Study guide

6.9 SCADA, Substation Automation, Functional Test Plans, and P&C Troubleshooting

NICET Electrical Power Testing Exam

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1 Chapter 1: Electrical Safety, Standards, and Work Practices (NFPA 70E & OSHA)

1.1 NFPA 70E Framework, Electrically Safe Work Conditions, and Approach Boundaries 1.2 Arc Flash Hazard Analysis, Incident Energy, and PPE Category Selection 1.3 Hazardous Energy Control: OSHA 1910.147 Lockout/Tagout & Grounding Procedures 1.4 Confined Spaces, Hazard Communication, and Job Site Safety Management 1.5 Voltage Classes, Approach Boundaries in Practice, and Equipment Isolation 1.6 Temporary Protective Grounding: ASTM F855, OSHA 1910.269(n), and the Equipotential Zone 1.7 Fall Protection, Ladders, Scaffolds, and Elevated Work 1.8 Fire Hazards, Extinguisher Classes, Emergency Response, First Aid, and CPR

2 Chapter 2: Electrical Power Theory, Test Instrumentation, and Basic Measurements

2.1 AC/DC Power Fundamentals, Three-Phase Systems, and Power Factor Concepts 2.2 Insulation Resistance Testing Fundamentals, Megohmmeters, DAR, and PI (IEEE 43) 2.3 Low-Resistance Measurement: Contact Resistance, DLROs, and Micro-ohmmeters 2.4 High-Voltage Test Equipment: AC/DC Hipots, VLF Sets, and Dielectric Withstand Principles 2.5 DC Circuit Analysis: Ohm's Law, Series and Parallel Networks, and Power 2.6 Test Equipment Identification, Selection, Ranges, and Calibration Control 2.7 Insulation Power Factor and Dissipation Factor Instrumentation: GST, GSTg, and UST Modes

3 Chapter 3: Power Transformers, Regulators, and Insulating Fluids

3.1 Transformer Visual Inspection, Nameplate Interpretation, and Vector Groups 3.2 Transformer Turns Ratio (TTR) and Winding Resistance Testing 3.3 Insulation Power Factor & Dissipation Factor Testing (Doble Test & Bushings) 3.4 Insulating Liquid Testing: Dielectric Breakdown (ASTM D877/D1816) and Physical Properties 3.5 Dissolved Gas Analysis (DGA, ASTM D3612), Duval Triangle, and Fault Interpretation 3.6 Excitation Current, Core Insulation, and Applied and Induced Potential Tests 3.7 Load Tap Changers, Voltage Regulators, and Insulating Liquid Processing

4 Chapter 4: Circuit Breakers, Switchgear, and Motor Control Centers

4.1 Low-Voltage Circuit Breakers (MCCB/LVPCB) and Electronic Trip Unit Testing (LSIG) 4.2 Medium- and High-Voltage Circuit Breakers: Vacuum, SF6, and Air Magnetic Breakers 4.3 Circuit Breaker Timing, Motion/Travel Analysis, and Contact Velocity 4.4 Switchgear, Switchboards, MCC Buswork, and Interlock Systems 4.5 Overcurrent Device Testing: Primary Injection, Secondary Injection, and Time-Current Curves 4.6 Vacuum Interrupter Integrity Testing and SF₆ Gas Quality Management 4.7 Fuses, Medium-Voltage Switches, and Disconnecting Devices

5 Chapter 5: Power Cables, Busways, and Terminations

5.1 Medium-Voltage Cable Construction, Shielding, and Termination Inspection 5.2 Cable Insulation Resistance, DC Withstand, and VLF Field Testing (IEEE 400.2) 5.3 Advanced Cable Diagnostics: Tan-Delta / Dissipation Factor and Partial Discharge (IEEE 400.3) 5.4 Busways, Duct Banks, and Cable Shield Continuity Testing 5.5 Cable Fault Location: TDR, Thumping, Arc Reflection, and Sectionalizing

6 Chapter 6: Protective Relaying and Instrument Transformers

6.1 Current Transformers (CTs): Ratio, Polarity, Excitation/Saturation, and Burden Testing 6.2 Voltage Transformers (VTs/PTs) and Control Power Transformers (CPTs) 6.3 Protective Relaying Fundamentals, Device ANSI Numbers (50/51, 87, 21, 27/59, 81), and Coordination 6.4 Electromechanical, Solid-State, and Digital/Microprocessor Relay Testing Methods 6.5 Differential Protection (87T, 87B, 87G) and Impedance/Distance Protection (21) 6.6 Overcurrent Relay Testing (50/51): Pickup, Timing, Reset, and Curve Selection 6.7 Protective Device Coordination, Short-Circuit, and Arc Flash Studies 6.8 Watt-Hour Meters, Transducers, and Power Quality Analysis 6.9 SCADA, Substation Automation, Functional Test Plans, and P&C Troubleshooting

7 Chapter 7: Grounding Systems and Ground-Fault Protection

7.1 Ground Resistance Testing: Fall-of-Potential (IEEE 81), 62% Rule, and Clamp-On Methods 7.2 Soil Resistivity Measurement (Wenner 4-Pin Method) and Ground Grid Integrity 7.3 Equipment Grounding, System Grounding, and Bonding Verification 7.4 Ground-Fault Protection Systems (GFPE): Sensor, Relay, and Injection Testing (NEC 230.95) 7.5 Step and Touch Potential and Ground Grid Design Criteria (IEEE 80)

8 Chapter 8: Rotating Machinery, Specialty Equipment, and Commissioning Management

8.1 AC/DC Motors and Generators: Stator, Rotor, Surge Comparison, and High-Potential Testing 8.2 Stationary Battery Systems, UPS, and DC Distribution Testing (IEEE 450 / 1188) 8.3 Automatic Transfer Switches and Emergency Power Transfer 8.4 NETA Acceptance vs. Maintenance Standards, Test Data Trending, and Temperature Correction 8.5 Electrical Commissioning: The Phased Sequence from Receipt to Full Load 8.6 Surge Arresters: Types, MCOV, Application, and Field Evaluation 8.7 Capacitors, Reactors, and Harmonic Filter Banks

9 Chapter 9: Infrared Thermography and Condition-Based Assessment

9.1 Infrared Thermography Fundamentals: Emissivity, Reflectivity, and Camera Setup 9.2 Conducting and Evaluating Thermographic Surveys (NETA Section 9, Table 100.18) 9.3 Ultrasonic, Corona, and Vibration Survey Techniques

10 Chapter 10: Test Data Evaluation, Troubleshooting, and Failure Analysis

10.1 Reading Electrical Drawings: One-Lines, Three-Lines, Schematics, and Site Plans 10.2 Evaluating Test Results Against NETA, Manufacturer, and Baseline Data 10.3 Serviceability Determination and Energization Readiness 10.4 Failure Modes, Root-Cause Analysis, and Corrective Recommendations

11 Chapter 11: Documentation, Reporting, and Standards Literacy

11.1 IEEE C37.2 Device Function Numbers, IEEE 315 Symbols, and NEMA Ratings 11.2 Test Data Recording, Field Forms, and Data Integrity 11.3 Technical Report Writing, Data Trending, and Communicating Deficiencies 11.4 Standards and Regulatory Literacy: NETA, IEEE, NFPA, ASTM, ANSI, and OSHA

12 Chapter 12: Job Planning, Switching, Supervision, and Professional Practice

12.1 Site-Specific Safety Plans, Job Hazard Analysis, and Safety Audits 12.2 Project Testing (Job) Plans, Scheduling, and Resource Management 12.3 Switching Procedures: Development, Review, Confirmation, and Execution 12.4 Supervising Test Crews, Training, and Assigning Personnel 12.5 NICET Code of Ethics, Client Relations, and Certification Maintenance

6.9 SCADA, Substation Automation, Functional Test Plans, and P&C Troubleshooting

Key Takeaways Explain This Topic AI

The 2026 Level III outline adds SCADA and automation component identification, functional test plan development, and protection and control troubleshooting as named tasks.

A functional test proves the complete chain from sensing element through logic to final actuated device, which point-to-point wiring checks alone cannot do.

IEC 61850 replaces copper control wiring with GOOSE messages over Ethernet, so a functional test must verify the message subscription rather than a wire.

End-to-end testing verifies the entire protection scheme including communications-assisted tripping across substations, using time-synchronized test sets.

Point-to-point wiring checks on a new installation are a Level III requirement and must be performed before energization, not after.

Last updated: August 2026

SCADA, Substation Automation, Functional Test Plans, and P&C Troubleshooting

Quick Answer: The 2026 Level III outline adds three tasks under 3.7 Protection, Control, and Automation : 3.7.3 "Identify SCADA and automation system components and approaches," 3.7.5 "Develop and execute functional test plans of electrical systems," and 3.7.6 "Troubleshoot Protection & Control (P&C) Systems." The central idea: testing each device individually does not prove the scheme works. Only a functional test does.

1. SCADA architecture

SCADA — Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition — is the layered system that monitors and controls the substation remotely.

  • Layer Components Function
  • Process CTs, VTs, transducers, position switches, actuators Sense and act on the primary system

Bay / field IEDs (intelligent electronic devices — protective relays, meters), RTUs , PLCs Local protection, control, and data concentration

Station Substation gateway, HMI, data concentrator, station clock Aggregation, local visualization, protocol conversion

Enterprise / control centre Master station, historian, EMS/DMS Remote supervision and control

Key components to recognize by name:

RTU (Remote Terminal Unit): gathers status and analogue points and reports them upstream; executes control commands.

IED: a microprocessor device that combines protection, metering, control, and communications — a modern protective relay is an IED.

HMI: the operator interface presenting one-lines, alarms, and controls.

Gateway / data concentrator: converts between station and enterprise protocols.

GPS clock / time source: provides the time reference — IRIG-B or PTP (IEEE 1588) — that makes sequence-of-events records comparable across devices. Without a common time reference, an SOE record from three relays cannot be sequenced, and sequencing is exactly what fault analysis needs.

Protocols to recognize: DNP3 and Modbus for SCADA telemetry; IEC 61850 for substation automation, including MMS for client-server, GOOSE for fast peer-to-peer status and trip messaging, and Sampled Values for digitized CT and VT data.

2. Device testing versus functional testing

This distinction is the heart of the section.

Device testing proves one component meets its specification: the relay picks up at its setting and times correctly, the CT ratio is right, the trip coil operates.

Functional testing proves the scheme performs its intended function end to end : apply a simulated fault at the CT input, and verify that the correct relay element asserts, the correct output contact closes, the correct breaker trips, the correct lockout operates, the correct alarms annunciate locally and at the control centre, and — critically — that nothing else operates .

Every device in a scheme can pass its individual test while the scheme fails, because the failure lives between devices: a wire landed on the wrong terminal, a relay output mapped to the wrong contact, a GOOSE subscription pointed at the wrong publisher, a lockout relay whose contact is in the wrong circuit, an interposing relay with reversed contacts.

Point-to-point wiring checks. Level III task 3.1d.3 requires "perform point-to-point wiring checks of all control circuits in new installation." Each conductor is verified from origin to destination against the schematic, before energization. This catches transposed wires and mislanded terminations that a functional test would find later and more expensively. Point-to-point checks and functional tests are complementary — the first proves the wiring matches the drawing, the second proves the drawing achieves the intent.

3. Building a functional test plan

Level III must develop the plan, not merely execute someone else's.

Define the scheme boundaries. What is in scope: which relays, which breakers, which lockouts, which annunciation.

Enumerate every intended function from the protection and control drawings, the relay setting sheets, and the sequence of operations. Each becomes a numbered test.

For each function, state: the stimulus (what is injected and where), the expected response (which contacts, which breakers, which alarms), and the expected non-response (what must not operate).

Define the test configuration: which test switches are open, which links are lifted, which circuits are isolated. Record it, because a scheme tested with a link lifted has not been fully tested.

Sequence the tests so each builds on verified ground and the highest-risk items are proven before energization.

Record results as-found and as-left , with the initials of the person performing each step.

Define restoration: every test switch closed, every link restored, every lifted lead landed, verified by a second person. The restoration checklist is part of the plan, not an afterthought — the most common cause of a protection scheme failing in service after maintenance is a test switch left open.

4. IEC 61850 and what it changes for the technician

In a conventional substation, a trip signal is a wire . You can ring it out, jumper it, and see the voltage on it.

In an IEC 61850 station, that trip signal may be a GOOSE message on an Ethernet network. There is no wire to ring out. What this changes:

Verification shifts from continuity to configuration. You verify that the subscribing device is configured to receive the correct publisher's dataset, and that the mapping from the received bit to the internal logic is correct. The tools are the relay configuration files (SCL/CID) and a GOOSE-capable test set or network analyser.

Supervision replaces inspection. GOOSE messages are re-transmitted continuously with a state number and a sequence number; a subscriber detects loss of the publisher within milliseconds and raises an alarm. That built-in supervision is stronger than a wire, which fails silently — but only if the alarm is mapped and monitored.

Test sets must speak the protocol. A conventional secondary-injection set can inject current but cannot verify a GOOSE trip; the set needs to subscribe to and publish GOOSE.

Time synchronization becomes critical , particularly where Sampled Values carry digitized CT data. Loss of the time source can disable protection rather than merely degrade record-keeping.

End-to-end testing applies where a scheme spans two substations — line differential, permissive overreaching transfer trip, direct transfer trip. Two test sets, synchronized to GPS , inject at each terminal simultaneously to prove the communication-assisted logic and measure the true total scheme operating time including channel delay. Testing each end independently cannot prove the channel.

5. Troubleshooting protection and control systems

A structured method, because P&C faults are usually intermittent and rarely where the symptom points.

Gather the evidence before touching anything. Retrieve relay event records, oscillography, and the sequence-of-events log. Modern relays record the analogue waveforms and the digital element states at the moment of operation — the answer is very often already in the record.

Establish the timeline using the synchronized SOE. Which element asserted first? Did the trip output assert before or after the breaker opened? A breaker that opened without a trip assert points to a mechanical or control failure, not a relay.

Separate "should not have tripped" from "should have tripped and did not." These have different fault trees. The first is usually a setting, a wiring cross, or an unexpected system condition; the second is usually a broken chain — open trip circuit, blown control fuse, failed trip coil, lifted test link.

Verify the basics before the sophisticated: control power present, control fuses intact, trip circuit continuity (many relays monitor it — check the trip circuit supervision alarm), test switches closed, links landed.

Check what changed. The great majority of P&C failures follow a recent change: a setting change, a firmware upgrade, maintenance work, a configuration download, a temporary jumper.

Reproduce it. An intermittent that cannot be reproduced is not fixed. Where reproduction is impossible, add monitoring and wait.

Prove the fix with a functional test , not a device test.

Exam trap: A scheme is commissioned in which every relay passed its individual pickup and timing tests, yet a bus fault trips the wrong breaker. The individual device tests were valid; the defect is in the scheme — a mis-landed wire, a wrongly mapped output, or an incorrect GOOSE subscription — and only a functional test that verifies both the intended operation and the intended non-operation would have caught it.