Study guide
9.3 A.10 Third-Party and Customer Relationships
PECB ISO/IEC 42001 Lead Auditor AI Management
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1 Chapter 1: Exam Orientation & AI Landscape
1.1 Current Exam Facts & PECB Credential Path 1.2 AI Concepts & ISO/IEC 22989 Terminology 1.3 AI Lifecycle & Trustworthiness Characteristics
2 Chapter 2: ISO AI Family & AIMS Purpose
2.1 ISO/IEC AI Standards Family 2.2 AIMS Purpose, PDCA & Management System Thinking 2.3 Global AI Governance Landscape for Auditors
3 Chapter 3: AIMS Requirements — Context & Leadership
3.1 Annex SL High-Level Structure & Clauses Overview 3.2 Clause 4 Context of the Organization 3.3 Clause 5 Leadership & AI Policy
4 Chapter 4: AIMS Requirements — Planning
4.1 Clause 6.1 Risks, Opportunities & AI Risk Assessment 4.2 Clause 6.1.4 AI System Impact Assessment 4.3 Clause 6.2 AI Objectives & Planning to Achieve Them 4.4 Clause 6.3 Planning of Changes
5 Chapter 5: AIMS Requirements — Support & Operation
5.1 Clause 7 Support 5.2 Clause 8 Operation & Operational Planning and Control 5.3 Clause 8 AI System Lifecycle Controls in Operation
6 Chapter 6: AIMS Requirements — Evaluation & Improvement
6.1 Clause 9 Performance Evaluation 6.2 Clause 10 Improvement 6.3 Integrated AIMS–ISMS Thinking for Auditors
7 Chapter 7: Annex A Controls — Governance & Resources
7.1 Annex A Architecture: 38 Controls Across A.2–A.10 7.2 A.2 Policies Related to AI & A.3 Internal Organization 7.3 A.4 Resources for AI Systems 7.4 A.5 Assessing Impacts of AI Systems
8 Chapter 8: Annex A Controls — Lifecycle & Data
8.1 A.6 AI System Life Cycle — Design, Development, Verification 8.2 A.6 Deployment, Operation, Monitoring & Documentation 8.3 A.7 Data for AI Systems 8.4 Bias, Fairness & Data Quality Audit Focus
9 Chapter 9: Annex A Controls — Transparency, Use & Third Parties
9.1 A.8 Information for Interested Parties 9.2 A.9 Use of AI Systems 9.3 A.10 Third-Party and Customer Relationships
10 Chapter 10: Fundamental Audit Concepts (ISO 19011)
10.1 Seven Audit Principles 10.2 Audit Types, Objectives, Criteria & Scope 10.3 Evidence-Based & Risk-Based Audit Approaches 10.4 Auditor Competence, Ethics & Impartiality
11 Chapter 11: Preparing an ISO/IEC 42001 Audit
11.1 Initiating the Audit & Feasibility 11.2 Determining Audit Objectives, Scope & Criteria 11.3 Document Review & Stage 1 Readiness 11.4 Audit Plan, Team & Working Documents
12 Chapter 12: Conducting an ISO/IEC 42001 Audit
12.1 Opening Meeting & On-Site Kickoff 12.2 Collecting Evidence: Interviews, Observation, Documents 12.3 AI-Specific Evidence: Model Cards, Lineage, Logs, Impact Assessments 12.4 Sampling Strategies & Generating Findings
13 Chapter 13: Closing an ISO/IEC 42001 Audit
13.1 Classifying Nonconformities & Observations 13.2 Audit Conclusions & Closing Meeting 13.3 Writing the Audit Report 13.4 Corrective Action Follow-Up & Verification
14 Chapter 14: Managing the AIMS Audit Program
14.1 Establishing & Implementing an Audit Program 14.2 Program Resources, Risks & Opportunities 14.3 Monitoring, Reviewing & Improving the Program 14.4 Certification Cycle: Surveillance, Recertification & Multi-Standard Audits
9.3 A.10 Third-Party and Customer Relationships
Key Takeaways Explain This Topic AI
Annex A.10 (three controls, typically A.10.2–A.10.4) covers allocation of AI responsibilities across suppliers and customers, supplier relationships for AI, and responsibilities of customers—accountability for the AIMS is not outsourced.
Suppliers include AI system providers, development tools, data providers, annotation services, fine-tuning platforms, and LLM/API vendors—not only traditional IT outsourcing.
Contractual controls should address data use (including training on prompts), change notification, evaluation rights, security/privacy, incident notice, audit/assurance, and role allocation (who does impact assessment, monitoring, user disclosure).
Lead auditors sample vendor due diligence files, contracts, ongoing monitoring, and critical AI dependencies; a common major NC is no effective AIMS control over critical AI vendors.
Customer relationships matter when the organization is a provider: customers need clarity on their duties (configuration, human oversight, prohibited uses) so risk is not merely shifted by silence.
Last updated: August 2026
9.3 A.10 Third-Party and Customer Relationships
Auditor focus: A.10 asks whether the organization manages AI risk that originates outside its employees and internal code —vendors, APIs, foundation models, data suppliers, and customer configurations—while still owning AIMS accountability. "The vendor is certified" is a starting claim, not the end of sampling.
Annex A.10 Third-party and customer relationships includes three controls (commonly A.10.2–A.10.4 ). Themes include allocating responsibilities across the AI value chain, managing AI-related suppliers , and addressing customers when the organization provides AI systems or AI-enabled services. With Clause 8.1 , A.10 is the Annex A home for AI supply-chain governance.
Principle: Transfer of activity ≠ transfer of accountability. The certified organization retains responsibility for AIMS conformity for AI systems within its scope, including third-party components.
AI vendor risk beyond generic procurement
- AI-specific risk Example Control implication
- Model behavior change Vendor swaps underlying model Notice + client re-evaluation
- Training on client data Vendor trains on prompts / fine-tunes Contractual ban or ZDR; verify settings
- Opaque lineage Unknown training data / licenses Diligence; documented risk acceptance
- Evaluation gap No client test harness Acceptance testing before production
- Multi-party cascade Fine-tune + base model + vector DB Multi-party RACI
- Customer misconfiguration Customer disables oversight Documented customer duties
- Allocation of AI responsibilities
Ambiguity is a finding when high-risk outcomes have no owner.
- Area Provider-leaning Deployer / customer-leaning Shared
- Foundation training / base safety Often provider — Assurance reports
- Integration, prompts, RAG data — Deployer Data quality rules
- Impact assessment for specific use Provider inputs Primary for use context Joint for embedded products
- User-facing disclosure Provider templates Deployer localization Contract annex
- Production monitoring Platform metrics Use-case metrics & overrides Alert routing
- Incident notification Vendor → client Client → users/regulators Severity matrix
Evidence: RACI in contracts or AI supplier standards; architecture with party boundaries; SoA that does not mark client-side duties "N/A – vendor."
Supplier categories to sample
Build the list from the AI inventory and data lineage , not only strategic IT vendors.
Supplier type Examples Diligence focus
AI system / model providers SaaS decisioning, vision APIs, LLM platforms Evals, safety, change control, subprocessors
- Development tools MLOps, labeling UIs, feature stores Pipeline integrity, access, audit logs
- Data suppliers Datasets, synthetic data, market feeds Provenance, rights, quality, bias
- Annotation / RLHF Outsourced labelers Quality sampling, confidentiality, workforce practices
- Fine-tuning / hosting Managed fine-tune, training cloud Retention, isolation, IP
- Embedded AI CRM with AI scoring Same if in AIMS scope
Shadow AI: Departmental SaaS AI never entered vendor risk → A.10 + inventory/scope + A.9 when material.
Contractual controls
- Clause theme Why it matters
- Role allocation Who is provider/deployer for which duties
- Data use & training Whether client data trains vendor models
- Security & confidentiality Prompts, embeddings, fine-tune sets
- Change / deprecation notice Time to re-test before behavior changes
- Incident notice AI failure modes, not only breaches
- Assurance / audit rights SOC, questionnaires, assessment rights
- Subprocessors Downstream hosts and processors
- Exit / portability Enables risk treatment by switching
- Customer duties (if you are provider) Required configs, prohibited uses, oversight
Weak: Marketing-only MSA; security schedule with no AI; unlimited unilateral model change with no client evaluation window for high-risk uses.
Auditor sampling: diligence, LLMs, APIs, fine-tuning
Pre-use pack (critical vendor): inventory link; security/privacy plus AI questions (evals, bias process, training-on-customer-data); vendor model/system docs; legal/IP/data rights; risk acceptance; production approval gate.
Ongoing LLM/API checks:
- Check Pass Fail
- Allow-listed endpoints / versions Managed config Any personal API key
- Client evaluation Golden set before major version "Looks good in chat"
- Monitoring Quality, abuse, safety filters Invoice-only monitoring
- Change detection Owner reacts to notices Nobody reads changelog
- Data path Contract and console settings verified Retention unknown
Fine-tuning: storage of fine-tune data; export of weights; vendor reuse; post-tune evaluation; rollback; link to A.7 and A.6.
When auditee is provider: sample customer onboarding for customer responsibilities, prohibited use, required oversight, and handling of customer misuse. "Customer owns everything" without clear allocation fails A.10 when the provider markets a managed AI outcome.
Common NC: no AIMS controls over critical AI vendors
Pattern: Highest-impact system is a third-party LLM or scoring API. Many A.6 development controls are N/A (sometimes justified), but A.10 is N/A or "covered by procurement." Procurement is generic insurance/DPA with no AI criteria , no re-evaluation on model change, no client monitoring, no AI vendor-risk owner.
- Severity driver Why serious
- High impact on people / regulated decisions Residual risk unmanaged
- Single critical dependency Concentration risk
- Customer data in prompts/fine-tunes Confidentiality + training risk
- No exit plan Cannot switch as treatment
- Marketing relies on vendor behavior A.8 accuracy also fails
Finding direction: Major NC against A.10 (often 8.1 ). Remediation: AI supplier standard; criticality tiering; mandatory AI diligence; contract playbook; evaluation harness; change-triggered re-assessment; SoA that shows real A.10 implementation.
Integration and Stage 2 trail
- Interface Relationship
- 8.1 Operational control of external processes/products/services
- A.5 / 6.1.4 Use-context impacts still assessed
- A.6 / A.7 Client deployment, monitoring, third-party data
- A.8 / A.9 Disclosure split; use of supplied tools
- ISMS Security supplier controls are complementary, not sufficient
Trap: Vendor ISO/IEC 42001 certificate ≠ client AIMS conformity. The certificate covers the vendor's scope; the client still controls integration, use, data, monitoring, and outcomes in its scope.
Trail: From inventory pick top externally dependent systems → diligence + contract + last review → "What happens when the vendor changes the model?" → one vendor-related change/incident → SoA vs reality → if provider, one customer agreement for duty allocation.
A.10 is effective when every critical AI dependency has an owner, diligence, contract, monitoring, and clear split of duties —and "the vendor handles AI" never excuses an empty control set.