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2.2 Hazard Identification (HAZID) & HAZOP Studies

NEBOSH HSE Certificate in Process Safety Management Exam

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1 Chapter 1: Process Safety Leadership

1.1 Process Safety vs Personal Safety & Historical Disasters 1.2 Board-Level Leadership & PSLG Principles 1.3 Leading and Lagging Performance Indicators 1.4 Management of Change (MOC) 1.5 Worker Engagement & Competence Management Systems

2 Chapter 2: Risk Management Techniques

2.1 COMAH 2015 Regulations & Regulatory Duties 2.2 Hazard Identification (HAZID) & HAZOP Studies 2.3 Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) & Independent Protection Layers (IPLs) 2.4 Bow-Tie Analysis & Risk Assessment Frameworks 2.5 Inherent Safety Principles & CCPS RBPS Framework

3 Chapter 3: Asset Integrity & Safe Systems of Work

3.1 Life-Cycle Asset Integrity & Maintenance Strategies 3.2 Risk-Based Inspection (RBI) & Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) 3.3 Safety-Critical Elements (SCEs) & Performance Standards 3.4 Permit-to-Work (PTW) Systems & High-Risk Controls 3.5 Safe Isolation (HSG253), Shift Handover & Contractor Management

4 Chapter 4: Process Hazard Control

4.1 Safe Operating Envelopes & Transient Operations 4.2 Alarm Management & EEMUA 191 Guidelines 4.3 Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) & Functional Safety (IEC 61511) 4.4 Utility Failures & Process Support Hazards 4.5 Static Electricity Controls & DSEAR/ATEX Area Classification

5 Chapter 5: Dangerous Substances: Reactions, Storage & Transport

5.1 Exothermic Runaway Reactions & Thermal Safety Screening 5.2 Emergency Relief System Sizing & Two-Phase Flow (DIERS) 5.3 Bulk Storage Tank Design, Overfill Protection & Bunding 5.4 LPG Storage, Refrigeration & BLEVE Prevention 5.5 Drum Storage, CLP Classification & Road Tanker Transfer

6 Chapter 6: Fire & Explosion Protection and Emergency Response

6.1 Fire Mechanics, Flammable Properties & Fire Types 6.2 Vapour Cloud Explosions (VCE) & Congestion/Confinement 6.3 Dust Explosions, Pentagons & Kst Classification 6.4 Explosion Prevention, Relief Venting & Inerting 6.5 Fire Protection Systems, Gas Detection & COMAH Emergency Planning

2.2 Hazard Identification (HAZID) & HAZOP Studies

Key Takeaways Explain This Topic AI

HAZID is a high-level qualitative screening technique applied early in conceptual design, whereas HAZOP is a detailed, parameter-driven study executed on final P&IDs.

HAZOP methodology combines process parameters (Flow, Pressure, Temperature, Level) with standard Guide Words (NO, MORE, LESS, REVERSE, AS WELL AS, PART OF, OTHER THAN) to identify deviations from design intent.

A process node represents a section of piping or equipment with a distinct design intent, serving as the discrete unit of analysis during a HAZOP study.

HAZOP studies must be conducted by a balanced, multidisciplinary team led by an independent, trained HAZOP Chairman and documented by a dedicated Scribe.

All HAZOP recommendations must identify specific causes, consequences, existing safeguards, and assigned action owners with enforceable completion targets.

Last updated: July 2026

Hazard identification is the critical foundation of process safety management. Within the process industries, qualitative risk assessment techniques are deployed across different lifecycle stages to systematically uncover process hazards, design deficiencies, and operational deviations. The two most prominent qualitative methodologies mandated by international standards (such as IEC 61882 ) are Hazard Identification (HAZID) and Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) studies.

1. Comparing HAZID and HAZOP

While both HAZID and HAZOP share the core objective of identifying safety and operational risks, they differ fundamentally in scope, timing, technical granularity, and methodology.

  • Feature / Aspect Hazard Identification (HAZID) Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP)
  • Project Stage Conceptual Design / Pre-FEED / Feasibility Detailed Engineering / Final P&ID / MOC

Primary Scope Plot layout, external hazards, major site hazards Piping & Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs), process lines

  • Granularity Broad, high-level screening Detailed, line-by-line, node-by-node analysis
  • Methodology Checklist & prompt list driven Guide word + parameter deviation matrix
  • Primary Output Major hazard register, site selection input Detailed HAZOP action log, safeguard validation
  • Hazard Identification (HAZID)

HAZID is an early-stage, high-level screening tool used to identify major hazards associated with plant location, layout, process chemistry, external environment, and logistics. It evaluates:

External Hazards : Seismic activity, flooding, lightning, extreme weather, aircraft crash impact, nearby industrial hazards (domino risks).

Facility Layout Hazards : Spacing between process units, control room positioning, toxic/flammable gas dispersion paths, emergency access routes.

Process & Chemical Hazards : Large inventory toxic gas storage, high-pressure reactivity, runaway reaction potential.

2. HAZOP Methodology & Node Selection

A Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study is a structured, highly systematic technique designed to identify process hazards and operational problems by evaluating deviations from the design intent .

The Concept of Design Intent

Every process line, vessel, or instrument loop is engineered to operate within defined parameters (e.g., transfer 50 m³/hr of hexane from Tank T-101 to Reactor R-201 at 25°C and 2.0 barg). This specified baseline is the design intent .

Node Selection Protocol

To make a HAZOP manageable, the P&IDs are divided into discrete sections called nodes .

Definition of a Node : A section of piping, vessel, or process equipment with a specific, uniform design intent.

Node Boundaries : Typical nodes include a pump suction line, a heat exchanger tube-side circuit, a distillation column overhead system, or a chemical reactor vessel.

Selecting Node Sizes : Nodes must be neither too large (risking missed detail) nor too small (leading to excessive repetition and team fatigue). [ Tank T-101 ] ===> ( Node 1: Pump Suction Line ) ===> [ Pump P-102 ] ===> ( Node 2: Pump Discharge Line ) ===> [ Reactor R-201 ]

3. Guide Words and Process Parameters

The core mechanism of a HAZOP study involves applying standard Guide Words to specific Process Parameters to generate hypothetical process deviations: Deviation = Guide Word + Process Parameter \text{Deviation} = \text{Guide Word} + \text{Process Parameter} Deviation = Guide Word + Process Parameter

Standard HAZOP Parameters

Flow : Fluid transfer rate through piping or equipment.

Pressure : Internal system force exerted on walls or vessels.

Temperature : Thermal state of process fluid or equipment.

Level : Height of liquid phase inside vessels or columns.

Viscosity / Composition : Chemical makeup, phase behavior, concentration.

Addition / Phase : Mixing sequence, batch charging, vapor/liquid fraction.

Service / Utility : Supply of cooling water, steam, instrument air, electricity, nitrogen purge.

Standard HAZOP Guide Words (IEC 61882)

  • Guide Word Definition / Meaning Example Deviation
  • NO / NOT Complete negation of the design intent No Flow (Blocked valve, pump trip, pipe rupture)
  • MORE Quantitative increase in parameter More Pressure (Thermal expansion, runaway reaction)
  • LESS Quantitative decrease in parameter Less Temperature (Loss of tracing, hydrate formation)
  • REVERSE Logical opposite of design intent Reverse Flow (Backflow from reactor into utility line)
  • AS WELL AS Qualitative increase / extra component As Well As Composition (Water ingress into acid tank)
  • PART OF Qualitative decrease / missing component Part Of Composition (Solvent ratio drop in extraction)
  • OTHER THAN Complete substitution / unintended state Other Than Service (Nitrogen line connected to air line)

Deviation Matrix Examples +------------------+--------------------+-----------------------------------------------------+

  • | Guide Word | Parameter | Process Deviation & Physical Cause |
  • +------------------+--------------------+-----------------------------------------------------+
  • | NO | FLOW | No flow due to closed XV-101 or pump trip |
  • | MORE | PRESSURE | More pressure due to tube rupture in heat exchanger |
  • | REVERSE | FLOW | Reverse flow due to check valve CV-202 failure |
  • | AS WELL AS | COMPOSITION | Air ingress creating explosive atmosphere in tank |
  • +------------------+--------------------+-----------------------------------------------------+
  • 4. Conducting the HAZOP Meeting & Review Workflow

A HAZOP study follows a rigid, repeating analytical sequence for every node under evaluation: [ Select Node & Define Intent ]

  • │
  • ▼
  • [ Select Process Parameter ]
  • │
  • ▼
  • [ Apply Guide Word ] ──► (Generates Deviation)
  • │
  • ▼
  • [ Identify Causes ] ──► (Is cause credible?)
  • │ (Yes)
  • ▼
  • [ Evaluate Consequences ] ──► (Assuming NO safeguards work)
  • │
  • ▼
  • [ List Existing Safeguards ] ──► (Hardware, Alarms, Interlocks)
  • │
  • ▼
  • [ Determine Risk & Recommendations ] ──► (Assign Action Owner)

Detailed Steps in the Node Assessment:

Define Design Intent : The Chair explains the node boundaries, fluid properties, operating pressure, temperature, and flow direction.

Apply Deviation : Combine a parameter and guide word (e.g., More Pressure ).

Identify Causes : Brainstorm all credible engineering and operational causes (e.g., control valve failed full open, downstream manual block valve closed, cooling water pump failed).

Identify Consequences : Trace the worst-case unmitigated sequence of events resulting from the cause (e.g., vessel overpressurization → \rightarrow → mechanical loss of containment → \rightarrow → toxic cloud release → \rightarrow → off-site fatalities). Crucial rule : Consequences must be evaluated assuming all existing safeguards fail.

Identify Safeguards : Record engineered and procedural safeguards currently shown on the P&ID or specified in procedures (e.g., Pressure Safety Relief Valve PSV-104, high-pressure trip PSHH-102 closing SDV-101, independent pressure alarm).

Formulate Recommendations : If existing safeguards are deemed inadequate to achieve tolerability, the team logs an explicit HAZOP Recommendation (e.g., "Install SIL 2 high-pressure interlock on feed line").

5. Multidisciplinary Team Composition & Roles

A HAZOP study cannot be conducted by a single engineer; it relies on the collective intelligence and dynamic cross-examination of a multidisciplinary team . ┌─────────────────────────┐

  • │ Independent Chair │
  • └────────────┬────────────┘
  • │
  • ┌───────────────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────┐
  • │ │ │
  • ┌───────┴─────────┐ ┌─────────┴─────────┐ ┌─────────┴─────────┐
  • │ Process Engineer│ │ Operations Lead │ │ Instrument Eng. │
  • └─────────────────┘ └───────────────────┘ └───────────────────┘
  • │ │ │
  • ┌───────┴─────────┐ ┌─────────┴─────────┐ ┌─────────┴─────────┐
  • │ Maintenance/Mech│ │ Scribe / Secretary│ │ HSE Specialist │
  • └─────────────────┘ └───────────────────┘ └───────────────────┘
  • Roles and Responsibilities

HAZOP Leader / Chair : An independent, trained expert in HAZOP methodology. Controls meeting flow, ensures systematic application of guide words, prevents rabbit-hole discussions, and maintains objectivity. Must not be the direct designer of the system.

HAZOP Scribe / Secretary : Dedicated professional recording deviations, causes, consequences, safeguards, and actions in specialized HAZOP software (e.g., PHA-Pro, HazopJet).

Process Design Engineer : Explains the process design intent, heat/material balances, equipment sizing, and operating envelopes.

Operations Representative : Provides real-world practical insight on how operators run the plant, manual valve operations, startup/shutdown sequences, and alarm response capabilities.

Instrument / Control Engineer : Explains control loops, Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) logic, trip settings, interlocks, cause-and-effect matrices, and valve fail positions.

Maintenance / Mechanical Engineer : Assesses mechanical integrity, corrosion allowances, pump curves, relief valve sizing, and piping specifications.

HSE Specialist : Provides regulatory context (COMAH, DSEAR), toxicological data, dispersion modelling insights, and corporate risk matrix standards.

6. P&ID Review & Action Tracking

The primary working document for a HAZOP is the Piping & Instrumentation Diagram (P&ID) . During the study:

Every line and vessel examined is physically highlighted (color-coded) on master P&ID prints as the node evaluation completes.

Action Item Quality : Recommendations must follow the SMART framework (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, Time-bound).

Closing the Loop : Every logged recommendation must be assigned to a named action owner. Recommendations cannot be closed out without documented technical justification and formal sign-off by the engineering authority.