Study guide

5.2 OSINT Sources and Techniques

CompTIA PenTest+ PT0-003

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1 Introduction & Exam Overview

1.1 Current PT0-003 Exam Facts 1.2 Format, PBQs, Scoring, and Retake Policy 1.3 Recertification, CEUs, and Career Fit

2 Pre-Engagement Planning

2.1 Scope, Rules of Engagement, and Agreements 2.2 Target Selection and Assessment Types 2.3 Shared Responsibility, Legal Authorization, and Ethics

3 Collaboration, Frameworks, and Threat Modeling

3.1 Collaboration, Escalation, and Stakeholder Communication 3.2 Testing Frameworks and Methodologies 3.3 Threat Modeling: STRIDE, DREAD, and OCTAVE

4 Reporting and Remediation

4.1 Penetration Test Report Components 4.2 Findings Analysis and Remediation Recommendations

5 Information Gathering

5.1 Active vs Passive Reconnaissance 5.2 OSINT Sources and Techniques 5.3 DNS, Certificate Transparency, and Search Engine Enumeration 5.4 Network Recon, Protocol Scanning, Sniffing, and Banner Grabbing

6 Enumeration Techniques

6.1 OS Fingerprinting, Service Discovery, and Host Discovery 6.2 DNS, Directory, Share, and Account Enumeration 6.3 Secrets, Permissions, and Wireless Enumeration 6.4 WAF Enumeration, Web Crawling, and Attack Path Mapping

7 Recon Scripting and Tools

7.1 Modifying Bash, Python, and PowerShell for Recon 7.2 Recon and Enumeration Tools

8 Vulnerability Scan Types

8.1 Network, Host, Authenticated, and Wireless Scans 8.2 SAST, DAST, IAST, SCA, IaC, and Mobile Scans 8.3 Container, Secrets, and ICS Vulnerability Assessment 8.4 Core Vulnerability Scanners (Nessus, OpenVAS, Nikto)

9 Scan Analysis and Physical Security

9.1 Specialized Discovery Tools 9.2 Validating Scan, Recon, and Enumeration Results 9.3 Public Exploit Selection and Scripted Validation 9.4 Physical Security Concepts for PenTests

10 Attack Prioritization and Preparation

10.1 Target Prioritization: CVSS, CVE, CWE, and EPSS 10.2 Exploit Selection, Customization, and Attack Documentation

11 Network Attacks

11.1 On-Path, VLAN Hopping, Relay, and Multihomed Hosts 11.2 Default Credentials, Misconfigured Services, Packet Crafting, and Certificate Services

12 Authentication Attacks

12.1 Pass-the-Hash, Pass-the-Ticket, Pass-the-Token, and Kerberos Attacks 12.2 Password Attacks, MFA Fatigue, LDAP Injection, OIDC, and SAML

13 Host-Based Attacks

13.1 Privilege Escalation and Credential Dumping 13.2 Process Injection, Security Bypass, and Host Attack Tools

14 Web Application Attacks

14.1 SQL, Command, XSS, and SSTI Injection 14.2 CSRF, SSRF, Deserialization, IDOR, and Directory Traversal 14.3 LFI/RFI, Web Shells, API Abuse, JWT, and Session Hijacking

15 Cloud Attacks

15.1 IAM Misconfiguration, Metadata Service, and Exposed Storage 15.2 Container Escape, Supply Chain, and Cloud Attack Tools

16 Wireless and Social Engineering

16.1 Wireless Attacks and Tools 16.2 Phishing, Spearphishing, Whaling, Vishing, and Smishing 16.3 Physical Social Engineering and SE Tools

17 Specialized Systems

17.1 Mobile Attacks and AI Prompt/Model Attacks 17.2 OT/ICS, NFC, RFID, and Bluetooth Attacks

18 Attack Scripting and BAS

18.1 PowerShell, Python, and Bash Attack Automation 18.2 Breach and Attack Simulation (Caldera, Infection Monkey, Atomic Red Team)

19 Persistence

19.1 Scheduled Tasks, Services, Accounts, and Shells 19.2 C2, Backdoors, Rootkits, and Security-Control Tampering

20 Lateral Movement

20.1 Pivoting, Relays, and Additional Credential Capture 20.2 Remote Services: SMB, RDP, WinRM, WMI, SSH, and Others 20.3 Lateral Movement Tools and LOLbins

21 Exfiltration and Cleanup

21.1 Staging and Exfiltration 21.2 Cleanup, Restoration, and Artifact Preservation

5.2 OSINT Sources and Techniques

Key Takeaways Explain This Topic AI

PT0-003 OSINT sources include social media, job boards, public code repositories, DNS (taught next), cached pages, cryptographic flaws, and password dumps.

LinkedIn and job posts routinely disclose the tech stack — for example a Senior Palo Alto administrator role — without any packet to the target.

Public GitHub/GitLab orgs, gists, and CI artifacts leak cloud keys, SSH private keys, and .env material; that is information disclosure plus a cryptographic flaw, not a license to attack GitHub.

Password-dump checks (Have I Been Pwned-style domain lookups) flag corporate-address exposure and reuse risk; they are not a brief to traffic stolen dumps or to spray production without RoE.

Cryptographic flaws found in OSINT include expired or mis-issued certificates, weak SSH keys committed to repos, and historical evidence of old TLS — live confirmation is a later active step.

Last updated: August 2026

Open-source intelligence (OSINT) is the named 2.1 bucket for collection from publicly available sources. CompTIA's list is specific: social media , job boards , scan code repositories , DNS lookups , reverse DNS lookups , cached pages , cryptographic flaws , and password dumps . DNS, reverse DNS, cached pages, and certificate-adjacent search get their own section next. This section is the human-and-leak layer: what employees and the company already published, and how that becomes information disclosure on a penetration-test report.

OSINT is almost always passive in the sense of the previous section — you are not SYN-scanning the client. It is not "anything on the internet." A live crawl of the production app is HTML scraping (active). A Shodan query of historical banners is OSINT-like third-party data (passive from your side). Keep the authorization question in view: public does not mean you may phish the people you found, paste full breach corpora into Slack, or treat a leaked AWS key as permission to use it against the account.

Social media

LinkedIn, corporate blogs, conference talks, YouTube architecture sessions, and even Instagram photos of badge lanyards or rack labels leak useful facts. Typical PenTest+ value:

Org chart and titles — who runs IAM, who owns the Palo Alto estate, which vendor just finished a cloud migration.

Tech stack in "About" and posts — "We moved the customer portal to EKS," "Our SOC is on Splunk," screenshots of Okta login pages in a how-we-work article.

Personal GitHub linked from a profile — a developer's public gist that still contains a staging URL or an API token from a hackathon.

Location and shift clues — helpful for physical or vishing scenarios only if RoE later allows social engineering; they are not a 2.1 exploit.

Exam trap: enumerating employees on LinkedIn is recon. Sending those people a credential-harvesting email is a Domain 4 social-engineering attack and needs explicit authorization. Do not jump domains in a 2.1 question.

Job boards

Job posts are one of the highest-yield OSINT sources on the exam because they are written for recruiters, not for a security reviewer. A listing for "Senior Palo Alto administrator, example.com" tells you the edge is likely PAN-OS, which later informs VPN and management-plane hypotheses. Other common leaks: Kubernetes, Terraform, specific SaaS IdPs, "legacy AS/400 still in use," "must know Cisco ISE," on-call tools, and even CIDR-sized hints ("experience with our /16 in us-east-1"). Contract roles often name the exact product being replaced, which is a map of the current and next stack.

Treat job-board data as stack and process intelligence , not as a target list. The Palo Alto is not in-scope until a selector (IP, CIDR, hostname, URL) and RoE say so. The finding, if you report it at all before testing, is that the company discloses internal architecture in public hiring ads — a low-severity information-disclosure note unless it names unpatched product versions.

Scan code repositories

"Scan code repositories" on PT0-003 means searching public GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket, Gitea, Gists, CI logs, and package registries the client or its staff already published. You look for:

Hard-coded cloud access keys , API tokens, and database passwords in old commits (history matters; deleting a file from HEAD does not erase the blob).

SSH private keys , .pem files, and id_rsa committed "just for the pipeline."

.env examples that were not examples, Terraform state, kubeconfigs, and mobile app google-services.json / Info.plist secrets.

Internal hostnames, forgotten microservices, and comments that describe auth bypasses.

That is information disclosure and often a cryptographic flaw (a private key is cryptographic material that should never have left the HSM or secrets manager). Professional handling: stop, record the URL and commit, do not use the key to expand access unless RoE explicitly allows credential testing, and tell the client to rotate immediately through the escalation path. You do not brute-force GitHub accounts, you do not clone private repos you are not entitled to, and you do not paste the live secret into the PDF report — cite a redacted fingerprint and the location.

Cryptographic flaws found in OSINT

CompTIA lists cryptographic flaws next to password dumps because many of them are sitting in public artifacts before you ever run a scanner:

Leaked certificates and private keys — a .key or PKCS#12 in a repo, a cert that CT shows was issued for an internal name, an expired cert that nobody renewed.

Weak SSH keys — old 1024-bit RSA, reused keys across jump hosts, a key with no passphrase in a gist.

Old TLS — Shodan/Censys historical rows showing TLS 1.0/1.1 or export-grade ciphers on a hostname. Historical data is a lead; proving the live service still speaks TLS 1.0 is an active handshake.

The exam wants the decision : OSINT can detect the leak; exploiting a weak cipher or using a stolen key is a later, authorized step.

Password dumps

Public breach corpora and lookup services (the exam-relevant pattern is Have I Been Pwned -style checks of a corporate domain, plus public paste sites) tell you whether @example.com addresses appeared in known incidents. That supports a professional finding: password reuse and missing MFA, especially if the same addresses are in LinkedIn and in a dump metadata list.

Teach this as an analyst, not as a dump trafficker. You do not buy stolen databases on criminal forums as a deliverable. You do not attach full dump files to the report. You do not spray every password against production SSO on day one because "it was already leaked." Credential stuffing and password spraying are Domain 4 attacks and need RoE, lockout-safe rates, and usually a test account window. 2.1 stops at: the domain is in public breach data; employees should assume those passwords are burned; recommend unique passwords, a secrets manager, and MFA.

If RoE later allows credential testing, you still start with the client's provided test users or with hashes you obtained from in-scope systems, not with a 50 GB stealer log.

Putting OSINT on the example.com engagement

Continue the worked scenario. Passive OSINT on example.com produces:

  • Source What you learn What you do not do yet
  • LinkedIn Security team uses Splunk; five engineers list "PAN-OS" Do not vish the engineers
  • Job board "Senior Palo Alto administrator" Do not scan the firewall

Public GitHub org Old commit with an AKIA… key and a vpn.dev hostname in a comment Do not use the key; escalate rotation

  • HIBP-style domain check 40 @example.com addresses in a 2023 breach Do not spray those passwords at Okta
  • Cached talk PDF Architecture diagram with an internal package name Do not treat the diagram as a CIDR

Every row is information disclosure or a cryptographic / credential-hygiene lead. Active confirmation (live TLS on vpn.dev.example.com , whether the AWS key still works) waits for the window and, for key use, for explicit credential-testing language.

Information disclosure as the finding name

Write the report language the exam expects. "We found a Palo Alto admin job post" is a recon note. "The organization publishes current edge-vendor and identity-stack details in public hiring ads, reducing attacker effort" is a disclosure finding. "A private SSH key and cloud access key were in a public repository" is a high-severity disclosure plus credential exposure. Severity follows what an attacker could do with the leak , not how clever the Google query was.

OSINT tools (theHarvester, Maltego, Recon-ng, SpiderFoot, OSINTframework.com, Hunter.io) automate collection; they do not change the ethics. The later tools chapter covers them. For 2.1, know the sources and the decision rules .

Loading diagram... OSINT sources become leads, not automatic attacks