Study guide
9.3 Fund Management
FRM Part I Financial Risk Manager Study Guide Exam
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1 Introduction & Exam Overview
1.1 Current Exam Facts 1.2 Study Strategy & Domain Weights
2 Foundations: Risk Building Blocks & Governance
2.1 Building Blocks of Risk Management 2.2 How Firms Manage Financial Risk 2.3 Governance of Risk Management 2.4 Credit Risk Transfer Mechanisms
3 Foundations: Portfolio Models, Data & ERM
3.1 MPT and the CAPM 3.2 APT and Multifactor Models 3.3 Risk Data Aggregation & Reporting 3.4 Enterprise Risk Management
4 Foundations: Disasters, Crisis & Ethics
4.1 Learning from Financial Disasters 4.2 Anatomy of the Great Financial Crisis 4.3 GARP Code of Conduct
5 Quantitative Analysis: Probability Foundations
5.1 Fundamentals of Probability 5.2 Random Variables 5.3 Common Univariate Distributions 5.4 Multivariate Random Variables
6 Quantitative Analysis: Inference & Regression
6.1 Sample Moments 6.2 Hypothesis Testing 6.3 Linear Regression 6.4 Multiple Regression
7 Quantitative Analysis: Diagnostics & Time Series
7.1 Regression Diagnostics 7.2 Stationary Time Series 7.3 Non-Stationary Time Series 7.4 Returns, Volatility & Correlation
8 Quantitative Analysis: Simulation & Machine Learning
8.1 Simulation and Bootstrapping 8.2 Machine-Learning Methods 8.3 Machine Learning and Prediction
9 Financial Markets: Institutions & Derivatives Intro
9.1 Banks 9.2 Insurance Companies and Pension Plans 9.3 Fund Management 9.4 Introduction to Derivatives
10 Financial Markets: Clearing, Futures & Hedging
10.1 Exchanges and OTC Markets 10.2 Central Clearing 10.3 Futures Markets 10.4 Using Futures for Hedging
11 Financial Markets: FX, Forwards, Commodities & Options
11.1 Foreign Exchange Markets 11.2 Pricing Financial Forwards and Futures 11.3 Commodity Forwards and Futures 11.4 Options Markets
12 Financial Markets: Option Properties, Strategies & Rates
12.1 Properties of Options 12.2 Trading Strategies 12.3 Exotic Options 12.4 Properties of Interest Rates
13 Financial Markets: Bonds, MBS, Rate Futures & Swaps
13.1 Corporate Bonds 13.2 Mortgages and Mortgage-Backed Securities 13.3 Interest Rate Futures 13.4 Swaps
14 Valuation & Risk Models: VaR, Volatility & Ratings
14.1 Measures of Financial Risk 14.2 Calculating and Applying VaR 14.3 Measuring and Monitoring Volatility 14.4 External and Internal Credit Ratings
15 Valuation & Risk Models: Credit, OpRisk & Stress
15.1 Country Risk 15.2 Measuring Credit Risk 15.3 Operational Risk 15.4 Stress Testing
16 Valuation & Risk Models: Fixed-Income Valuation
16.1 Pricing, Discounting & Arbitrage 16.2 Interest Rates 16.3 Bond Yields and Return Calculations 16.4 Duration, Convexity & DV01
17 Valuation & Risk Models: Term Structure, Options & Greeks
17.1 Non-Parallel Term Structure Shifts 17.2 Binomial Trees 17.3 The Black-Scholes-Merton Model 17.4 Option Sensitivity Measures: The Greeks
9.3 Fund Management
Key Takeaways Explain This Topic AI
Open-end funds issue/redeem at NAV; closed-end funds trade at premiums/discounts; ETFs combine exchange trading with creation/redemption arbitrage around NAV
Mutual-fund structures can encourage short-term trading behaviors—market timing, late trading historically, and liquidity mismatches—that harm long-term holders
Hedge funds differ from mutual funds in flexibility, leverage, liquidity locks, and fee design (management plus incentive fees with hurdles, HWM, clawbacks)
Incentive-fee math depends on high-water marks and hurdles; clawbacks reclaim overpaid incentives over a fund life or deal cycle
- Reported hedge-fund performance can be biased by survivorship, selection, backfill, and smoothed valuations
- Last updated: August 2026
Fund Management
FMP–3 is about pooled investment vehicles : who can redeem when, at what price, with what fees, and with what risk transfers between managers and investors. Banks and insurers appear as sponsors and counterparties; the products themselves reshape market liquidity and systemic risk when leverage and redemption terms misalign.
Open-End, Closed-End, and ETFs
Vehicle Shares outstanding Pricing Liquidity mechanism
Open-end mutual fund Varies with subscriptions/redemptions Typically end-of-day NAV Fund issues/redeems with investors
Closed-end fund Fixed (mostly) after IPO Exchange price; can diverge from NAV Investors trade shares with each other
ETF Varies via creation/redemption Exchange price usually near NAV Authorized participants arbitrage vs NAV
Net asset value (NAV) = (assets − liabilities) / shares outstanding. For an open-end fund, investors buy and sell with the fund at NAV (subject to cutoffs and possible fees). Closed-end funds can trade at a premium (price > NAV) or discount (price < NAV) for long periods because you cannot force the fund to redeem at NAV. ETFs usually stay tight to NAV because creations/redemptions in-kind (or cash) let arbitrageurs correct gaps—unless underlying markets are illiquid or volatile.
Worked NAV example
A fund holds securities worth $505 million, has liabilities of $5 million, and 20 million shares outstanding.
NAV = (505 − 5) / 20 = $25.00 per share.
If markets gap and assets fall to $485 million the next day with the same liabilities and share count, NAV = 480 / 20 = $24.00. Open-end redeemers receive that day’s NAV (per prospectus timing rules); closed-end holders get whatever exchange price clears, which might be $23.40 (a 2.5% discount to NAV) in a risk-off tape.
Undesirable Trading Behaviors
Open-end structures create conflicts between redeeming shareholders and remaining shareholders when:
Market timing exploits stale NAVs (especially in international funds priced on lagged closes).
Late trading (illegal when after-cutoff orders receive same-day NAV) advantages insiders.
Liquidity mismatch : daily liquidity offered on portfolios of illiquid assets forces remaining investors to bear transaction costs and fire-sale discounts when others exit.
Soft-dollar / excessive trading can enrich brokers or managers at investors’ expense.
Fair-value pricing, redemption fees, gates/side-pockets (more common in alternatives), and swing pricing are tools to protect long-term holders. For FRM, connect the behavior to the victim (remaining shareholders) and the control .
Hedge Funds Versus Mutual Funds
- Dimension Typical mutual fund Typical hedge fund
- Regulation / disclosure Heavily regulated retail product Lighter; often limited to qualified investors
- Strategy freedom Long-only constraints common Long/short, derivatives, concentrates allowed
- Leverage Limited Often material
- Liquidity Daily (open-end) Lockups, gates, side pockets
- Fees Management fee (e.g., ~0.5–1%+) Management + incentive (e.g., “2 and 20”)
- Shorting Restricted or none Common
Hedge funds sell flexibility and absolute-return aspirations ; mutual funds sell regulated, liquid, relative-return products. Neither label guarantees performance. Leverage and illiquidity in hedge funds create investor liquidity risk and prime-broker / funding risk that mutual funds usually avoid.
Incentive Fees: Hurdle, High-Water Mark, Clawback
A common structure: management fee on AUM plus incentive fee on profits.
Hurdle rate : incentive fees accrue only on returns above a stated rate (soft hurdle: fee on all profits if hurdle cleared; hard hurdle: fee only on profits above the hurdle—know which version a question specifies).
High-water mark (HWM) : no incentive fee until NAV exceeds the previous peak on which fees were paid—prevents double-charging for recovering losses.
Clawback : especially in private equity, mechanisms to reclaim incentive distributions if early winners are offset by later losers over the fund life.
Worked incentive-fee example (with HWM)
Start-of-year NAV = $100. Incentive fee = 20% of profits above HWM; HWM starts at $100. Ignore management fees for clarity.
Year 1: NAV before fees rises to $120. Profit = $20. Incentive fee = 0.20 × 20 = $4. End NAV after fee ≈ $116. New HWM = $116 (conceptually the peak after fee crystallisation—questions may define HWM on pre- or post-fee NAV; follow the stated convention. Here we treat HWM as $116 post-fee).
Year 2: NAV falls to $110 (before fees). Below HWM → no incentive fee. Investors are recovering prior peak.
Year 3: NAV rises to $130 before fees. Profit above HWM = 130 − 116 = $14. Incentive = 0.20 × 14 = $2.80. After fee ≈ $127.20; HWM updates.
Soft hurdle sketch
If a 5% soft hurdle applies on a $100 start and NAV goes to $112 (12% return), the hurdle is cleared; with 20% incentive on all profits, fee = 0.20 × $12 = $2.40. Under a hard hurdle, fee applies only to 12% − 5% = 7 points → 0.20 × $7 = $1.40. Soft versus hard changes fee drag materially.
Strategies and Risks
Common hedge-fund strategy families and signature risks:
- Strategy Idea Key risks
- Long/short equity Security selection with hedges Factor bets, short squeezes, crowding
- Event-driven / merger arb Deal spreads Deal breaks, regulatory denial
- Distressed Cheap stressed credit Legal, liquidity, timing of recovery
- Global macro Directional bets on rates, FX, commodities Trend reversals, leverage
- Managed futures / CTA Trend following Whipsaw in range markets
- Relative value / arb Spreads, carry Crowding, funding, “arb” that is really credit/liquidity risk
Many “arbitrage” labels hide tail risk : small steady gains, rare large losses when spreads blow out and leverage forces deleveraging.
Performance Biases
Reported hedge-fund index returns can look better than live investor experience because of:
Survivorship bias — dead funds drop out; averages exclude their poor returns.
Selection / self-reporting bias — only funds that choose to report appear in databases.
Backfill (instant history) bias — strong early track records are added retroactively when a fund starts reporting.
Smoothed / stale valuations — illiquid marks understate volatility and overstate Sharpe-like ratios.
Liquidation bias — final death returns may be missing or incomplete.
Risk managers adjusting peer comparisons must haircut headline Sharpes and correlations. Diversification benefits versus hedge-fund indices often shrink after bias corrections and in crises when correlations spike.
Putting Fund Management Together
An open-end bond fund offering daily liquidity on concentrated high-yield holdings is a liquidity mismatch story. A hedge fund advertising a 2-and-20 fee without HWM after a 40% drawdown is an incentive design story. An index of self-reported macro funds with a 1.8 Sharpe almost surely embeds performance bias . FMP–3 tests whether you can name the vehicle, the fee rule, and the bias—not just recite “hedge funds are unregulated.”