapter 16: Analysis Toolkits, Python Scripting & Tool Validation
16.1 Reverse Engineering & Password Cracking: Ghidra, IDA Pro, Hashcat & John the Ripper 16.2 Python for Digital Forensics: Parsing Raw Artifacts, Custom Scapy Scripts & Evidence Automation 16.3 Forensic Tool Testing & Validation: NIST CFTT Methodology, ISO/IEC 17025 Standards & Daubert Compliance
17 Chapter 17: Database Forensics & Web Application Firewalls
17.1 MySQL Forensics: Internal Architecture, Data Directory, Information Schema & Utility Programs 17.2 SQL Server Forensics: SSMS, ApexSQL, SQLCMD Transaction-Log Collection, Plan Cache & Trace Files 17.3 Web Application Firewall (WAF) Architecture, Audit Logs, Benefits & Limitations
18 Chapter 18: Social, Virtualized, Multimedia & Browser Investigations
18.1 Social Media, Social Engineering, Insider Threat & Identity Theft Forensics 18.2 Virtualization, Container & Microservices Forensics, Bluetooth and Electron Chat Applications 18.3 Multimedia Forensics: Image, Audio & Video Authentication, EXIF, PRNU and Deepfake Detection 18.4 Browser Artifact Recovery, Private Browsing, USB Enumeration, Partition Recovery & Packer Unpacking Tools
11.1 Windows Registry Forensics: SYSTEM, SOFTWARE, SAM & NTUSER.DAT Hive Analysis
Key Takeaways Explain This Topic AI
The Windows Registry is a hierarchical database stored across system-wide hives in %SystemRoot%\System32\config\ (SYSTEM, SOFTWARE, SAM, SECURITY, DEFAULT) and user-specific hives ( %UserProfile%\NTUSER.DAT and AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\UsrClass.dat ).
Modern Windows operating systems utilize transaction logging (.LOG1, .LOG2) to maintain hive consistency; forensic examiners must replay dirty hive transaction logs prior to analysis to prevent missing volatile or recently flushed evidentiary keys.
The SYSTEM hive preserves hardware configurations and USB storage connection history under CurrentControlSet\Enum\USBSTOR , cross-referenced with MountedDevices and DeviceClasses to establish device serial numbers, vendor details, and first/last insertion timestamps.
The SAM hive stores local security accounts and Relative Identifiers (RIDs), with binary F and V values containing Last Logon, Password Last Set, Account Expiration, Failed Login Count, and account status flags.
User activity profiles in NTUSER.DAT track TypedURLs, RecentDocs (MRU lists), and UserAssist execution data, while UsrClass.dat preserves ShellBags and MuiCache artifacts revealing folder browsing histories and application execution.
Last updated: September 2026
11.1 Windows Registry Forensics: SYSTEM, SOFTWARE, SAM & NTUSER.DAT Hive Analysis
Quick Answer: The Windows Registry is a hierarchical database containing vital forensic artifacts regarding operating system configuration, user activity, hardware usage, and malware persistence. It is physically partitioned into system-wide hives located in %SystemRoot%\System32\config\ ( SYSTEM , SOFTWARE , SAM , SECURITY , DEFAULT ) and user-specific hives ( NTUSER.DAT in %UserProfile%\ and UsrClass.dat in %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\ ). Because active registries utilize transaction logs ( .LOG1 , .LOG2 ), examiners must replay dirty hive transaction logs using tools like Eric Zimmerman's Registry Explorer or yarp before performing analysis. Key investigative targets include USB device tracking via SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\USBSTOR , persistence mechanisms under SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run , user account telemetry within the SAM\Domains\Account\Users keys (RIDs, binary F and V values), and user activity traces (TypedURLs, RecentDocs, ShellBags) in NTUSER.DAT and UsrClass.dat .
Windows Registry Architecture & Storage Mechanics
The Windows Registry serves as the central configuration repository for the Windows NT kernel, device drivers, services, Security Account Manager, and user applications. Understanding its architectural layout, logical-to-physical mapping, and binary storage mechanics is fundamental to forensic reconstruction.
Logical Root Keys vs. Physical On-Disk Hives
Logically, the registry presents five root keys within Windows tools like regedit.exe . However, only two of these keys are physically stored on disk as primary hives; the remaining three are dynamic pointer links generated by the kernel at boot:
Logical Root Key Physical On-Disk Hive Source Forensic Scope & Content
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE (HKLM) %SystemRoot%\System32\config\ (SYSTEM, SOFTWARE, SAM, SECURITY, HARDWARE [volatile]) System-wide hardware, OS settings, installed applications, and security policies.
HKEY_USERS (HKU) %UserProfile%\NTUSER.DAT and DEFAULT hive Loaded profiles for all active interactive users and the default system profile.
HKEY_CURRENT_USER (HKCU) Linked to active user branch in HKEY_USERS ( HKU\<User_SID> ) User-specific environment, recent files, typed URLs, and application preferences.
HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT (HKCR) Merged view of HKLM\Software\Classes and HKCU\Software\Classes ( UsrClass.dat ) File extension associations, COM class registrations, and ShellBags.
HKEY_CURRENT_CONFIG (HKCC) Symbolic link to HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Hardware Profiles\Current Volatile runtime hardware configuration profile.
Registry Physical File Locations
The physical binary files containing registry data are called hives . Unlike standard flat files, hives are structured in 4,096-byte database pages ("hbins") containing data cells (keys, values, security descriptors, and subkey lists): +-------------------------------------------------------------------------+
- | WINDOWS REGISTRY HIVE FILE LOCATIONS |
- +-------------------------------------------------------------------------+
- | Hive Name | File System Path |
- |--------------|----------------------------------------------------------|
- | SYSTEM | %SystemRoot%\System32\config\SYSTEM |
- | SOFTWARE | %SystemRoot%\System32\config\SOFTWARE |
- | SAM | %SystemRoot%\System32\config\SAM |
- | SECURITY | %SystemRoot%\System32\config\SECURITY |
- | DEFAULT | %SystemRoot%\System32\config\DEFAULT |
- | NTUSER.DAT | %UserProfile%\NTUSER.DAT (e.g., C:\Users\Alice\) |
- | UsrClass.dat | %UserProfile%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\UsrClass.dat|
- | Amcache | %SystemRoot%\appcompat\Programs\Amcache.hve |
- +-------------------------------------------------------------------------+
- Registry Value Data Types
Registry keys function like filesystem directories and contain named values. Each value possesses a specific binary data type:
REG_SZ: Fixed-length null-terminated Unicode string.
REG_EXPAND_SZ: Expandable string containing unexpanded environment variables (e.g., %SystemRoot%\System32\cmd.exe ).
REG_BINARY: Raw binary data of arbitrary size (used for timestamps, hardware descriptors, and encryption hashes).
REG_DWORD: 32-bit unsigned integer (often used for boolean flags and numerical limits).
REG_QWORD: 64-bit unsigned integer (commonly used for 64-bit memory addresses and high-resolution timestamps).
REG_MULTI_SZ: Multi-string array containing multiple null-terminated strings ending with a double-null character.
Transaction Logs and Dirty Hive Recovery
Modern Windows operating systems (Windows 8.1, Windows 10, and Windows 11) utilize a transactional logging mechanism to protect the registry database from disk corruption during sudden power loss or kernel crashes.
Transaction Log Architecture (.LOG1 and .LOG2)
Each physical hive file is accompanied by two transaction log files:
- <HiveName>.LOG1
- <HiveName>.LOG2
When Windows updates a registry key or value, it writes the modified memory pages into the transaction log ( .LOG1 / .LOG2 ) before committing them to the primary hive file on disk. The transaction log contains raw sector journal entries, sequence numbers, and dirty page lists. [Registry Write Request]
- │
- ▼
- [Write to RAM Cache] ──> [Append Transaction Log (.LOG1)] ──> [Commit to Disk Hive]
- │
- [Clear Dirty Bit Flag]
- The Dirty Bit Flag
The primary hive header contains a Primary Sequence Number , a Secondary Sequence Number , and a Dirty Hive Flag :
In a cleanly dismounted hive (e.g., after a standard shutdown), the primary and secondary sequence numbers match, and the dirty flag is set to 0x00000000 .
When a system crashes, is abruptly powered off, or evidence is acquired live (or via hard power termination), the sequence numbers do not match, and the dirty flag is set to 0x00000001 (Dirty).
Forensic Implications & Log Replay
Caution
Parsing a raw, dirty registry hive directly without replaying its companion transaction logs ( .LOG1 / .LOG2 ) causes substantial evidence loss. Critical keys—such as malware persistence Run keys, recently connected USB devices, or deleted event log indicators—may reside exclusively inside the uncommitted transaction logs.
Forensic examiners must utilize tools capable of transaction log replay:
Registry Explorer (Eric Zimmerman): Automatically detects companion .LOG1 and .LOG2 files in the source directory, prompts the examiner to apply transactions, and creates a recovered hive containing all uncommitted transactions alongside a detailed transaction changelog.
yarp (Yet Another Registry Parser): Python library that programmatically parses dirty hives with transaction log merging.
RegRipper (v3.0+): Harlan Carvey's utility supporting dirty hive reconciliation when configured with appropriate transaction log arguments.
SYSTEM Hive Analysis: Hardware & Storage Artifacts
The SYSTEM hive preserves system hardware configurations, operating system boot profiles, network interfaces, and peripheral storage records.
CurrentControlSet vs. ControlSet001/002
When viewing an offline SYSTEM hive, examiners will not observe a CurrentControlSet key. Instead, the hive contains numbered control sets (e.g., ControlSet001 , ControlSet002 ) and a Select key: HKLM\SYSTEM\Select
- ├── Current : 0x00000001 (Points to ControlSet001 as active)
- ├── Default : 0x00000001 (Points to ControlSet001 as default)
- ├── Failed : 0x00000000 (No control set has failed)
- └── LastKnownGood : 0x00000002 (Points to ControlSet002)
Examiners must inspect SYSTEM\Select\Current to identify which numbered ControlSet00X was actively mounted as CurrentControlSet during the incident.
- System Identity and Time Zone Configuration
- Computer Name: SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\ComputerName\ComputerName -> ComputerName (REG_SZ)
- Time Zone Bias & UTC Normalization: SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\TimeZoneInformation
TimeZoneKeyName : Standard Windows name of the configured time zone (e.g., "Eastern Standard Time").
ActiveTimeBias : Signed 32-bit integer indicating the current offset in minutes from UTC (including daylight saving adjustments).
Bias : Standard time offset from UTC in minutes (e.g., 300 minutes = UTC-5).
Forensic Utility: Essential for normalizing file timestamps across multi-timezone distributed investigations.
- Network Interfaces
- SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Tcpip\Parameters\Interfaces\{GUID}
Records IP configurations, network adapter GUIDs, subnet masks, default gateways, and DHCP server assignments ( DhcpIPAddress , DhcpServer , LeaseObtainedTime , LeaseTerminatesTime ).
USB Storage Forensic Tracking (USBSTOR)
Tracking external USB mass storage devices is vital for intellectual property theft, data exfiltration, and malware introduction inquiries. Windows tracks connected USB devices across multiple interrelated SYSTEM keys: 1. Device Enumeration: SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\USBSTOR
- 2. Device Classification: SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceClasses\{53f56307...}
- 3. Volume Correlation: SYSTEM\MountedDevices
- 4. User Attribution: NTUSER.DAT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\MountPoints2
- Step 1: Enumeration in USBSTOR
SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\USBSTOR\<DeviceClass>&Ven_<Vendor>&Prod_<Product>&Rev_<Revision>\<SerialNumber>&<Index> Example Key:
SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\USBSTOR\Disk&Ven_SanDisk&Prod_Ultra&Rev_1.00\0123456789ABCDEF&0
Vendor & Product ID: Identifies manufacturer and model (e.g., SanDisk Ultra).
Unique Serial Number vs. OS-Generated ID:
If the second character of the serial number string is NOT an ampersand ( & ), the string is the unique hardware serial number assigned by the manufacturer (e.g., 0123456789ABCDEF ).
If the second character IS an ampersand ( & ), the device did not provide a compliant serial number, and Windows generated a pseudo-unique identifier containing ampersands (e.g., 7&1b4d32f&0 ).
Last Disconnection Timestamp: The Last Written Timestamp of the specific device subkey represents the last time the device was disconnected from the system.
Step 2: First Insertion Timestamp
SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceClasses\{53f56307-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\...
The GUID {53f56307-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b} represents the Disk Device Interface Class. Subkeys matching the device serial number reveal the first insertion timestamp recorded under the subkey's Last Written Time.
- Step 3: Volume Correlation (MountedDevices)
- SYSTEM\MountedDevices
Correlates drive letters (e.g., \DosDevices\E: ) and Volume GUIDs ( \??\Volume{GUID} ) with the binary device signature containing the USB serial number. This confirms which drive letter Windows assigned to the USB drive.
Step 4: User Attribution (MountPoints2)
To prove which user plugged in the drive, open each user's NTUSER.DAT : NTUSER.DAT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\MountPoints2\{Volume-GUID}
If a user was logged in when the USB volume was mounted, Windows creates a subkey under MountPoints2 matching the Volume GUID identified in MountedDevices . The presence of this key establishes definitive user attribution.
SOFTWARE Hive Analysis: OS Metadata, Persistence & Networks
The SOFTWARE hive contains configuration details for the Windows OS, third-party applications, file associations, and autostart persistence mechanisms.
- Operating System Version & Install History
- SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion
Value Name Data Type Forensic Significance
ProductName REG_SZ Complete OS edition string (e.g., "Windows 10 Pro").
DisplayVersion / ReleaseId REG_SZ Feature update version (e.g., "22H2").
CurrentBuildNumber REG_SZ Exact OS build number (e.g., "19045").
InstallDate REG_DWORD 32-bit Unix epoch timestamp (seconds since Jan 1, 1970) representing OS installation date.
InstallTime REG_QWORD 64-bit Windows FILETIME (100-nanosecond intervals since Jan 1, 1601) representing OS installation date.
RegisteredOwner REG_SZ Name entered during Windows setup.
Autostart Extensibility Points (ASEPs) / Persistence Keys
Threat actors maintain persistence by registering malicious binaries into Autostart Extensibility Points (ASEPs) within the SOFTWARE and NTUSER.DAT hives: # System-wide Autostart Keys (Run with Elevated Privileges)
- HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
- HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce
- HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx
- HKLM\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
- # User-Specific Autostart Keys (Run at User Logon)
- HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
- HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce
- # Winlogon Authentication Hijacking
- HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon
- ├── Shell : explorer.exe (Adversaries append or replace with malware)
- └── Userinit : C:\Windows\system32\userinit.exe, (Note trailing comma)
- Installed Application Inventory
To determine software installed on the system (and identify uninstalled anti-forensic tools or unauthorized software):
64-bit Software: SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\{GUID or AppName}
32-bit Software on 64-bit OS: SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\{GUID or AppName}
Values parsed: DisplayName , DisplayVersion , InstallLocation , InstallDate , UninstallString .
- Network List Profiles (SSID & Connection Tracking)
- SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\NetworkList\Profiles\{Profile_GUID}
ProfileName : SSID of Wi-Fi network or name of wired connection.
Category : 0x00 = Public, 0x01 = Private, 0x02 = Domain.
DateCreated : 128-bit SYSTEMTIME binary structure marking when the host first connected to the network.
DateLastConnected : 128-bit SYSTEMTIME binary structure marking the most recent connection timestamp.
SAM Hive Analysis: Account Governance & Binary Values
The Security Account Manager ( SAM ) hive contains local account credentials, group memberships, and logon security metrics. Located at %SystemRoot%\System32\config\SAM , it is protected by the Windows kernel and inaccessible to standard users while the OS is running.
Account Structure and Relative Identifiers (RIDs)
Every local user account on Windows is assigned a unique Security Identifier (SID) terminating in a Relative Identifier (RID) : S-1-5-21-<Domain_Identifier>-<RID> +-------------------------------------------------------------------------+
- | STANDARD WINDOWS RELATIVE IDENTIFIERS (RIDs) |
- +-------------------------------------------------------------------------+
- | RID (Hex / Decimal) | Account Identity & Purpose |
- |---------------------|---------------------------------------------------|
- | 0x01F4 / 500 | Default Built-in Administrator Account |
- | 0x01F5 / 501 | Built-in Guest Account |
- | 0x01F7 / 503 | DefaultAccount (Application container) |
- | 0x01F8 / 504 | WDAGUtilityAccount (Windows Defender Application Guard) |
- | >= 0x03E8 / >= 1000 | Custom User Accounts created by administrators |
- +-------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Account subkeys reside under: SAM\Domains\Account\Users\<RID_in_Hex> (e.g., 000003E8 for RID 1000).
The mapping between usernames and RIDs is stored under SAM\Domains\Account\Users\Names\<Username> .
The Binary F and V Values
Within each RID subkey ( SAM\Domains\Account\Users\<Hex_RID> ), Windows maintains two binary values: SAM\Domains\Account\Users\000003E8\
├── F : [Fixed-length binary data - 80 bytes]
└── V : [Variable-length binary data - variable size] +-------------------------------------------------------------------------+
- | THE BINARY 'F' VALUE (FIXED LENGTH: 80 BYTES) |
- +-------------------------------------------------------------------------+
- | Byte Offset | Length | Value Stored (Little-Endian) |
- |-------------|----------|-----------------------------------------------|
- | 0x08 - 0x0F | 8 bytes | Last Logon Timestamp (FILETIME) |
- | 0x18 - 0x1F | 8 bytes | Password Last Set Timestamp (FILETIME) |
- | 0x20 - 0x27 | 8 bytes | Account Expiration Timestamp (FILETIME) |
- | 0x28 - 0x2F | 8 bytes | Last Failed Login Timestamp (FILETIME) |
- | 0x38 - 0x39 | 2 bytes | Account Control Flags (0x0001 = Disabled) |
- | 0x40 - 0x41 | 2 bytes | Failed Login Counter (Tracks brute force) |
- | 0x42 - 0x43 | 2 bytes | Total Successful Logon Counter |
- +-------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Account Control Flags (Offset 0x38): If the least significant bit is set ( 0x0001 ), the account is disabled. If bit 0x0010 is set, the account is locked out.
The Variable-Length V Value: Contains relative offset pointers and lengths to null-terminated Unicode strings: Username, Full Name, User Comment, User Profile Path, and encrypted password hash structures (NTLM hashes encrypted with the Syskey/SYSKEY derived from the SYSTEM hive).
User Hives: NTUSER.DAT & UsrClass.dat
User hives provide detailed insight into the specific actions, file accesses, and web browsing habits of individual user accounts.
NTUSER.DAT Artifacts
Located in %UserProfile%\NTUSER.DAT (e.g., C:\Users\Bob\NTUSER.DAT ):
TypedURLs: NTUSER.DAT\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\TypedURLs
Contains URLs manually typed into the address bar of Internet Explorer, Windows Explorer, or legacy Edge.
Values: url1 , url2 , etc., sorted in reverse chronological order.
Note: Also inspect TypedURLsTime for 64-bit FILETIME timestamps of when each URL was typed.
RecentDocs (Most Recently Used - MRU): NTUSER.DAT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RecentDocs
Tracks recently opened files categorized by file extension subkeys (e.g., .pdf , .docx , .exe ) as well as the root key.
Contains binary values and an MRUListEx value (array of 4-byte integers defining the exact order of access, with the first integer representing the most recent file).
Office Recent Files: NTUSER.DAT\Software\Microsoft\Office\<Version>\<Application>\User MRU\<AD_SID>\File MRU
Tracks exact file paths, full filenames, and live access timestamps for Microsoft Word, Excel, and PowerPoint documents.
UsrClass.dat Artifacts
Located in %UserProfile%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\UsrClass.dat :
Associated with HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes .
MuiCache (Multilingual User Interface Cache): UsrClass.dat\Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\MuiCache
Populated whenever an application executes and registers its friendly display name.
Preserves full file system paths of executed binaries, including portable tools executed from temp folders or USB drives that may have been subsequently deleted.
ShellBags: UsrClass.dat\Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\Bags and BagMRU
Detailed in Section 11.3; proves folder browsing, folder access dates, and external drive navigation.