Study guide

10.1 State Action & Procedural Due Process

Multistate Bar Examination MBE

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1 MBE Overview, Scoring & Study Strategy

0.1 About the Multistate Bar Examination 0.2 MBE Question Mechanics & Test Pacing 0.3 High-Yield Preparation & Error Analysis Strategy

2 Civil Procedure I: Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, Removal & Governing Law

1.1 Subject-Matter Jurisdiction: Federal Question & Diversity 1.2 Supplemental Jurisdiction & Removal 1.3 The Erie Doctrine & Federal Common Law

3 Civil Procedure II: Personal Jurisdiction, Venue & Provisional Relief

2.1 Personal Jurisdiction & Service of Process 2.2 Venue, Transfer & Forum Non Conveniens 2.3 Preliminary Injunctions, TROs & Pretrial Conferences

4 Civil Procedure III: Pleadings, Joinder & Class Actions

3.1 Pleadings, Amendments & Rule 11 3.2 Joinder of Claims & Parties, Intervention & Interpleader 3.3 Class Actions & the Class Action Fairness Act

5 Civil Procedure IV: Discovery, Pretrial Motions & Jury Trials

4.1 Discovery, Disclosure & Sanctions 4.2 Rule 12 Motions, Summary Judgment, Defaults & Dismissals 4.3 Jury Trials: The Right to a Jury, Selection, Instructions & Verdicts

6 Civil Procedure V: Post-Trial Motions, Preclusion & Appeals

5.1 Judgment as a Matter of Law, New Trials & Relief from Judgment 5.2 Claim & Issue Preclusion 5.3 Appealability & Standards of Review

7 Constitutional Law I: The Federal Judicial Power

6.1 Judicial Review, Federal Jurisdiction & State Sovereign Immunity 6.2 Justiciability: Standing, Ripeness, Mootness & Political Questions

8 Constitutional Law II: The Powers of Congress

7.1 Enumerated Powers: Commerce, Taxing & Spending 7.2 War, Foreign Affairs, Civil Rights Enforcement & Other Congressional Powers

9 Constitutional Law III: The Presidency & Separation of Powers

8.1 Presidential Powers: Chief Executive, Commander in Chief, Foreign Affairs & Appointments 8.2 Interbranch Relations: Nondelegation, Presentment, Legislative Limits & Immunities

10 Constitutional Law IV: Federalism & State Power

9.1 The Tenth Amendment, Anti-Commandeering & Intergovernmental Immunities 9.2 Preemption, the Dormant Commerce Clause & Congressional Authorization

11 Constitutional Law V: State Action, Due Process & Equal Protection

10.1 State Action & Procedural Due Process 10.2 Substantive Due Process: Fundamental Rights & Other Liberty Interests 10.3 Equal Protection: Classifications, Scrutiny & Fundamental Rights

12 Constitutional Law VI: Takings & Other Economic Protections

11.1 The Takings Clause 11.2 Contracts Clause, Ex Post Facto Laws, Bills of Attainder & Privileges and Immunities

13 Constitutional Law VII: First Amendment Freedoms

12.1 Freedom of Religion: Establishment & Free Exercise 12.2 Freedom of Speech: Content Regulation, Forums, Unprotected Categories & Commercial Speech 12.3 Speech in Government Settings, Expressive Conduct, Prior Restraints, Press & Association

14 Contracts I: Formation—Offer, Acceptance & Consideration

13.1 Governing Law, Offers & Termination of the Power of Acceptance 13.2 Acceptance, Silence, Unilateral Contracts & the Battle of the Forms 13.3 Consideration, Modification, Promissory Estoppel & Restitution

15 Contracts II: Defenses to Enforcement

14.1 Capacity, Duress, Undue Influence, Unconscionability, Illegality & Public Policy 14.2 Mistake, Misunderstanding, Misrepresentation & Nondisclosure 14.3 The Statute of Frauds

16 Contracts III: Contract Terms, Interpretation & Warranties

15.1 Parol Evidence, Interpretation & Implied Terms 15.2 Warranties in the Sale of Goods

17 Contracts IV: Conditions, Performance & Breach

16.1 Conditions & Excuse of Conditions 16.2 Substantial Performance, Material Breach, Repudiation & Adequate Assurance 16.3 UCC Performance: Tender, Rejection, Cure, Revocation, Installments & Risk of Loss

18 Contracts V: Excuse, Discharge & Remedies

17.1 Impossibility, Impracticability, Frustration & Discharge 17.2 Expectation Damages, Consequential Damages, Mitigation & UCC Damage Formulas 17.3 Reliance, Restitution, Liquidated Damages, Specific Performance & Rescission

19 Contracts VI: Third-Party Beneficiaries, Assignment & Delegation

18.1 Third-Party Beneficiaries 18.2 Assignment of Rights & Delegation of Duties

20 Criminal Law I: General Principles, Defenses, Inchoate Crimes & Parties

19.1 Criminal Acts, Mental States, Mistake, Causation & Jurisdiction 19.2 Responsibility & Defenses: Insanity, Intoxication, Infancy, Justification & Excuse 19.3 Inchoate Crimes: Solicitation, Conspiracy & Attempt 19.4 Parties to Crime: Principals, Accomplices & Accessories After the Fact

21 Criminal Law II: Homicide, Property Crimes & Crimes Against the Person

20.1 Homicide: Murder, Felony Murder & Manslaughter 20.2 Theft Offenses, Receiving Stolen Property, Robbery & Burglary 20.3 Assault, Battery, Sexual Offenses, Kidnapping, Arson & Possession Offenses

22 Criminal Procedure I: The Fourth Amendment & the Exclusionary Rule

21.1 Fourth Amendment: Searches, Seizures, Arrests & Warrants 21.2 Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement & Special Needs Searches 21.3 The Exclusionary Rule, Standing & Fruit of the Poisonous Tree

23 Criminal Procedure II: Confessions, Identification & the Right to Counsel

22.1 Confessions, Miranda & the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination 22.2 Pretrial Identification & the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel

24 Criminal Procedure III: Trial Rights, Pleas, Double Jeopardy, Punishment & Appeals

23.1 Fair Trial, Jury & Confrontation Rights, Guilty Pleas & Burdens of Proof 23.2 Double Jeopardy, Cruel & Unusual Punishment, Appeal & Error

25 Evidence I: Presenting Evidence, Relevance & Witnesses

24.1 Introducing Evidence: Judge & Jury, Objections, Judicial Notice & Presumptions 24.2 Relevance, Rule 403 & Real, Demonstrative & Illustrative Evidence 24.3 Witnesses: Competency, Mode of Examination, Refreshing Recollection & Exclusion

26 Evidence II: Impeachment, Character & Other Acts

25.1 Impeachment: Bias, Inconsistent Statements, Capacity, Contradiction & Rehabilitation 25.2 Impeachment by Character for Truthfulness, Specific Instances & Criminal Convictions 25.3 Character Evidence: The Propensity Ban, Criminal-Case Exceptions & Methods of Proof 25.4 Other Crimes, Wrongs & Acts; Habit & Routine Practice; Sexual Misconduct Rules

27 Evidence III: Opinions, Authentication, Documents, Privileges & Policy Exclusions

26.1 Lay & Expert Opinion Testimony 26.2 Authentication & Identification 26.3 Best Evidence Rule, Summaries & the Rule of Completeness 26.4 Privileges: Attorney-Client, Spousal, Psychotherapist & Other Privileges 26.5 Policy Exclusions: Remedial Measures, Compromise, Medical Payments, Pleas & Insurance

28 Evidence IV: Hearsay & Its Exceptions

27.1 The Hearsay Definition & Statements That Are Not Hearsay 27.2 Hearsay Exclusions: Prior Statements of Testifying Witnesses & Opposing Party Statements 27.3 Hearsay Exceptions Not Requiring Unavailability (FRE 803) 27.4 Unavailability Exceptions, Residual Exception, Multiple Hearsay & Confrontation

29 Real Property I: Estates, Concurrent Ownership & Leaseholds

28.1 Present Estates, Future Interests & Waste 28.2 Rule Against Perpetuities, Restraints on Alienation, Fair Housing & Conflicts of Law 28.3 Concurrent Ownership: Tenancy in Common, Joint Tenancy & Tenancy by the Entirety 28.4 Landlord & Tenant: Tenancies, Duties, Remedies & Transfers

30 Real Property II: Rights in Land

29.1 Easements, Profits & Licenses 29.2 Real Covenants, Equitable Servitudes & Common Interest Communities 29.3 Fixtures 29.4 Support, Water Rights & Zoning

31 Real Property III: Real Estate Contracts

30.1 Real Estate Contracts: Brokers, Formation, Performance & Remedies 30.2 Marketable Title, Equitable Conversion, Options, Disclosure & Merger

32 Real Property IV: Mortgages & Security Devices

31.1 Mortgages & Security Devices: Theories, Pre-Foreclosure Rights & Transfers 31.2 Discharge, Foreclosure, Redemption & Priorities

33 Real Property V: Titles

32.1 Adverse Possession 32.2 Deeds, Delivery, Title Covenants & Transfers at Death 32.3 Recording Acts, Title Assurance & Liens

34 Torts I: Intentional Torts

33.1 Intent & Intentional Torts Against the Person 33.2 Intentional Torts Against Property 33.3 Defenses & Privileges for Intentional Torts

35 Torts II: Negligence—Duty, Standard of Care & Proof

34.1 Duty: Foreseeable Plaintiffs, Failure to Act & Control of Others 34.2 Standard of Care, Custom, Negligence Per Se & Res Ipsa Loquitur

36 Torts III: Negligence—Causation, Damages & Limits on Liability

35.1 Actual Cause, Joint & Several Liability, Contribution & Indemnity 35.2 Proximate Cause, Damages, Survival & Wrongful Death 35.3 Owners & Occupiers of Land 35.4 Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, Intangible Harms & Pure Economic Loss

37 Torts IV: Vicarious Liability & Negligence Defenses

36.1 Vicarious Liability: Employees, Independent Contractors & Others 36.2 Defenses to Negligence: Comparative Fault, Assumption of Risk & Immunities

38 Torts V: Strict Liability & Products Liability

37.1 Strict Liability: Animals & Abnormally Dangerous Activities 37.2 Products Liability: Theories, Defects & Defenses

39 Torts VI: Nuisance, Defamation, Privacy & Economic Torts

38.1 Private & Public Nuisance 38.2 Defamation & Invasion of Privacy 38.3 Misrepresentation & Interference with Business Relations

10.1 State Action & Procedural Due Process

Key Takeaways Explain This Topic AI

Constitutional rights guarantees other than the Thirteenth Amendment restrict only government action; private conduct is state action only when the private actor performs a traditionally exclusive public function or the government is significantly involved in the specific conduct.

Heavy regulation, government funding, licensing, or a state-granted monopoly does not by itself make a private entity a state actor (Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison; Rendell-Baker v. Kohn; Halleck).

Procedural due process applies only to deliberate deprivations of life, liberty, or property—negligence is not enough (Daniels v. Williams)—and property interests require a legitimate claim of entitlement created by an independent source such as state law.

The Mathews v. Eldridge test weighs the private interest, the risk of error and value of added safeguards, and the government's interest to decide what process is due and when.

A tenured public employee is entitled to notice and an opportunity to respond before termination, followed by a fuller post-termination hearing (Loudermill), while welfare recipients receive an evidentiary hearing before benefits end (Goldberg v. Kelly).

Last updated: September 2026

10.1 State Action & Procedural Due Process

Before analyzing any individual-rights claim, identify the government actor. Then, for a procedural due process claim, ask two questions in order: (1) did the government deprive the person of a protected liberty or property interest, and (2) if so, what process was due? Substantive due process—whether the government may take the action at all—is covered in Section 10.2.

  • The State Action Requirement
  • The General Principle

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." By its explicit terms, the Fourteenth Amendment—and by extension the Bill of Rights incorporated through it—applies exclusively to government actors .

Constitutional Reach: The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments apply only to state and local governments (including state legislatures, executive agencies, municipalities, public school boards, and state courts). The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause applies only to the federal government.

Private Conduct Exempt: Private individuals, corporations, private universities, clubs, and commercial enterprises are not bound by Fourteenth Amendment individual rights guarantees. A private employer who terminates an employee for political speech does not violate the First Amendment; a private landlord who discriminates against tenants does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.

The Thirteenth Amendment Exception: The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude. It applies directly to both government actors and private individuals without requiring state action. Under Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress possesses the power to prohibit private racial discrimination as a "badge or incident of slavery" ( Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. ).

Statutory vs. Constitutional Protection: Congress can regulate private conduct through commerce clause legislation or civil rights statutes (e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981). On the MBE, when a plaintiff sues under the Constitution, private discrimination is not actionable unless one of two strict exceptions applies.

Exception 1: The Exclusive Public Function Doctrine

Private conduct will be treated as state action if a private entity exercises powers that are traditionally and exclusively reserved to the sovereign state .

Company Towns ( Marsh v. Alabama ): When a private corporation owns an entire municipality—including streets, sidewalks, police forces, and residential quarters—it performs the full panoply of civic municipal functions. Therefore, its suppression of expressive activity on town sidewalks constitutes state action under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

Primary Elections ( Smith v. Allwright , Terry v. Adams ): Conducting primary elections or pre-primary candidate selections that select party nominees for public office is an exclusive sovereign function. A political party cannot evade equal protection by excluding racial minorities from party primaries.

What Is NOT an Exclusive Public Function: The Supreme Court has interpreted "exclusively public" with extreme narrowness:

Shopping Centers: Running a large commercial shopping mall open to the public is not an exclusive public function, even if it mimics a traditional downtown business district ( Hudgens v. NLRB , Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner ).

Private Schools: Educating children is traditionally performed by both private and public institutions, so private schools receiving state funding are not state actors ( Rendell-Baker v. Kohn ).

Utilities: A heavily regulated private electric or water utility holding a state-sanctioned monopoly is not performing an exclusive sovereign function ( Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. ).

Warehouseman Liens: Enforcing a self-help commercial lien authorized by state statute is not an exclusive public function ( Flagg Bros. v. Brooks ).

Exception 2: Significant State Involvement (Entanglement / Joint Participation)

Private conduct constitutes state action where the state has affirmatively authorized, encouraged, facilitated, or entwined itself in the unconstitutional private activity, creating a symbiotic relationship or joint participation .

Judicial Enforcement of Restrictive Covenants ( Shelley v. Kraemer ): While private parties are free to enter into racially discriminatory private agreements, when a state court issues an injunction or enters a judgment enforcing a racially restrictive covenant, the judicial machinery of the state provides coercive enforcement, transforming private bias into state action.

Symbiotic Financial Leases ( Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority ): Where a privately owned restaurant leased commercial space inside an off-street parking garage owned and operated by a public authority, and the public authority maintained the facility and relied on restaurant revenues to finance public bond obligations, the government and the private enterprise entered a mutual "symbiosis" that made the restaurant's racial discrimination attributable to the state.

Peremptory Jury Strikes ( Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. ): Private civil litigants exercising race-based peremptory jury challenges in a state or federal courthouse act with the overt, significant assistance of the trial judge and the court clerk, constituting state action.

Pre-Judgment Attachment with State Officers ( Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. ): A private creditor who enlists the state court clerk and county sheriff to execute an ex parte pre-judgment seizure of a debtor's property engages in state action.

What Is NOT Significant State Involvement (MBE Distractors):

Extensive State Regulation: The mere fact that a business is heavily regulated or supervised by a state agency does not create state action ( Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. ).

State Liquor Licensing: Granting a state liquor license to a private racially discriminatory club does not make the club a state actor ( Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis ).

Government Funding or Subsidies: Extensive government funding—even where 90% or more of an institution's operating budget comes from state contracts or grants—does not convert a private entity into a state actor ( Rendell-Baker v. Kohn , Blum v. Yaretsky ).

Monopoly Status: Holding a state-granted exclusive monopoly (e.g., utility providers, transit companies) is insufficient ( Jackson ).

Private Athletic Associations: The NCAA is a private voluntary association whose disciplinary actions against state university coaches do not constitute state action ( NCAA v. Tarkanian ; contrast with Brentwood Academy , where a state high school athletic association composed predominantly of public school officials was deemed a state actor due to pervasive state entwinement).

MBE Tip: If an MBE question presents a private company receiving government funding or a government license that fires an employee or denies service to a patron, the correct answer almost always turns on the lack of state action . Do not evaluate whether due process or free speech was violated until state action is affirmatively established.

Procedural Due Process

The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment (binding the federal government) and the Fourteenth Amendment (binding the states) guarantee that the government shall not deprive any person of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."

The Deprivation Requirement: Intent vs. Negligence

Procedural due process applies only when the government deprives an individual of a protected interest. Under Daniels v. Williams (1986) and Davidson v. Cannon (1986), a constitutional "deprivation" requires more than mere negligence ; the Court has not decided whether recklessness or gross negligence is enough. Mere official negligence—such as a prison guard negligently leaving a pillow on a stairway causing an inmate to slip and fall—does not constitute a deprivation under the Due Process Clause, even if it results in severe injury. State tort law, not constitutional due process, is the sole remedy for negligent harms.

Protected Interests: Life, Liberty, and Property

Before determining what process is required, courts must first determine whether a protected interest is at stake. ┌──────────────────────────────────────────────┐

  • │ Did the government deprive a person of life, │
  • │ liberty, or property? │
  • └──────────────────────┬───────────────────────┘
  • │
  • NO │ YES
  • ▼ │ ▼
  • ┌───────────────────┐ │ ┌───────────────────┐
  • │ No Procedural │ │ │ What process is │
  • │ Due Process │ │ │ due under Mathews │
  • │ protection │ │ │ v. Eldridge? │
  • └───────────────────┘ │ └───────────────────┘
  • 1. Liberty Interests

A liberty interest is implicated when the government imposes physical restraints, confinement, or deprives a person of core constitutional freedoms:

Physical Restraints: Incarceration, civil commitment to a mental health facility ( Vitek v. Jones ), probation or parole revocation ( Morrissey v. Brewer ), or physical confinement.

Loss of Legal Freedoms: The right to contract, practice one's chosen profession, marry, or direct the education of one's children.

The "Stigma-Plus" Doctrine ( Paul v. Davis ): Defamation or injury to reputation by government officials alone is not a deprivation of liberty . To establish a liberty deprivation, the reputational harm must be accompanied by a tangible, legal alteration of status or loss of a right—such as termination from public employment or loss of a government license ("stigma-plus").

2. Property Interests

A constitutional property interest is not created by the Constitution itself. Rather, it is created and defined by an independent source such as state law, federal statutes, municipal ordinances, or express/implied contracts ( Board of Regents v. Roth , Perry v. Sindermann ).

The "Legitimate Claim of Entitlement" Rule: A protected property interest requires a legitimate claim of entitlement under positive law. An abstract need, desire, or unilateral expectation of a benefit does not suffice.

Public Employment:

At-Will Employment: An at-will public employee who can be dismissed for any reason or no reason has no property interest in continued employment. Summary discharge violates no procedural due process rights ( Roth ).

For-Cause Employment: A public employee who can be dismissed only "for cause," "for misconduct," or who has attained civil service tenure possesses a protected property interest in continued employment ( Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill ).

Welfare and Public Assistance Benefits: Recipients of statutory welfare benefits have a legitimate claim of entitlement created by the eligibility statute ( Goldberg v. Kelly ).

Public Education: State statutes guaranteeing free public education create a property entitlement; suspending a student deprives them of property and liberty ( Goss v. Lopez ).

Government Licenses: Professional licenses, driver's licenses ( Bell v. Burson ), and business permits create property interests once issued; the state cannot arbitrarily revoke them without process.

Utility Services: Customers of municipal utilities with statutory protections against shut-offs absent cause possess a property interest in continued service ( Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft ).

What Process Is Due: The Mathews v. Eldridge Balancing Test

Once a deprivation of life, liberty, or property is established, the core procedural requirements are notice reasonably calculated under all circumstances to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action ( Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. ) and an opportunity to be heard before a neutral, unbiased decisionmaker ( Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. ).

To determine the specific timing, formality, and procedural elements required (e.g., whether a pre-deprivation evidentiary hearing is necessary, or whether a post-deprivation hearing suffices), courts apply the three-factor balancing test established in Mathews v. Eldridge (1976):

The Private Interest: The strength and nature of the private interest that will be affected by the official governmental action;

The Risk of Erroneous Deprivation & Value of Additional Safeguards: The probability that existing administrative procedures will result in an erroneous deprivation, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and

The Government Interest: The government's function, including the fiscal, administrative, and operational burdens that additional or substitute procedural requirements would impose.

Procedural Safeguards Across Common Administrative Contexts

Administrative Action Required Timing & Nature of Process Governing Supreme Court Authority

Termination of Welfare Benefits Full Pre-Termination Evidentiary Hearing required; recipient must have notice, right to appear in person, present oral evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and receive written findings by an impartial decisionmaker. Goldberg v. Kelly (1970) (brutal need; welfare recipients lack alternative survival funds)

Termination of Disability Benefits Post-Termination Evidentiary Hearing is constitutional; pre-termination process requires only written notice, opportunity to review files, and right to submit written rebuttal evidence. Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) (disability is not based on financial need; medical records are objective)

Tenured Public Employee Discharge Pre-Termination "Check Against Mistake" (oral or written notice of charges, explanation of evidence, opportunity to present side of story) followed by a Full Post-Termination Evidentiary Hearing . Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill (1985)

Public School Student Suspension (≤ 10 Days) Prompt Informal Notice & Hearing ; administrator must give oral/written notice of accusations and immediate opportunity for student to explain their version. Pre-suspension hearing unless student poses ongoing danger. Goss v. Lopez (1975)

Academic Dismissal from Public University No Formal Hearing Required ; satisfied if decision is careful, deliberate, and university gives prior warning of academic deficiency. Board of Curators v. Horowitz (1978)

Revocation of Driver's License Generally requires Pre-Suspension Hearing ; however, summary suspension for refusal to submit to a chemical breathalyzer test is valid if immediate Post-Suspension Hearing is available. Bell v. Burson (1971); Mackey v. Montrym (1979)

Civil Asset Forfeiture Real property (real estate) requires Pre-Seizure Notice & Hearing absent extraordinary emergency; personal property (vehicles, cash) may be seized ex parte if accompanied by prompt Post-Seizure Hearing . United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property (1993); Calero-Toledo (1974)

  • More State Action and Procedural Due Process Rules
  • Recent State Action Decisions

Public access channels: A private nonprofit corporation that operated public access cable channels was not a state actor when it suspended producers from its facilities, because operating a forum for speech is not a function traditionally and exclusively performed by government ( Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck , 2019).

Officials' social-media accounts: A public official's posts and blocking decisions are state action only if the official (1) possessed actual authority to speak on the government's behalf on the matter and (2) purported to exercise that authority in the relevant posts ( Lindke v. Freed , 2024).

Contracted government functions: A private physician under contract to provide medical care to state prisoners acts under color of state law, because the state has an obligation to provide that care and delegated it ( West v. Atkins , 1988).

No General Duty to Protect

The Due Process Clause limits government action; it does not generally require the government to protect people from private harm. A county was not liable for failing to protect a child from his father's abuse, even though social workers knew of the danger ( DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services , 1989), and a person holding a restraining order had no property interest in police enforcement of it ( Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales , 2005). The government does owe duties to people in its custody, such as prisoners and involuntarily committed patients.

Additional Procedural Rules

Random, unauthorized deprivations: If a state employee's random and unauthorized act deprives someone of property, and a predeprivation hearing was impossible, an adequate state post-deprivation remedy—such as a tort suit—satisfies due process ( Hudson v. Palmer , 1984). That rule does not apply when the deprivation results from an established state procedure ( Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. , 1982).

Notice: When mailed notice of a tax sale is returned unclaimed, the government must take additional reasonable steps to notify the owner if practicable ( Jones v. Flowers , 2006).

Neutral decisionmaker: Due process is violated when a judge has a direct financial interest in the outcome ( Tumey v. Ohio , 1927), when a campaign contributor's extraordinary support creates a serious risk of bias ( Caperton ), or when a judge decides a case in which he had significant personal involvement as a prosecutor ( Williams v. Pennsylvania , 2016).

Burdens of proof: Termination of parental rights ( Santosky v. Kramer , 1982) and involuntary civil commitment ( Addington v. Texas , 1979) require at least clear and convincing evidence.

Prisoners: Prison discipline implicates a liberty interest only if it imposes an atypical and significant hardship compared with ordinary prison life ( Sandin v. Conner , 1995).

Property seizures: When the government seizes personal property such as a car for civil forfeiture, due process requires a timely post-seizure forfeiture hearing but not a separate preliminary hearing on whether the government may keep the property in the meantime ( Culley v. Marshall , 2024).