Study guide

12.3 Speech in Government Settings, Expressive Conduct, Prior Restraints, Press & Association

Multistate Bar Examination MBE

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1 MBE Overview, Scoring & Study Strategy

0.1 About the Multistate Bar Examination 0.2 MBE Question Mechanics & Test Pacing 0.3 High-Yield Preparation & Error Analysis Strategy

2 Civil Procedure I: Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, Removal & Governing Law

1.1 Subject-Matter Jurisdiction: Federal Question & Diversity 1.2 Supplemental Jurisdiction & Removal 1.3 The Erie Doctrine & Federal Common Law

3 Civil Procedure II: Personal Jurisdiction, Venue & Provisional Relief

2.1 Personal Jurisdiction & Service of Process 2.2 Venue, Transfer & Forum Non Conveniens 2.3 Preliminary Injunctions, TROs & Pretrial Conferences

4 Civil Procedure III: Pleadings, Joinder & Class Actions

3.1 Pleadings, Amendments & Rule 11 3.2 Joinder of Claims & Parties, Intervention & Interpleader 3.3 Class Actions & the Class Action Fairness Act

5 Civil Procedure IV: Discovery, Pretrial Motions & Jury Trials

4.1 Discovery, Disclosure & Sanctions 4.2 Rule 12 Motions, Summary Judgment, Defaults & Dismissals 4.3 Jury Trials: The Right to a Jury, Selection, Instructions & Verdicts

6 Civil Procedure V: Post-Trial Motions, Preclusion & Appeals

5.1 Judgment as a Matter of Law, New Trials & Relief from Judgment 5.2 Claim & Issue Preclusion 5.3 Appealability & Standards of Review

7 Constitutional Law I: The Federal Judicial Power

6.1 Judicial Review, Federal Jurisdiction & State Sovereign Immunity 6.2 Justiciability: Standing, Ripeness, Mootness & Political Questions

8 Constitutional Law II: The Powers of Congress

7.1 Enumerated Powers: Commerce, Taxing & Spending 7.2 War, Foreign Affairs, Civil Rights Enforcement & Other Congressional Powers

9 Constitutional Law III: The Presidency & Separation of Powers

8.1 Presidential Powers: Chief Executive, Commander in Chief, Foreign Affairs & Appointments 8.2 Interbranch Relations: Nondelegation, Presentment, Legislative Limits & Immunities

10 Constitutional Law IV: Federalism & State Power

9.1 The Tenth Amendment, Anti-Commandeering & Intergovernmental Immunities 9.2 Preemption, the Dormant Commerce Clause & Congressional Authorization

11 Constitutional Law V: State Action, Due Process & Equal Protection

10.1 State Action & Procedural Due Process 10.2 Substantive Due Process: Fundamental Rights & Other Liberty Interests 10.3 Equal Protection: Classifications, Scrutiny & Fundamental Rights

12 Constitutional Law VI: Takings & Other Economic Protections

11.1 The Takings Clause 11.2 Contracts Clause, Ex Post Facto Laws, Bills of Attainder & Privileges and Immunities

13 Constitutional Law VII: First Amendment Freedoms

12.1 Freedom of Religion: Establishment & Free Exercise 12.2 Freedom of Speech: Content Regulation, Forums, Unprotected Categories & Commercial Speech 12.3 Speech in Government Settings, Expressive Conduct, Prior Restraints, Press & Association

14 Contracts I: Formation—Offer, Acceptance & Consideration

13.1 Governing Law, Offers & Termination of the Power of Acceptance 13.2 Acceptance, Silence, Unilateral Contracts & the Battle of the Forms 13.3 Consideration, Modification, Promissory Estoppel & Restitution

15 Contracts II: Defenses to Enforcement

14.1 Capacity, Duress, Undue Influence, Unconscionability, Illegality & Public Policy 14.2 Mistake, Misunderstanding, Misrepresentation & Nondisclosure 14.3 The Statute of Frauds

16 Contracts III: Contract Terms, Interpretation & Warranties

15.1 Parol Evidence, Interpretation & Implied Terms 15.2 Warranties in the Sale of Goods

17 Contracts IV: Conditions, Performance & Breach

16.1 Conditions & Excuse of Conditions 16.2 Substantial Performance, Material Breach, Repudiation & Adequate Assurance 16.3 UCC Performance: Tender, Rejection, Cure, Revocation, Installments & Risk of Loss

18 Contracts V: Excuse, Discharge & Remedies

17.1 Impossibility, Impracticability, Frustration & Discharge 17.2 Expectation Damages, Consequential Damages, Mitigation & UCC Damage Formulas 17.3 Reliance, Restitution, Liquidated Damages, Specific Performance & Rescission

19 Contracts VI: Third-Party Beneficiaries, Assignment & Delegation

18.1 Third-Party Beneficiaries 18.2 Assignment of Rights & Delegation of Duties

20 Criminal Law I: General Principles, Defenses, Inchoate Crimes & Parties

19.1 Criminal Acts, Mental States, Mistake, Causation & Jurisdiction 19.2 Responsibility & Defenses: Insanity, Intoxication, Infancy, Justification & Excuse 19.3 Inchoate Crimes: Solicitation, Conspiracy & Attempt 19.4 Parties to Crime: Principals, Accomplices & Accessories After the Fact

21 Criminal Law II: Homicide, Property Crimes & Crimes Against the Person

20.1 Homicide: Murder, Felony Murder & Manslaughter 20.2 Theft Offenses, Receiving Stolen Property, Robbery & Burglary 20.3 Assault, Battery, Sexual Offenses, Kidnapping, Arson & Possession Offenses

22 Criminal Procedure I: The Fourth Amendment & the Exclusionary Rule

21.1 Fourth Amendment: Searches, Seizures, Arrests & Warrants 21.2 Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement & Special Needs Searches 21.3 The Exclusionary Rule, Standing & Fruit of the Poisonous Tree

23 Criminal Procedure II: Confessions, Identification & the Right to Counsel

22.1 Confessions, Miranda & the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination 22.2 Pretrial Identification & the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel

24 Criminal Procedure III: Trial Rights, Pleas, Double Jeopardy, Punishment & Appeals

23.1 Fair Trial, Jury & Confrontation Rights, Guilty Pleas & Burdens of Proof 23.2 Double Jeopardy, Cruel & Unusual Punishment, Appeal & Error

25 Evidence I: Presenting Evidence, Relevance & Witnesses

24.1 Introducing Evidence: Judge & Jury, Objections, Judicial Notice & Presumptions 24.2 Relevance, Rule 403 & Real, Demonstrative & Illustrative Evidence 24.3 Witnesses: Competency, Mode of Examination, Refreshing Recollection & Exclusion

26 Evidence II: Impeachment, Character & Other Acts

25.1 Impeachment: Bias, Inconsistent Statements, Capacity, Contradiction & Rehabilitation 25.2 Impeachment by Character for Truthfulness, Specific Instances & Criminal Convictions 25.3 Character Evidence: The Propensity Ban, Criminal-Case Exceptions & Methods of Proof 25.4 Other Crimes, Wrongs & Acts; Habit & Routine Practice; Sexual Misconduct Rules

27 Evidence III: Opinions, Authentication, Documents, Privileges & Policy Exclusions

26.1 Lay & Expert Opinion Testimony 26.2 Authentication & Identification 26.3 Best Evidence Rule, Summaries & the Rule of Completeness 26.4 Privileges: Attorney-Client, Spousal, Psychotherapist & Other Privileges 26.5 Policy Exclusions: Remedial Measures, Compromise, Medical Payments, Pleas & Insurance

28 Evidence IV: Hearsay & Its Exceptions

27.1 The Hearsay Definition & Statements That Are Not Hearsay 27.2 Hearsay Exclusions: Prior Statements of Testifying Witnesses & Opposing Party Statements 27.3 Hearsay Exceptions Not Requiring Unavailability (FRE 803) 27.4 Unavailability Exceptions, Residual Exception, Multiple Hearsay & Confrontation

29 Real Property I: Estates, Concurrent Ownership & Leaseholds

28.1 Present Estates, Future Interests & Waste 28.2 Rule Against Perpetuities, Restraints on Alienation, Fair Housing & Conflicts of Law 28.3 Concurrent Ownership: Tenancy in Common, Joint Tenancy & Tenancy by the Entirety 28.4 Landlord & Tenant: Tenancies, Duties, Remedies & Transfers

30 Real Property II: Rights in Land

29.1 Easements, Profits & Licenses 29.2 Real Covenants, Equitable Servitudes & Common Interest Communities 29.3 Fixtures 29.4 Support, Water Rights & Zoning

31 Real Property III: Real Estate Contracts

30.1 Real Estate Contracts: Brokers, Formation, Performance & Remedies 30.2 Marketable Title, Equitable Conversion, Options, Disclosure & Merger

32 Real Property IV: Mortgages & Security Devices

31.1 Mortgages & Security Devices: Theories, Pre-Foreclosure Rights & Transfers 31.2 Discharge, Foreclosure, Redemption & Priorities

33 Real Property V: Titles

32.1 Adverse Possession 32.2 Deeds, Delivery, Title Covenants & Transfers at Death 32.3 Recording Acts, Title Assurance & Liens

34 Torts I: Intentional Torts

33.1 Intent & Intentional Torts Against the Person 33.2 Intentional Torts Against Property 33.3 Defenses & Privileges for Intentional Torts

35 Torts II: Negligence—Duty, Standard of Care & Proof

34.1 Duty: Foreseeable Plaintiffs, Failure to Act & Control of Others 34.2 Standard of Care, Custom, Negligence Per Se & Res Ipsa Loquitur

36 Torts III: Negligence—Causation, Damages & Limits on Liability

35.1 Actual Cause, Joint & Several Liability, Contribution & Indemnity 35.2 Proximate Cause, Damages, Survival & Wrongful Death 35.3 Owners & Occupiers of Land 35.4 Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, Intangible Harms & Pure Economic Loss

37 Torts IV: Vicarious Liability & Negligence Defenses

36.1 Vicarious Liability: Employees, Independent Contractors & Others 36.2 Defenses to Negligence: Comparative Fault, Assumption of Risk & Immunities

38 Torts V: Strict Liability & Products Liability

37.1 Strict Liability: Animals & Abnormally Dangerous Activities 37.2 Products Liability: Theories, Defects & Defenses

39 Torts VI: Nuisance, Defamation, Privacy & Economic Torts

38.1 Private & Public Nuisance 38.2 Defamation & Invasion of Privacy 38.3 Misrepresentation & Interference with Business Relations

12.3 Speech in Government Settings, Expressive Conduct, Prior Restraints, Press & Association

Key Takeaways Explain This Topic AI

Public employees' speech is protected only when they speak as citizens on matters of public concern and their interest outweighs the government's interest in efficient operations (Pickering; Connick); speech made pursuant to official duties is unprotected (Garcetti v. Ceballos).

Public schools may restrict student speech that materially and substantially disrupts school activities (Tinker), lewd speech (Fraser), school-sponsored speech for legitimate teaching reasons (Hazelwood), and speech promoting illegal drug use (Morse), but they have less authority over off-campus speech (Mahanoy).

When the government itself speaks, it need not be viewpoint neutral (Summum; Walker), but it may not use funding conditions to regulate recipients' speech outside the program (AOSI) or coerce private parties to punish disfavored speech (NRA v. Vullo).

Regulations of expressive conduct are valid under O'Brien if they further an important interest unrelated to suppressing expression and burden no more speech than necessary; laws aimed at the message, such as flag-burning bans, receive strict scrutiny (Texas v. Johnson).

Prior restraints are presumptively invalid, vague or substantially overbroad laws are void, the press has no special constitutional privileges beyond the public's, and compelled disclosure of association membership or donors must survive exacting scrutiny (NAACP v. Alabama; AFP v. Bonta).

Last updated: September 2026

12.3 Speech in Government Settings, Expressive Conduct, Prior Restraints, Press & Association

Some First Amendment questions arise when the government acts as employer, educator, funder, or speaker, or regulates conduct rather than words. Others involve the press and the right to associate. The rules in this section modify the general framework in Section 12.2, so identify the government's role before choosing a test.

Overarching Speech Protections: Vagueness, Overbreadth, & Prior Restraints

Void-for-Vagueness: A statute is unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause if a person of ordinary intelligence cannot understand what conduct is prohibited, or if it authorizes arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement ( Kolender v. Lawson ).

Substantial Overbreadth: A law is unconstitutionally overbroad if it punishes a substantial amount of protected speech relative to its plainly legitimate sweep ( Broadrick v. Oklahoma ). An overbroad statute is facially invalid; even a defendant whose own conduct was unprotected can challenge the law facially.

Prior Restraints: Government orders, injunctions, or licensing schemes that prevent speech before it occurs face a heavy constitutional presumption against validity ( Near v. Minnesota , New York Times Co. v. United States - Pentagon Papers). A licensing scheme is constitutional only if it contains narrow, objective, and definite standards leaving no unfettered discretion to government officials, coupled with prompt judicial review ( City of Lakewood , Freedman v. Maryland ).

  • Speech in Government Employment, Schools, and Funding
  • Public Employees

Balancing test: A public employee speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern is protected unless the government's interest in efficient public services outweighs the employee's interest in speaking ( Pickering v. Board of Education , 1968, protecting a teacher's letter to a newspaper criticizing the school board).

Public concern: Speech about internal office grievances is not a matter of public concern ( Connick v. Myers , 1983).

Official duties: Statements made pursuant to an employee's official duties are not protected, such as a prosecutor's internal memorandum about a warrant affidavit ( Garcetti v. Ceballos , 2006). Truthful sworn testimony given under subpoena outside the employee's ordinary job duties is citizen speech ( Lane v. Franks , 2014).

Political affiliation: Government may not fire, promote, or hire most public employees based on political party affiliation unless affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the job ( Elrod v. Burns , 1976; Branti v. Finkel , 1980; Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois , 1990).

Union fees: Public employees may not be required to pay fees to a union unless they affirmatively consent ( Janus v. AFSCME , 2018).

Oaths: Government may require employees to swear to support the Constitution and oppose its overthrow by unconstitutional means ( Cole v. Richardson , 1972), but not to take vague oaths or disclaim mere membership in groups.

Students in Public Schools

Speech Standard Case

Political or personal expression at school May be restricted if it materially and substantially disrupts school activities or invades others' rights Tinker v. Des Moines (1969) (black armbands protected)

Lewd or vulgar speech at school events May be restricted Bethel School District v. Fraser (1986)

School-sponsored speech, such as a class newspaper Restrictions reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier (1988)

Speech reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use May be restricted at school events Morse v. Frederick (2007)

Off-campus speech School's interest diminished; discipline for a profane social-media post that caused no substantial disruption was invalid Mahanoy Area School District v. B.L. (2021)

Government Speech, Funding Conditions, and Coercion

Government speech: When the government speaks for itself, it may choose its message. Permanent monuments in a public park ( Pleasant Grove City v. Summum , 2009) and specialty license plate designs ( Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans , 2015) are government speech. By contrast, a city program that let private groups raise flags of their choosing at City Hall was not government speech, so refusing a religious group's flag was viewpoint discrimination ( Shurtleff v. City of Boston , 2022). Trademark registration is not government speech ( Matal v. Tam , 2017).

Defining a program: Government may decline to fund activities outside its program, such as abortion counseling in a federally funded family-planning program ( Rust v. Sullivan , 1991), and may consider decency and respect for diverse beliefs in awarding arts grants ( National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley , 1998).

Leveraging funds: Government may not require funding recipients to adopt a policy position as a condition of funding ( Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International , 2013), forbid public broadcasters receiving federal funds from editorializing ( FCC v. League of Women Voters , 1984), or bar funded legal-aid lawyers from challenging welfare laws ( Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez , 2001).

Indirect coercion: Officials may not threaten private parties to punish or suppress speech the government disfavors. A state financial regulator's alleged pressure on insurers to cut ties with a gun-rights group stated a First Amendment claim ( National Rifle Ass'n of America v. Vullo , 2024).

Permit fees: A parade permit fee may not vary based on the expected hostility of the audience, because that makes the fee depend on the content of the speech ( Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement , 1992).

Expressive Conduct

Is the conduct expressive? Conduct is expressive if the actor intends to convey a particularized message and viewers are likely to understand it ( Spence v. Washington , 1974). Requiring law schools to give military recruiters equal access regulates conduct, not speech ( Rumsfeld v. FAIR , 2006).

Is the law aimed at the message? If the government's interest is related to suppressing expression, strict scrutiny applies. Laws punishing flag burning to protect the flag's symbolic meaning are invalid ( Texas v. Johnson , 1989; United States v. Eichman , 1990).

If not, apply United States v. O'Brien (1968). A regulation of conduct with an incidental effect on expression is valid if it is within the government's constitutional power, furthers an important or substantial interest, the interest is unrelated to suppressing expression, and the incidental restriction is no greater than essential. O'Brien upheld a conviction for burning a draft card; Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence (1984) upheld a ban on sleeping in certain parks; and public-nudity bans have been upheld as applied to nude dancing ( City of Erie v. Pap's A.M. , 2000).

Cross burning: A state may ban cross burning done with intent to intimidate, but it may not treat the burning itself as prima facie evidence of that intent ( Virginia v. Black , 2003).

Compelled Speech and Editorial Choices

The government may not compel students to salute the flag ( West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette , 1943) or require drivers to display a state motto on license plates ( Wooley v. Maynard , 1977).

A state may not use a public-accommodations law to force a website designer to create custom wedding websites expressing messages she disagrees with ( 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis , 2023), or force private parade organizers to include a group whose message they do not wish to convey ( Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston , 1995).

A social-media platform's curation of third-party content in its feeds is expressive activity, and a facial challenge to a law regulating such curation requires analyzing the law's full range of applications ( Moody v. NetChoice, LLC , 2024).

Requirements that commercial advertisers disclose purely factual and uncontroversial information are reviewed more leniently if they are reasonably related to preventing deception and not unduly burdensome ( Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel , 1985).

Campaign Finance

Contributions versus expenditures: Contribution limits are valid when closely drawn to prevent quid pro quo corruption or its appearance, but limits on independent expenditures are invalid ( Buckley v. Valeo , 1976).

Corporations and unions: The government may not ban independent political expenditures by corporations or unions ( Citizens United v. FEC , 2010), although disclosure requirements are generally valid.

Other limits struck down: Aggregate limits on the total a donor may give to all candidates ( McCutcheon v. FEC , 2014) and a limit on using post-election contributions to repay a candidate's personal loans to the campaign ( FEC v. Ted Cruz for Senate , 2022) violated the First Amendment.

Freedom of the Press

No special privileges: Reporters have no First Amendment privilege to refuse to testify before a grand jury ( Branzburg v. Hayes , 1972), and the press has no greater right than the public to access prisons ( Houchins v. KQED, Inc. , 1978).

Access to criminal proceedings: The public and press have a right to attend criminal trials ( Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia , 1980) and preliminary hearings ( Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court , 1986), which may be closed only when necessary to serve an overriding interest and narrowly tailored. Mandatory closure during all testimony by minor sex-offense victims is invalid; closure must be decided case by case ( Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court , 1982).

Publishing lawfully obtained truthful information: A state may punish publication of truthful information lawfully obtained about a matter of public significance only to further a state interest of the highest order ( Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co. , 1979; Florida Star v. B.J.F. , 1989; Bartnicki v. Vopper , 2001).

Gag orders: Orders forbidding the press from reporting on criminal proceedings are almost never valid ( Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart , 1976).

Taxes: The press is subject to generally applicable taxes, but a special tax singling out the press ( Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue , 1983) or a tax exemption based on content ( Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland , 1987) is invalid.

Broadcasting and the internet: Broadcast media may be regulated more extensively because of spectrum scarcity ( Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC , 1969; FCC v. Pacifica Foundation , 1978), but speech on the internet receives full First Amendment protection ( Reno v. ACLU , 1997).

Freedom of Association

Disclosure: Compelled disclosure of membership lists or donors is subject to exacting scrutiny, which requires a substantial relation to a sufficiently important interest and narrow tailoring ( NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson , 1958). A state's blanket requirement that charities give the attorney general the names of their major donors failed that test ( Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta , 2021).

Punishing membership: A person may be punished for membership in a group only if the person knows of the group's illegal aims and specifically intends to further them ( Scales v. United States , 1961).

Antidiscrimination laws: A state's compelling interest in eliminating sex discrimination justified requiring a large civic organization to admit women, with little effect on its expression ( Roberts v. United States Jaycees , 1984). But forcing an expressive organization to accept a leader whose presence would significantly burden its message violates its expressive association ( Boy Scouts of America v. Dale , 2000). A public law school's requirement that recognized student groups accept all comers was a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral condition in a limited public forum ( Christian Legal Society v. Martinez , 2010).

Political parties: A state may not force a political party to open its primary to voters who are not party members ( California Democratic Party v. Jones , 2000).