Study guide

11.3 Consequence Analysis

Nautical Institute DP Operator DPO

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1 Introduction & NI Scheme

1.1 Current Exam Facts 1.2 Phases A–E Pathway 1.3 Certificates, Eligibility & Revalidation

2 DP Principles Fundamentals

2.1 What is Dynamic Positioning & Degrees of Freedom 2.2 Seven Components of a DP System 2.3 The DP Operator & Human-Machine Interface

3 Controller, Model & Environmental Sensors

3.1 DP Controller & Mathematical Model 3.2 Kalman Filtering & Current Estimation 3.3 Gyrocompass & Heading Feedback 3.4 Wind Sensor, MRU & UPS

4 GNSS & Acoustic Position References

4.1 DGNSS & Differential Correction 4.2 Relative GNSS / RTK Concepts 4.3 Hydroacoustics USBL/SSBL 4.4 Long Baseline (LBL) Systems

5 Relative PRS, Selection & Voting

5.1 Light Taut Wire 5.2 Laser Relative References (Fanbeam/CyScan) 5.3 Radar/Microwave Relative References (RadaScan) 5.4 Reference Selection, Voting & Common-Mode Failure

6 Power Generation & PMS

6.1 Diesel-Electric Power Architecture 6.2 Power Management System 6.3 Load Sharing, Load Shedding & Spinning Reserve

7 Bus Configuration & Power Failures

7.1 Open vs Closed Bus-Tie 7.2 Blackout & Blackout Recovery 7.3 Drive-Off vs Drift-Off

8 Thrusters & Allocation

8.1 Tunnel, Azimuth & Retractable Thrusters 8.2 Thrust Allocation, Forbidden Zones & Bias 8.3 Thruster Interaction & Faulty Thruster Response

9 Control Modes

9.1 Auto DP Mode 9.2 Joystick & Independent Joystick System 9.3 Mode Selection & Practical Setup

10 DP Equipment Classes

10.1 IMO Equipment Classes 1, 2 and 3 10.2 MSC.1/Circ.1580 vs MSC/Circ.645 10.3 Sensor Redundancy & 2-out-of-3 Voting

11 FMEA, Worst Case Failure & Consequence Analysis

11.1 FMEA & Annual DP Trials 11.2 Worst Case Failure 11.3 Consequence Analysis

12 ASOG, CAM & TAM

12.1 Activity Specific Operating Guidelines (ASOG) 12.2 Critical Activity Mode (CAM) 12.3 Task Appropriate Mode (TAM)

13 Capability Plots & Approach Planning

13.1 DP Capability Plots 13.2 Footprint Plots & Weather-Optimal Heading 13.3 500 m Zone Approach & Escape Routes

14 Watchkeeping & Industry Guidance

14.1 Watchkeeping & Handover 14.2 Checklists, Alarms & Time to Terminate 14.3 IMCA M103/M117 Guidance Context

15 Integrated Operations & Assessment Strategy

15.1 Multi-System Failure Scenarios 15.2 Integrated Operations Case Studies 15.3 Induction Assessment Strategy

11.3 Consequence Analysis

Key Takeaways Explain This Topic AI

Consequence analysis is an online Class 2/3 software function that continuously checks whether the vessel can still hold position after WCF in the present environment and thruster/power load state

If residual capability would be inadequate, the system warns so the operator can change heading, reduce load, open bus, improve plant state, or abort critical work

Online consequence analysis is distinct from offline capability plots, which are pre-calculated envelopes for planning

Consequence-analysis alarms link directly to ASOG amber/red thinking: residual risk is no longer acceptable for the activity

Green consequence analysis does not replace watchkeeping — sensor faults, wrong thruster enables, or bad weather models can still mislead the calculation

Last updated: July 2026

Online residual safety — what consequence analysis is

Consequence analysis (also called online consequence analysis, DP consequence analysis, or residual-capability monitoring, depending on vendor language) is a live software function on Class 2 and Class 3 DP systems. Continuously, or on a short cycle, it asks:

Given present environmental forces, thruster status, power status, and configuration, if the worst-case failure happened now , could the remaining thrusters and power still hold position and heading within acceptable limits?

If the answer becomes no (or margin becomes too small per system settings), the system alarms / warns the operator. The point is not academic curiosity. It is an early operational trigger: change something before the failure, or stop the critical activity so that a design failure does not become a loss-of-position incident.

  • Feature Consequence analysis
  • When it runs Online, continuously during DP
  • Failure model Design WCF / residual thruster-power set
  • Environment Present estimated weather/load state
  • Output OK / warning that residual hold would fail
  • Operator use Heading, plant config, load, abort decisions

Tip

Think of consequence analysis as a permanent “what if WCF hits this minute ?” check, using today’s real plant and weather — not last month’s office plot.

Why Class 2/3 systems include it

Class 2/3 vessels are allowed to work in conditions where intact plant holds easily, but residual plant after WCF might not. Humans are bad at continuously re-computing residual force versus wind, current, thruster enables, and power limits. Consequence analysis automates that residual check so degraded weather, a deselected thruster, or a power limitation cannot silently leave the vessel one failure away from drift-off during critical work.

  • Situation Intact plant After WCF Consequence analysis role
  • Calm, full thrusters Easy hold Still easy Stays healthy
  • Strong beam weather Holds Residual thrusters saturated Alarm — residual inadequate
  • One residual thruster already deselected Holds Residual worse than design Alarm earlier than plots assumed
  • Power limited on healthy side Holds Residual power insufficient Alarm
  • Distinct from offline capability plots

Candidates mix these up constantly. Keep them separate:

  • Tool Offline capability plot Online consequence analysis
  • Nature Pre-calculated charts/tables from models Live software on the DP system

Inputs Assumed thruster sets, environments, often fixed configs Present thrusters, power, estimated environment, live config

When used Planning, briefing, weather screening, manuals Continuous watch while on DP

Question answered “In general, what weather can intact/post-WCF plant hold?” “ Right now , after WCF, would we still hold?”

  • Updates When recalculated/reissued Every cycle as plant/weather change
  • Alarm No — static document Yes — warns operator

Capability plots remain essential for voyage and task planning . Consequence analysis remains essential for real-time residual assurance . A green consequence-analysis status does not rewrite a bad plan against the plots; a perfect plot set does not replace watching the live residual alarm during the job.

What the function typically considers

Exact algorithms are vendor-specific, but exam-level inputs include:

Which thrusters are available now (enabled, ready, not faulted, deployed).

Which thrusters would remain after WCF (residual set from configuration/FMEA model).

Power available to residual thrusters (bus state, generators, limits).

Present environmental demand (wind, current estimate, wave-related forces as modelled).

Heading and position control demand (present setpoints and force needs).

Sometimes load/bias and forbidden-zone constraints that reduce effective residual force.

  • Input family Why it matters
  • Thruster enable set Deselected units disappear from residual
  • Bus / power state Residual thrusters without power are useless
  • Weather / model forces Demand residual thrusters must meet
  • Heading Changes projected force envelope
  • WCF definition in software Must match vessel design residual

If the WCF model in software no longer matches the real vessel (outdated after modification), consequence analysis can give false comfort or false alarms . That is another reason FMEA and trials currency matter to operators.

What the operator does on a consequence-analysis warning

A warning means: if the design failure occurs in present conditions, residual capability is insufficient (or marginal). Typical responses — chosen per company procedure, ASOG, and the task — include:

  • Response Intent
  • Change heading Align residual thruster envelope with weather; reduce force demand
  • Reduce industrial / thruster load Free power margin; reduce bias if appropriate
  • Enable additional thrusters Restore residual set the analysis assumed
  • Open bus / restore CAM plant Ensure residual power partitions match design
  • Start extra generation Give residual side enough kW
  • Move off / increase separation Lower consequence if excursion occurs

Abort or pause critical activity Divers recover, lift stops, gangway clear, etc.

Do not ignore and “hope weather drops” Hope is not a residual thruster

Exam framing: the system warns ; the operator decides and acts . Consequence analysis does not by itself recover divers or open the bus-tie.

Link to ASOG red/amber status

Activity Specific Operating Guidelines (ASOG) (and related WSOG/SOM tables) translate plant and environmental status into green / amber / red (or equivalent) operating guidance. Consequence-analysis unhealthy status is a classic driver toward amber or red :

  • Status idea Meaning for the task
  • Green Parameters within normal limits for the activity
  • Amber Caution — prepare to stop or improve condition; heightened vigilance
  • Red Stop critical activity / go to contingency — residual or plant no longer acceptable

A consequence-analysis alarm saying residual hold after WCF would fail is effectively telling you that single-failure tolerance for this weather and config is no longer true . For diving or close-proximity construction, that is not a “note in the log and continue” event. ASOG should already define whether that condition is amber (time-limited improvement allowed) or red (immediate terminate).

  • Consequence analysis ASOG linkage
  • Healthy / OK Supports continued green if other ASOG lines also green
  • Warning / residual fail Push toward amber/red per table
  • After corrective action restores residual margin May return toward green only if ASOG all lines allow
  • Warning ignored during critical work Procedural and safety failure

Related chapters cover ASOG/CAM/TAM in depth; here the exam link is simple: consequence analysis is a live residual red-flag input to ASOG decisions.

Limitations and healthy scepticism

Consequence analysis is powerful but not omniscient:

It depends on correct thruster and power status — a thruster showing available but mechanically useless can fool the model.

Environmental estimates can lag or err (wind sensor issues, current estimate drift).

Software WCF definition must match actual residual design.

It does not replace PRS quality , drive-off monitoring, or human detection of model-measurement mismatch.

Vendor implementations differ in conservatism and alarm hysteresis.

  • Bad practice Better practice
  • “Green consequence analysis = nothing can go wrong” Use it as one residual check among many
  • Disable the function to stop “nuisance” alarms Fix plant/config/weather; respect ASOG
  • Rely only on offline plots during the job Watch live residual status
  • Ignore alarm because position is still tight Position now ≠ residual after WCF

Important

Holding position with intact plant while consequence analysis is in alarm means you are gambling that WCF will not occur . For Class 2/3 critical work, that gamble is exactly what the function exists to stop.

Worked operational scenario

A DP crane vessel holds 15 m off a platform in rising beam wind. Intact thrusters hold a small footprint. Offline post-WCF plots for the planned heading were acceptable at the 06:00 briefing. By afternoon, one retractable thruster that forms part of the residual set is deselected for a fault, and wind has increased. Online consequence analysis goes into warning : after WCF (loss of the other section), remaining thrusters cannot hold. The DPO treats this as ASOG amber trending red , stops the next critical lift, enables a repaired thruster after test, adjusts heading toward residual-optimal, and only resumes when consequence analysis is healthy and ASOG returns to green. The vessel never lost position — the system prevented a future loss after the design failure.

Exam traps for consequence analysis

  • Trap Correct framing
  • Same as offline capability plot Online, continuous , present-state residual check
  • Replaces FMEA Uses WCF/residual from design; does not replace FMEA
  • Auto-aborts the task always Warns ; operator/ASOG decide actions
  • Only Class 1 feature Associated with Class 2/3 residual philosophy
  • Green means weather cannot increase Status is live — it can go into alarm as conditions change
  • Only about PRS voting About thruster/power residual after WCF , not PRS selection

Bottom line: consequence analysis is the Class 2/3 online function that continuously tests whether residual plant after WCF can still hold in present conditions; it is not an offline plot; its alarms drive heading, configuration, load, and ASOG amber/red decisions so critical work does not continue one design failure away from loss of position.