Study guide

25.2 Criminal Damage

Solicitors Qualifying Examination Part 1 SQE1

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1 Introduction and Exam Overview

1.1 Current SQE1 Exam Facts 1.2 Single Best Answer Technique and Assessment Day 1.3 Qualifying as a Solicitor After SQE1

2 Ethics and Professional Conduct

2.1 The SRA Principles 2.2 Code of Conduct: Clients, Confidentiality and Disclosure 2.3 Conflicts, Undertakings and Duties to the Court 2.4 Firms, Managers and Compliance Officers 2.5 SRA Warning Notices: NDAs and SLAPPs

3 Business Organisations and Finance

3.1 Business Organisations, Personality and Limited Liability 3.2 Incorporation, Constitutions and Companies House 3.3 Financing: Debt, Equity, Security and Distributions 3.4 Partnership Decision-Making and Authority

4 Business Governance, Insolvency and Tax

4.1 Directors' Duties and Powers 4.2 Shareholders, Meetings, Filings and Minority Protection 4.3 Insolvency: Options and Procedures 4.4 Claw-Back of Assets and Order of Priority 4.5 Income Tax for Businesses 4.6 Capital Gains Tax for Businesses 4.7 Corporation Tax 4.8 VAT and Business Property Relief

5 Starting and Pleading a Civil Claim

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6 Case Management, Trial, Costs and Enforcement

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7 Contract Formation, Parties and Terms

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8 Vitiating Factors, Termination and Remedies

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9 Negligence, Defences and Vicarious Liability

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13 Legal Services Regulation, Equality and AML

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14 Financial Services and Funding Legal Services

14.1 The FSMA Perimeter and Authorisation 14.2 Section 327, Scope Rules and Insurance Distribution 14.3 Retainers, Fixed Fees, CFAs and DBAs 14.4 Civil Legal Aid, Third-Party Funding and Insurance

15 Freehold Conveyancing Practice

15.1 Investigating Freehold Title 15.2 Pre-Contract Searches and Enquiries 15.3 Finance and Acting for a Lender 15.4 Drafting the Contract and Exchange 15.5 Completion, Post-Completion and Delay Remedies

16 Leasehold Practice, Security of Tenure, Planning and Property Tax

16.1 Lease Structure and Granting a Lease 16.2 Assignment, Covenants and Remedies 16.3 Business Security of Tenure (Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 Part II) 16.4 Planning Law and Property Taxation

17 Land: Estates, Title and Co-ownership

17.1 The Nature of Land, Estates and Interests 17.2 Acquiring, Transferring and Protecting Interests in Land 17.3 Registered and Unregistered Title 17.4 Co-ownership and Trusts of Land

18 Easements, Covenants, Mortgages and Leases

18.1 Easements 18.2 Freehold Covenants 18.3 Mortgages 18.4 Leases and Licences 18.5 Passing and Enforcing Leasehold Covenants

19 Wills, Revocation and Intestacy

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21 Express Trusts, Resulting Trusts and the Family Home

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22 Fiduciaries, Trustees and Breach of Trust

22.1 Fiduciary Obligations and Liability of Strangers 22.2 Trustees: Appointment, Retirement and Removal 22.3 Trustees' Duties: Care, Investment and Advancement 22.4 Breach of Trust, Tracing and Equitable Remedies

23 Solicitors' Accounts

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24 Criminal Liability: Offences Against the Person and Defences

24.1 Actus Reus, Mens Rea, Parties and Attempts 24.2 Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person 24.3 Homicide and Partial Defences 24.4 General Defences

25 Theft, Criminal Damage and Fraud

25.1 Theft, Robbery and Burglary 25.2 Criminal Damage 25.3 Fraud

26 Police Station, Bail and Allocation

26.1 Advising at the Police Station 26.2 Bail and First Hearings 26.3 Plea Before Venue, Allocation, Case Management and Disclosure

27 Evidence, Trial, Sentencing, Appeals and Youth Court

27.1 Burden of Proof, Identification and Silence 27.2 Hearsay, Confessions, Bad Character and Exclusion 27.3 Trial Procedure in the Magistrates' Court and Crown Court 27.4 Sentencing 27.5 Appeals in Criminal Practice 27.6 Youth Court Procedure and the Welsh Language

25.2 Criminal Damage

Key Takeaways Explain This Topic AI

Simple criminal damage under Criminal Damage Act 1971 s.1(1) is destroying or damaging property belonging to another without lawful excuse, intending that result or being subjectively reckless as in R v G.

Section 5 lawful excuse covers an honest belief in consent and an honest belief that property was in immediate need of protection by reasonable means; it does not apply to aggravated criminal damage under s.1(2).

Aggravated criminal damage under s.1(2) can be committed on D's own property, but life must be intended to be endangered, or recklessly endangered, by the destruction or damage itself (R v Steer).

Where property is destroyed or damaged by fire, the offence must be charged as arson under s.1(3), either as simple arson or as aggravated arson.

Last updated: September 2026

Criminal damage is a specified FLK2 offence in three forms: simple criminal damage, aggravated criminal damage, and arson. All three live in Criminal Damage Act 1971 s.1. A newly qualified solicitor who treats "damage" as a single crime will miss both the life-endangerment uplift and the mandatory fire label. Charge from the facts: what was damaged, whose property it was, whether fire was used, whether life was endangered by that damage, and whether a s.5 excuse is even available.

  • Charge Provision Property Extra mens rea Lawful excuse s.5
  • Simple criminal damage s.1(1) Belonging to another Intention or subjective recklessness as to damage Yes

Aggravated criminal damage s.1(2) D's own or another's Plus intention or recklessness as to endangering life by the damage No

  • Simple arson s.1(1) and (3) Belonging to another As simple damage, by fire Yes
  • Aggravated arson s.1(2) and (3) D's own or another's As aggravated damage, by fire No
  • Simple criminal damage

Section 1(1) provides that a person who without lawful excuse destroys or damages any property belonging to another, intending to destroy or damage any such property or being reckless as to whether any such property would be destroyed or damaged, is guilty of an offence. Break it into actus reus, mens rea, and the absence of lawful excuse.

Destroy or damage

Destruction is straightforward. Damage is any physical interference that impairs the value or usefulness of the property, including temporary impairment if time, effort or money is needed to put it right. Painting slogans on a pavement was damage in Hardman v Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset because the local authority incurred cost in removing it, even though rain might later have washed the paint away. Flooding a police cell and soaking a blanket was damage in R v Fiak. A scratch that does not impair usefulness may not be damage (Morphitis v Salmon, on a scaffolding bar). Spitting on a police officer's raincoat, wiped away with a cloth, was not damage in A (a juvenile) v R. Mud smeared on a police cell wall that needed to be cleaned off was capable of being damage in Roe v Kingerlee. The exam question is not "was it messy?" but "was value or usefulness impaired, or did restoration cost something?"

Property belonging to another

Section 10(1) confines "property" to property of a tangible nature, whether real or personal, including money. Unlike theft, land can be damaged: slashing a fence, digging up a garden, or flooding a floor are all within the Act. Wild creatures that have been tamed or are ordinarily kept in captivity are property; other wild creatures or their carcasses are property only if reduced into possession and not lost or abandoned. Confidential information and electricity sit outside this offence in the same way they sit outside theft, though other statutes may apply.

Section 10(2) treats property as belonging to any person having custody or control of it, or having in it any proprietary right or interest. Damaging a hired car, or a wall in which a neighbour has an interest, is damaging property belonging to another even if D also has some interest. Simple s.1(1) cannot be committed on property that belongs only to D. That is why an owner who burns their own warehouse is not guilty of simple criminal damage, but may still be guilty of aggravated criminal damage or of arson in its aggravated form if the life-endangerment limb is met.

Mens rea: intention or R v G recklessness

The prosecution must prove intention to destroy or damage property belonging to another, or recklessness as to that result. After R v G [2003] UKHL 50, recklessness is subjective. D is reckless if he is aware of a risk that property would be destroyed or damaged, and it was, in the circumstances known to him, unreasonable to take that risk. Caldwell objective recklessness is not the law. Children and persons with limited capacity are judged on the risk they actually foresaw, not the risk a reasonable adult would have foreseen. A defendant who gave no thought to the risk is not reckless under R v G, though that may still leave an evidential argument about what they must have been aware of.

Transferred malice operates in the ordinary way: intending to break V's window and missing, breaking W's window instead, still supplies intention as to property belonging to another. Recklessness as to damage to one item of property can also found liability for damage to another if D was aware of that risk.

Lawful excuse: section 5

Section 5 supplies two statutory excuses for offences to which it applies. It applies to simple criminal damage and to simple arson. It does not apply to aggravated criminal damage or aggravated arson under s.1(2). That single proposition decides many SQE items.

Under s.5(2)(a), D has a lawful excuse if he believed that the person entitled to consent to the destruction or damage had consented, or would have consented if they had known of the destruction or damage and its circumstances. Under s.5(2)(b), D has a lawful excuse if he destroyed or damaged the property in order to protect property belonging to himself or another, and at the time he believed that the property was in immediate need of protection and that the means adopted were or would be reasonable having regard to all the circumstances. Section 5(3) states that it is immaterial whether a belief is justified, as long as it is honestly held.

Jaggard v Dickinson is the belief case everyone is expected to know: a drunken defendant who honestly believed she was breaking into a friend's house, with consent, could still rely on s.5(2)(a). The fact that drink caused the mistake did not strip out a defence that Parliament had framed in the language of belief. R v Denton is the consent case on the other side of the ledger: setting fire to a mill at the employer's request can be a believed consent. R v Hunt shows the limit of s.5(2)(b): setting fire to a bed to demonstrate that a fire alarm did not work was not acting in order to protect property. R v Hill and Hall shows the immediacy limit: cutting a fence at a nuclear base as a remote political protest was not protection of property in immediate need. Blake v DPP confirms that a claimed divine command is not a s.5 excuse.

There may also be a general-law excuse, such as self-defence or prevention of crime, which is not confined to s.5. Do not use s.5 language on a s.1(2) count.

Aggravated criminal damage

Section 1(2) provides that a person who without lawful excuse destroys or damages any property, whether belonging to himself or another, intending to destroy or damage any property or being reckless as to whether any property would be destroyed or damaged, and intending by the destruction or damage to endanger the life of another or being reckless as to whether the life of another would be thereby endangered, is guilty of an offence. Two features change the charging decision.

First, the property may be D's own. The owner who fires their own flat intending that the smoke will endanger a neighbour is within s.1(2). Second, there is a dual mens rea: intention or recklessness as to the damage, and intention or recklessness as to endangering life by that damage. Actual endangerment of life is not required. The word "thereby" in s.1(2)(b) is doing real work. The danger to life must come from the destruction or damage, not merely from the method D used. In R v Steer, shooting through a window endangered life by the bullets, not by the damaged window, so aggravated criminal damage was not made out. Contrast cases where the damaged property itself creates the danger: a brick through a car windscreen that causes flying glass to endanger the driver, or a fire whose smoke and flames endanger occupants (R v Warwick; R v Webster; R v Dudley). If the only danger is the shot, the bottle, or the blow, look to offences against the person, not to s.1(2).

Because s.5 does not apply, a believed consent to damage D's own insured building is no answer to a s.1(2) charge if D was reckless as to whether life would be endangered by the damage.

Arson

Section 1(3) states that an offence committed under s.1 by destroying or damaging property by fire shall be charged as arson. The fire is not a separate mental element bolted on top; it is a charging rule. If the damage is by fire, the count is arson contrary to s.1(1) and (3), or arson contrary to s.1(2) and (3) where the life limb is present. Simple arson still requires property belonging to another and is still open to s.5. Aggravated arson can be committed on D's own property and is not open to s.5. Recklessness as to whether property would be damaged by fire is enough for simple arson; the prosecution does not have to prove an intent to burn a particular building if D was aware of that risk and it was unreasonable to take it.

A lighted match dropped into a letterbox, a wheelie bin pushed against a door and ignited, and a cigarette left smouldering on a sofa are all charging problems about whose property was at risk and whether D foresaw damage by fire. If D foresaw only scorching of their own newspaper and a neighbour's curtain in fact burns, you still have to find awareness of a risk to property belonging to another, or rely on the aggravated form if D's own property was damaged and life was endangered by that fire.

SQE application

Take the facts in this order. Identify the tangible property and whether it belonged to another. Ask whether it was destroyed or damaged in the Hardman/Fiak sense. Ask whether the damage was by fire. Ask whether D intended that damage or was aware of a risk of it (R v G). If the Crown wants the aggravated offence, ask whether D intended, or was reckless as to, life being endangered by the damage itself. Only then consider s.5, and only on a simple count. A client who burned their own lock to regain entry, honestly believing the landlord would have consented, is in s.5(2)(a) territory on simple damage and nowhere on a s.1(2) count. A client who smashed a window during a burglary may face both burglary (ulterior damage under s.9(1)(a), or separate criminal damage) and simple criminal damage; do not merge the offences until every element of each is satisfied.